

Giovanni B. Andornino

## The People's Republic of China at 60: Issues and Trends

### Introduction

On October 1<sup>st</sup> 2009 the People's Republic of China celebrated the 60th anniversary of its foundation with an impressive parade in Tien An Men, the country fourth generation of communist leadership duly lined up and waving from the spot where Chairman Mao in 1949 had famously stated that "the Chinese people have stood up." At the time, after over a century of socio-political turmoil, economic weakness and international encroachment upon their own territory, the Chinese were at last contemplating the restitution of some degree of dignity to a unified China.

### China comes of age

Sixty years later, China has undergone tremendous changes: today we are no longer saluting a people standing up within its own territory, but a country rising to prominence in the international arena. For many analysts both in the PRC and abroad this is what 2009 was all about: the coming of age of China as a great power.

There are several reasons for the widespread diffusion of this perception. The larger public has been affected by

Beijing's excellent show as host city for the XXIX Olympic Games, a symbolically crucial event much in the way the 1964 edition was for Japan and the 2016 may turn out to be for Brazil.

At a deeper, more structural level, economists and International Relations scholars face what amounts to a swift paradigm shift, bracing for a significantly more self-confident China, whose global stature has been boosted by the current economic crisis. In the space of little more than a decade, we have witnessed the utter demise of the "unipolar moment" in favour of a *de facto* multipolar condition.

Top U.S. Government figures have pretty much undersigned this claim as they, in turn, encouraged Beijing to continue investing in U.S. Treasury bonds (Secretary of State Clinton, February 2009), admitted that "no nation can meet the world's challenges alone" (Clinton, July 2009), signalled a "compelling need to work with China to meet global challenges" (Deputy Secretary of State Steinberg, September 2009) and even postponed a meeting with the Dalai Lama until after President Obama's November visit to Beijing (White House, September 2009).

N. 160 - OCTOBER 2009

### Abstract

The People's Republic of China turned 60 this month. Celebrating its astonishing achievements in economic growth and poverty reduction is a country that has become an indispensable partner on the global economic and political scene. Already the international system is witnessing a systemic shift toward multipolarity, as changes in international institutions and the new US foreign policy stand to demonstrate.

Whether China and its current and upcoming leadership can manage the severe challenges lying ahead without arousing regional and global anxieties will be key to the preservation of peace and prosperity in our world.

*Giovanni B. Andornino is Lecturer in International Relations of East Asia at the University of Turin and the Catholic University of Milan. He is Visiting Professor at Zhejiang University (Hangzhou, PRC) and General Editor of TheChinaCompanion ([www.thechinacompanion.eu](http://www.thechinacompanion.eu)), a web portal focussing on Chinese politics, IR and IPE.*

## The PRC's founding

Just before the PRC was officially proclaimed in 1949, in his opening address at the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (September 21<sup>st</sup> 1949) Chairman Mao had commented that China's communist revolution had won the sympathy and admiration of people around the world. At the time this had to do with the then main source of legitimacy for the ruling Communist Party of China (CPC): its quasi-mythical, hard-fought and enlightened (for many) quest for the liberation of the country. The 1934-35 Long March, the fight against the Japanese and the Yan'an governance experiments constituted the bulk of this momentum.

After the founding of the PRC and especially as the international climate turned stormy in East Asia – the 1950-53 Korean War being the *casus belli* which pitted Beijing against Washington for the next two decades – ideology prevailed. China chose to fully join the Soviet camp, despite the lack of good chemistry between Stalin and Mao, who was regarded as a deviant in Moscow for his passionately autonomous interpretation of Marxist philosophy. Beijing's fixation with the instillation of purported "Chinese characteristics" into virtually all key government policies today can be said to date back to this time. The leadership's desire to shrug off any perception of foreign influence was just as manifest with Mao's resistance to Soviet communist orthodoxy, as it is

today with regards to the forging of a new identity as a "socialist country with Chinese characteristics".

While the Chinese honour Sun Yatsen as the father of Republican China and the initiator of the transition away from the decaying imperial tradition, in reality it was Mao who strived to embark his country on a modernization path capable of invigorating China's uniqueness.

An avid reader (but reluctant traveller), Mao understood China in a way few others ever have and his strategies and approach – crystallized as Mao Zedong Thought in the CPC constitution – remain central in today's Chinese domestic policy discourse and political scheming. To this day Mao is generally respected by the population at large and stands in stark contrast to the current un-charismatic leadership.

