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**Cultural Pluralism, Social Justice and  
the Idea of a European Commonwealth**

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# CULTURAL PLURALISM, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE IDEA OF A EUROPEAN COMMONWEALTH

*Gerard Delanty*

## *Introduction*

Virtually every political order has had to deal with the problem of pluralism. The existence of different groups with their own claims to political autonomy has been a challenge for many states and some have been more successful than others in recognizing the claims of competing groups. This has been in particular a problem for the European Union, which was initially an intergovernmental organization aimed at fostering the national interests of its members. With its transformation into a more far-reaching political order that has challenged the sovereignty of its members, there have been unavoidable tensions. But the EU has been relatively successful in achieving a balance between national interests and the continued development of a transnational political order. A kind of unity in diversity has been reached as far as the relations between the individual states and the EU is concerned. This may for the time being solve the problem of political diversity, but it leaves unresolved the problem of cultural diversity. Is culture merely a matter of recognizing diversity or can there be also a shared public culture? This is the topic of this paper. The European project needs to respond to the rise of new kinds of diversity which were largely absent in its foundation. Such forms of diversity extend beyond the older national communities to include social groups of all kinds, but specifically ethnic groups. European societies today are being transformed by migration and from changed relations between cores and peripheries. This is a diversity that is not primarily cultural, but it is also social and one that has major political implications.

The political diversity of Europe was easier to handle than these new kinds of diversity, which are intermeshed with inequality. It was a diversity that was primarily state or nation based. The new challenge of diversity is different. It is bound up with issues of social integration and citizenship and cannot be easily solved on an intergovernmental level. To this extent it is inextricably bound with questions of rights and values. The implications of cultural diversity go beyond purely cultural questions to pose entirely new political questions. That is why we cannot speak of a total separation of the cultural and the political. But the approach adopted in this paper will be to take the cultural as the point of departure.

It is possible to speak of a cultural transformation of the European project. The implications of this are as yet not fully clear, but there are indications that the assumptions about the nature of peoplehood that have prevailed until now are becoming increasingly problematic. The EU was once a project aimed at the integration of states but became in time a project aimed at the integration of peoples. While this was initially the peoples of a Europe of nations, the current situation has opened the category of peoplehood to new interpretations. This paper is an exploration of some of the issues that are at stake. The broad direction of the argument given is that the European project needs to be relaunched around the idea of what I shall be calling a European commonwealth. The main feature of this is a more inclusive conception of the European polity based on recognition and solidarity. I argue there are two major challenges to be addressed: the recognition of diverse identities and the advancement of solidarity. Connecting both of these is an essentially social project addressed to the problem of social justice. The idea of a European commonwealth is based on a social conception of the European project and one that recognizes that Europe today is not just multinational but also multiethnic. The upshot of this is that there needs to be a stronger emphasis on Europe as a social and cultural project as opposed to a state led project.

### *1. The Changing Context of Europeanization*

One of the central claims made here is that there has been a major cultural transformation of the European project. The project of the transnationalization of the nation-state has reached its limits. While the foreseeable future will probably bring a further development of the process, the rationale of European integration in terms of its identity and legitimacy can no longer be based on the existing models and modes of justification.

At the present time there are three competing models of the European project. It would not be an exaggeration to speak of a clash of cultures, in the sense of a clash of different visions of what Europe is and where it is going. These are as follows: a vision of Europe as a transnational supracommunity, a vision of Europe as a postnational political community based on rights, and a vision of Europe based on core values of peoplehood as embodied in both national and European traditions. The latter two have emerged in opposition to the first. By far the dominant vision of Europe is that associated with what might be called the official EU ideology: a vision of Europe that is primarily based on the political level of the state. In this dominant discourse Europe is a matter of the transnationalization of the nation-state by a post-sovereign supracommunity whose main legitimation is that it is able to solve the problems that have beset the nation-state in an age of globalization. The EU is thus able to integrate the economies of its member states while protecting them from the wider global context. This is primarily a functional, if not a technocratic, legitimation and one that has been the principal focus of support

among electorates. So long as it delivers the goods and achieves a legitimacy through efficiency, it has the support of citizens. This concept of Europe has considerable appeal and can even command a degree of loyalty and identity. But its support basis, which will be nationally variable, is relatively limited due to the predominance of domestic politics.

Competing with this official vision of Europe as an emerging transnational state are two other visions. One of these is a largely leftist position that sees Europe in terms of a civic conception of the polity as a political community based on rights. As best exemplified in the writings of Jürgen Habermas, the European project exhibits some signs of a postnational democracy based on the rights of the individual and a republican constitutional order<sup>1</sup>. Rather than seeing Europeanization in terms of a transnationalization of the nation-state in the direction of a supranational state, an essentially civic conception of Europe is posited as the ideal. This vision of Europe is based on rights as opposed to efficiency. It is a vision of Europe that is clearly highly pertinent to the challenges facing European societies in integrating diverse groups of peoples. Given the scale of human mobility within the EU, a rights based conception of the political has a huge relevance<sup>2</sup>. While not entirely in opposition to the technocratic model of Europe, it does point to a democratization of the EU in the direction of a greater role for civil society. As a strongly normative model, it is not a vision of Europe that has found strong support among electorates. It has not succeeded in articulating a model of identity, other than the relatively thin identity of what Habermas has called a constitutional patriotism, that is an identity focused on the abstract principles of the constitution as opposed to substantive values of a people<sup>3</sup>.