## Times of ideology

Yet, in order to preserve his ideological legitimacy in the face of ill-advised policy choices (the 1958-61 Great Leap forward, for instance, was indeed a man-made disaster causing between 16 and 40 million deaths in rural China), Mao did not shy away from employing the most inflammable of social forces: youth. In 1966, he launched the so-called Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, a post-revolutionary struggle for the purification of the Party against alleged "bourgeois" and "intellectual" tendencies. Teachers, professors, judges,

and even such symbols of authority as local CPC officers became target of vicious attacks by young Red Guards. Millions were forced into manual labour, and tens of thousands executed, resulting in massive civil unrest and economic disorder. Eventually, the Army had to be called upon to quell unrest, although things did not return to complete stability until after Mao's death in 1976 and the arrest of the so-called Gang of Four.

As much as China has changed since then, the country's social fabric still bears vivid traces of these dramatic events. Families were broken at the time, children revolting against their parents and disowning them never to come back. In urban centres especially, even people employed in small commerce and administration came to be considered "rightists", regardless of their actual contribution to society and their personal commitment to and involvement in the CPC.

A mere forty years onwards, wounds are still open: shattered bonds of trust are hard to rebuild even in China's family-oriented cultural context. The Party's decision to effectively halt any efforts of historical reassessment (Mao was declared 70% right, 30% wrong, and that's the "end" of the story, at least for now) contributes little to helping the Chinese come to terms with their immediate past in a healthy way.

This tendency to omit (or grossly simplify) a critical portion of the PRC's history from school curricula and

public debate was displayed on the international stage in Summer 2008 at the opening of the Beijing Olympics. An awe-inspiring extravaganza led viewers through 4,000 years of Chinese history and then skipped the years 1949 to 1979. Just as tellingly, *Mubei* (Tombstone), an investigative history on the Great Leap famine by a Chinese journalist, is banned in mainland China even though it was voted one of the best books published in Hong Kong in 2008. These developments are consequential at a time when the CPC's legitimacy base has switched from ideology to the delivery of economic growth.

In a wider social context that is generally amoral – i.e. not immoral, but rather devoid of any stringent ethical milieu – young urban Chinese generations are generally oblivious about social or family duties as they concentrate on climbing a social ladder that is above all measured in money terms. Bewildered by the stunningly abrupt shift away from the rhetoric of the paradise of communist workers to the hard reality of a competitive world of consumption with few safety nets, older parents and grandparents can offer little guidance in society.

### The 1978 turning point

The need for a centre of gravity in Chinese society is made especially compelling by the speed of change that can be observed anywhere, especially in China's major cities. The Pudong area in Shanghai, to name the most promi-

nent case, hosted little more than rice fields well into the 1980s, but is now a 522-square-kilometer area dense with industrial parks, some of the world's tallest skyscrapers, billion dollar auto and steel plants, foreign factories, and housing developments.

The turning point from Mao's failed experiment with modernization was the by now legendary 3<sup>rd</sup> Plenum of the 11<sup>th</sup> CPC Central Committee in December 1978: Deng Xiaoping emerged as China's leader and structural economic reforms were launched. The rural commune system was abandoned, decollectivization implemented and individual farmers selling produce at market prices formed the first stage of economic reform. This led on to town and village enterprises, propelling small-scale manufacturing in a way which was at least as important for national growth as the coastal Special Economic Zones (SEZs) set up to produce goods for exports. The gradual establishment of a now-thriving service sector followed, setting the stage for the world's most prolonged and significant experience of economic expansion.

### China's development in perspective

According to World Bank figures, over the past two decades the world has witnessed a dramatic fall in global poverty, thanks in large part to rapid economic growth in China, which helped lift 475 million people out of extreme poverty. Between 1981 and 2004, the fraction of the

PRC's population living on less than a dollar-a-day fell from 65% to 10%; between 2001 and 2004 the pace of poverty reduction accelerated, and there are indications that poverty has continued to decline rapidly since 2007. Although the 2008 statistical update released by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has recently forced a revision of China's ranking in terms of Human Development Index (HDI), placing Beijing in 94<sup>th</sup> position compared to the previously estimated 81<sup>st</sup> (2005-08 period), the fact that this update is the fruit of China's first ever participation to the International Comparison Program (the world's largest statistical initiative producing internationally comparable price levels) lends greater accuracy to international estimates and mirrors China's continued commitment to opening up to external inquiries and assessments.

On this basis, the China-related data in the 2009 Millennium Development Goals Report gain relevance. According to this report, China has already achieved the target of halving the proportion of people living in extreme poverty, while also nearing full primary education coverage.

Today an average Chinese can expect to live 73 years and, compared to 60 years ago, pregnant women's death rate at birth has decreased from 1,500 to 34.2 per 100,000 births. The infant mortality rate has dropped dramatically from 20% to 14.9 per 1,000. All these numbers

rank among the highest in developing countries, putting China on par with the mid- to high-income countries. In terms of education, only one in four Chinese children could go to primary school in 1950. Today, almost all of them can attend school, with 99.3 per cent of school-age children finishing nine years of state-sponsored compulsory education. With 27 million students enrolled in higher education institutions, China also ranks n° 1 in the world for university student population.

In aggregate economic terms, over the past six decades the PRC's GDP has grown 77 times, at an average of 8.1 percent annually. China's current economic output in a single day surpasses the entire annual economic output of 1952. China's share of the global economy was virtually nothing in 1949 and only 1.8 per cent in 1978, but reached 6.4 per cent in 2008, ranking third in the world behind the United States and Japan. On a per capita basis, national income has grown more than 32 times, at an annual average of 6.5 per cent, excluding inflationary factors. According to the World Bank, China has leaped into the mid-income countries with its US\$3,292 per capita GDP in 2008.

### **The other side of the coin**

Unsurprisingly, such steep pace of growth has not come without costs, be they social, environmental or political. Firstly, measured by international standards, vulnerability to poverty is still widespread, especially in rural China, and

there are signs that the responsiveness of poverty to economic growth has decreased. Second, and very importantly for the consequences it entails for the overall stability of the country, economic growth has by no means impacted on Chinese society in an even way. Indeed, the Gini coefficient, measuring disparity in domestic income distribution on a scale from 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (absolute inequality) is approaching 0,5 the third highest in Asia behind Hong Kong and Papua New Guinea. This is alarming, in a country whose very existence was originally predicated upon Marxist grounds, and that has truly realized a communist society for some thirty years. The coefficient was just at 0.25 in the 1980s and reached 0.38 in the 1990s. Its current level is far higher than that estimated for other East Asian economies, such as South Korea and Taiwan (hovering around 0.30). The U.S. and India too are lower down in the list, respectively with 0,45 and 0,36.

While some economists have claimed that a fast growing economy naturally generates disparities in income distribution, the evidence for the Kuznets curve is weak. A rapid and sustained rise in inequality is not an inevitable result of high economic growth: the Republic of Korea and Taiwan never touched 0.40 during their phase of rapid growth between the 1970s and 1990s, and even declined over some periods. Conversely, a reduction in inequality as a result of continuous economic growth

beyond a turning point is also not a foregone conclusion, while particularly high levels of inequality may have an adverse impact on future growth and development prospects.

Half of China's 1.3bn people live in the countryside, but these citizens account for only 9% of GDP consumption. Having played its vanguard part in the 1980s, the rural sector fell behind as the government focus turned to large-scale industrialisation and the countryside's role reverted to that of feeding urban centres.

The neglect of agriculture has taken its inevitable toll, particularly when combined with urbanisation, pollution and desertification, and inefficient use of water and fertilizers. Only recently has the leadership in Beijing taken steps to inject new impetus in this sector, by modifying regulations presiding over the management of land (still owned by the state in China). The hope seems to be that by favouring the transfer of land by small farmers to larger ones or to agro-businesses larger, more mechanised and more profitable farms will be established.

Things are not necessarily better in the industrial sector. Here privatization proceeded first tentatively and then increasingly more boldly in the 1980s and 1990s, accelerating from 1998 under the premiership of Zhu Rongji, the political figure credited with steering the People's Republic of China into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. In 1999 a new Constitu-

tion for the PRC was adopted, recognizing the private sector as an “indispensable part of the national economy”. In 2002, the CPC was finally ready to change its mission with the enshrinement of then Secretary General Jiang Zemin’s “important thought of the Three Represents”. This was adopted in the 2002 XVI National CPC Congress and later included in the State Constitution. It predicates that the CPC no longer represents farmers, workers and soldiers, but rather “the requirements of the development of China’s advanced productive forces, the orientation of the development of China’s advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the people in China”. Generally speaking, the first “Represent” is taken to indicate the inclusion of private entrepreneurs into the Party.

The Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000) launched a privatization strategy for the majority of China’s state-owned-enterprises (SOEs), a policy under the slogan “managing the large and letting go of the small” (*zhua da fang xiao*). It refers to the government’s decision to concentrate state support on the PRC’s roughly 2,000 larger, more politically sensitive and more successful SOEs while taking measures to loosen state control and ownership over smaller ones.

Despite its overall success (especially if compared to the messy privatization occurred in the former USSR) and government efforts to provide some sort of safety net, the move came much as a cul-

tural shock in urban China, as this entailed the final erosion of the vestiges of the “iron rice bowl” system, meaning the network of provisions traditionally guaranteed by the state to its factory workers. In the next decade the number of workers laid off by restructured SOEs swelled to enormous dimensions, reaching between 15 to 40 million, depending on estimates. These new urban poor become an underclass with little hope for their children, who have to go to inferior schools and cannot afford university tuition.

### **The impact of the global economic crisis**

Despite the downsides of its development story, China’s economy nevertheless expanded at breakneck pace through to early 2008, with tighter monetary and fiscal policies having to be put in place to avoid the economy’s overheating. Since the installment of new CPC Secretary General Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao in 2002, domestic economic policy discourse had shifted away from Jiang Zemin’s macro-economic growth mantra toward the new leading vision, that of “Scientific Outlook on Development”. Central to the works of the 2007 XVII CPC National Congress, the new set of ideas focussed on productivity and sustainability, aiming at redressing domestic imbalances and building a “harmonious society”.

Such new priorities were to be abruptly reversed as the 2008 financial crisis spilled over to

the real economy and catapulted the world into recession. China too was affected, although its economy displayed a number of advantages that other economies do not have: due to its relative insulated condition the PRC’s financial system did not feel any direct hit from the financial turbulence abroad. Secondly, China’s domestic banks had been de-leveraging in recent years and are in a position to lend now that they are encouraged by the government. Finally, the government itself has quite a bit of microeconomic and fiscal space to boost the economy, which is exactly what it did swiftly at the onset of the crisis.

In November 2008 Beijing announced a US\$ 586 billion stimulus package to counter the negative effects of rapidly declining exports. The stimulus package aimed at pouring substantial amounts of money into new infrastructure, while earmarking some for the expansion of social welfare. In January 2009 the Ministries of Finance and Civil Affairs distributed some US\$ 1.42 billion among the needy to help them celebrate the beloved Spring Festival. The unprecedented aid package, with one-off payments, is thought to have benefited more than 74 million people. Two key considerations pushed the leadership to act. An immediate concern for social stability was the certainly the number one motivating factor: up to 41 million mainland workers are reported to have lost their jobs during the financial crisis and 23 million of them remain out of work a year after the onset

of the economic turbulence. Moreover, migrant worker employment rarely figures into calculations and end-reporting where the overall unemployment rate is concerned. Yet, the number of jobless migrants – i.e. citizens coming from rural areas in the interior mainly to work in factories and building sites in coastal provinces – is necessarily huge (sources say over 20 million), considering that the total migrant workforce is estimated to hover around 160 million. Finally, at least one million college graduates are not expected to be able to find jobs this year.

It is unsurprising, therefore, that the Government has been operating a minimum guarantee (*dibao*) policy like that received by urban households for those returning migrant workers who can't find work. Households receive the difference between their actual per capita income per month and, usually, around 200RMB per capita, that in most parts of China is the official poverty threshold.

At the same time, tellingly, official figures put overall spending on public security, including that by local governments, at some US\$ 71.2 billion this year, an increase of 20.5 per cent from last year's. State officials have recently warned of the potential for widespread unrest as the country's economy continues to sag.

The second consideration behind the government intervention entails a more structural assessment: China needs to rethink its develop-

ment trajectory. Excessive emphasis on exports may stymie its chances to catch up with the other advanced economies and domestic consumption must be boosted to re-balance the country's act.

Consumption growth in any country is necessarily limited by the growth in household income and wealth, neither of which has grown nearly as rapidly in China as the country's economy. Despite the government's initial steps, cultural factors, weaknesses in the social security system and immature financial markets are still making sure that this situation will not change radically in the immediate future.

While in general macroeconomic terms Beijing's stimulus package is regarded to have had significant short-term benefits, the medium to long-term scenario is far more blurred. Until much more effective reforms in social security, health, education and finance are implemented a major portion of household savings will still be locked up as savings.

This last point is also the key reason why thinking that China's consumers will come to the rescue of world producers and pull them out of recession is indeed a dangerous illusion. Nor is there any indication that Beijing is paying heed to the IMF's calls for allowing the Renmimbi to appreciate against the dollar in order to lower external demand. Rather, the very opposite seems to be happening in recent months.

## China's new global role

The current global economic crisis has enormously augmented the PRC's global stature. Of course this has more to do with the plummeting legitimacy of the Western model than with China's ability to come up with an alternative, sustainable development strategy. Yet, at a time when confidence in the old liberist mantra and revered finance gurus has touched the lowest possible point, the example of a country that has been able to avoid the worst excesses of a global crisis for the second time in a row (the first being the 1997 Asian turbulence) does strike a chord with governments and public opinion around the world. If we add that direct government involvement in national economies has become the norm throughout all advanced countries, we cannot but see some kind of indirect vindication of Beijing's "capitalism with Chinese characteristics" (essentially state capitalism).

Crucially, however, the comparative advancement of China's economic influence on the global economic stage is not only grounded in theoretical academic discussions or widespread hopes for a sudden explosion of domestic demand among Chinese emerging middle class. Much more substantially, Beijing holds some US\$ 2 trillions in foreign reserves, thereby playing a crucial role in the preservation of global financial stability – and the viability of the U.S. federal deficit. According to both US and Chinese statistics around 80% of China's reserves are in-

vested in dollars, much of them in US Treasury bonds: in 2008 China surpassed Japan to become the largest foreign holder of US Treasury bonds. Naturally, reciprocal US-China dependence is fast becoming a pivotal issue in international relations, as US Secretary of State Clinton's comments at the beginning of her tenure clearly demonstrate.

Beijing's capacity in terms of global agenda setting and discourse steering has reached unprecedented heights. When People's Central Bank of China chief Zhou Xiaochuan called for the dollar to be replaced with a "super-sovereign" currency, for instance, a planetary debate ensued, continuing to this day.

### **A new China policy in Washington?**

Both the White House and the State Department have developed a 'hyper-pragmatic' towards Beijing since the new US Administration has taken office in January 2009. Hillary Clinton's first remarks as Secretary of State stressed the need to build upon the foundations laid by former Treasury Secretary Paulson with the U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue in order to develop it into a more comprehensive forum, covering political and security issues.

Since then we have witnessed the formation of a gradually more structured framework to engage China, culminating in US Deputy Secretary of State Steinberg's speech in Sep-

tember where the previous emphasis on China acting as a "responsible stakeholder" gave way to a new policy of "strategic reassurance". As Steinberg put it, "just as we [the U.S.] and our allies must make clear that we are prepared to welcome China's arrival as a prosperous and successful power, China must reassure the rest of the world that its development and growing global role will not come at the expense of security and well-being of others".

While reaction to this policy development has been broadly positive in the U.S. – "strategic reassurance" does appear to be a less patronizing concept, and a more practicable tool to address the heart of the problem between the US and China in coming years, namely the lack of mutual trust – criticism has been just as vocal in relation to the administration's seeming decision to drop its commitment to uphold human rights.

President's Obama recent decision to postpone a meeting with the Dalai Lama until after his November trip to Beijing will mark the first occasion since 1991 in which the Tibetan spiritual leader visits Washington without meeting with the US President.

### **Critical issues**

These gestures of good-will are bound to cause much debate in the U.S. and the West in general, especially as Tibet and human rights activists, Taiwan supporters, CPC

watchers and security analysts express growing anxiety on a variety of fronts. Fifty years after it violently suppressed a large-scale uprising in Lhasa, Beijing is still keeping Tibet under tight military and paramilitary control: At the time of this writing Lhasa and other Tibetan areas enter the sixteenth month of paramilitary presence in the streets, with no signs of it being lifted any time soon.

Accusations of policies by the central government to dilute Tibetan identity by means of massive Han immigration are recurring and many observers have long reached the conclusion that Beijing is really just waiting for the current Dalai Lama's natural demise. Whether the absence of an inspirational and widely revered figure such as Tenzin Gyatso will in fact help the peaceful settling of the Tibetan issue is very much objectionable.

As for Taiwan, scholars have recently pointed out that its position as a *de facto* independent state seems to be morphing very slowly toward the "one country, two systems" status of Hong Kong.

According to this view, the process, initiated by the election of Kuomintang leader Ma Ying-jeou as president in 2008, is by no means irreversible but the sentiments of those of mainland origin in the governing party, along with the self-interest of business groups and a widespread sense of economic vulnerability are all pushing the island toward accommodation with Beijing. Although such anxie-

ties are probably exaggerated, there is evidence of Taipei's desire to please Beijing – even at the expense of the liberal values which have gained Taiwan much praise in recent years.

The recent refusal to let the exiled Uyghur leader Rebiya Kadeer enter Taiwan is arguably the most striking example, Ms Kadeer has recently come to be identified with the cause of the Uyghur people of Xinjiang, China's gigantic north-western province where ethnic tensions between Uyghurs (a largely Muslim group that makes up the majority of the population in the province) and Han citizens erupted into bloody riots in July 2009. State media reported 197 dead, mostly Han Chinese, 1,721 injured, over 1,500 arrested.

### The future of the CPC

Based on the evidence and data available to Western scholars, there does not seem to be any real attempt by CPC leadership to foster a convergence trajectory with Taiwan based on domestic political reforms in the PRC. Indeed, Dai Bingguo, State Councillor and one of the leading officials to participate in the recent high-level talks between the United States and China, has been quoted by state media as saying that “to ensure the US-China relationship develops forward in a stable, healthy and long-term way, it is very important to mutually understand, respect and support the other side, and defend our own core interests”.

The first of such interests for China is “to maintain its fundamental system and state security”.

The recently held Fourth Plenary Session of the 17<sup>th</sup> CPC Central Committee confirmed this view, as continuity was carefully stressed. Xi Jinping, the man tipped to inherit Hu Jintao's position in 2013 was expected to receive the title of vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, a traditional prerequisite for the presidency. This, however, did not happen, signalling some degree of tension in the leadership and the desire not to foster conflict ahead of the national anniversary celebrations.

Analysts have approached the issue with a variety of explanations, ranging from Xi's rumoured fear of taking on the leadership at such a delicate time to the divisions in the party.

Two factions, in particular, have been distinguished: the “populists” (known in Western literature as *tuanpai*, after the Chinese Communist Youth League through which they advanced their careers) are led by President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao and are credited mainly with organizational and propaganda skills; their platform advocates attention to vulnerable social groups such as farmers, migrant workers, and the urban poor.

The “princelings”, so called because they are children of former high-ranking officials, are in reality a coalition of the elitist and are widely known in

business circles as aiming to advance the interests of entrepreneurs and the emerging middle class.

What the two groups have in common is the average age of their members: they both pertain to the “lost generation”, that of the children born in the 1950s who were teenagers when the Cultural Revolution broke out in 1966. They lost the opportunity for formal schooling as a result of the political turmoil, and experienced the most traumatic effects of ideological hype.

In the hands of this first group of leaders born when the People's Republic had already been founded rests the future of what the CPC has always liked to call “New China”. Whether these men will be able to infuse a new meaning into this epithet will have a profound impact on their great country and on the collective future of humankind.”

### Conclusion

The 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the founding of the PRC comes at a critical time both for China and the rest of the world. The most severe economic crisis since 1929 has sped up processes of change already in motion before 2008, challenging the CPC leadership to steer the national economy towards a more balanced path, while taking on an international role of increasingly high profile.

How changes of this magnitude can occur domestically and internationally without

compromising stability and generating regional and global security dilemmas is a conundrum that should preoccupy not only China, but indeed all actors considering themselves “responsible”.

La ricerca ISPI analizza le dinamiche politiche, strategiche ed economiche del sistema internazionale con il duplice obiettivo di informare e di orientare le scelte di policy.

I risultati della ricerca vengono divulgati attraverso pubblicazioni ed eventi, focalizzati su tematiche di particolare interesse per l'Italia e le sue relazioni internazionali e articolati in:

- ✓ Programma Africa
- ✓ Programma Caucaso e Asia Centrale
- ✓ Programma Europa
- ✓ Programma Mediterraneo e Medio Oriente
- ✓ Programma Russia e Vicini Orientali
- ✓ Programma Sicurezza e Studi Strategici
  
- ✓ Progetto Argentina
- ✓ Progetto Asia Meridionale
- ✓ Progetto Cina e Asia Orientale
- ✓ Progetto Diritti Umani
- ✓ Progetto Disarmo
- ✓ Progetto Emergenze e Affari Umanitari
- ✓ Progetto Internazionalizzazione della Pubblica Amministrazione

ISPI  
Palazzo Clerici  
Via Clerici, 5  
I - 20121 Milano  
[www.ispionline.it](http://www.ispionline.it)

Per informazioni:  
[ispi.policybrief@ispionline.it](mailto:ispi.policybrief@ispionline.it)  
[ispi.policybrief1@ispionline.it](mailto:ispi.policybrief1@ispionline.it)

© ISPI 2009