In opposition to both of these visions of Europe is an alternative one that has considerable support among electorates. This is a vision based less on rights than on the core values of peoplehood. Such values are generally seen as embodied in national traditions, but it can also be embodied in the very idea of a European political heritage. In this view, which is often expressed in anti-European sentiments, the European project has lost its ability to connect with the core values of peoplehood, which include rights but also include a wider sphere of values such as those of solidarity and social justice. While often taking a nationalist and populist form, this defensive stance with regard to Europeanization can claim to represent an important tradition within the European political heritage. At the core of this is a social conception of society based on the values of solidarity and redistributive justice. This is generally associated with culturally specific conceptions of peoplehood, as defined in largely national categories.

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<sup>1</sup> J. HABERMAS, *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory*, Cambridge, 1998; *Idem*, *Why Europe Needs a Constitution*, in «New Left Review», 2001, 11, pp. 5-26.

<sup>2</sup> E.O. ERIKSEN (Ed.), *Making the Euro-Polity: Reflexive Integration in Europe*, London, 2005.

<sup>3</sup> J. HABERMAS, *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory*, cit.

These three competing visions of Europe with their respective emphasis on efficiency, rights and values are often overlapping. The rights based model of Europe associated with Habermas makes certain assumptions about the nature of peoplehood for instance. The official discourse of European identity associated with the EU often makes appeals to a vaguely defined notion of a European people based on a unity in diversity. But as visions of Europe they embody fairly distinct modes of legitimation and understandings of political community. The analysis in this paper is that none of these models is capable of providing a solution to the demands of the present day.

Efficiency can no longer be the only justification for the EU, which must devise different kinds of legitimation, which also cannot derive from the principle of subsidiarity or purely regulatory policy-making. The expansion in the competences of the EU has unavoidably led to its politicization and to a questioning of its democratic basis. There is a widespread perceived lack of accountability, whether justified or not. In addition, there is a nascent fear of the social consequences of the liberalization of markets, a fear that is now increasingly associated with global markets. This is more significant than the issue of the so-called democratic deficit. My thesis is that the social question is becoming more and more important and as it does there will be a deepening crisis of the European project. The three dominant visions of Europe will be unable to address this challenge due to their limited horizons and the failure to see that the social question of solidarity and social justice cannot be solved without the creation of an entirely new vision of a European society in the sense of a social conception of Europe. The three dominant visions tend to avoid this. The model of Europe favoured by the EU is one of political coordination of functions and has relatively little to say on questions of identity and solidarity. It is often associated, whether rightly or wrongly, with a neo-liberal agenda. The rights model suffers from a more or less total neglect of issues of social justice, operating with a narrow rights based view of the polity as a civic order. The social contextualization of political community is thus neglected. While more explicitly addressed to issues of social justice, the defence of peoplehood fails to offer a robust vision for the future.

Four examples of the deepening crisis of European integration can be mentioned to illustrate these considerations: the 2005 constitutional crisis, the rise of the extreme right, the French riots in 2005, and the continued controversy over Turkey's bid for EU membership. Lying at the core of these crises are major issues about social justice which point to problems that are far-reaching and cannot be easily accommodated within the existing models and visions of Europe.

The momentous "no" votes in May 2005 when the French and Dutch voters overwhelmingly rejected the draft constitutional treaty marked a fundamental turning point in the history of the EU. It was the first hard choice to test the desirability of a postnational Europe. It was also the first major example of the masses revolting against the elites. It would be a mistake to see this as a

straightforward endorsement of the nation-state and a rejection of the European project since the “no” vote was a product of a diverse coalition of interests that had little unity to it. Opposition to the draft constitution was the means for diverse interests to pursue their different goals, which even included the means to bring about the destruction of each other. Some of the main concerns that led to the “no” vote were social concerns relating to a perceived liberalization of markets and fears of large-scale immigration. A strong EU and a weaker role for national governments are simply not an attractive proposition for electorates accustomed to a long tradition of social securities and the stability of a strong national state. The appeal to legitimacy through efficiency is not enough when it comes to such choices.

The rise of the extreme right throughout Europe, with some exceptions, is a product of social fears being channelled into political support for rightwing parties, whose support derives from social anxieties and fears. The extreme right have a foothold in many of the small western European countries – Denmark, Belgium, Austria, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway – whose social models have been challenged by the wider cultural transformation of Europe, on the one side, and on the other by the steady decline of social democracy. Immigrants have been the obvious targets for these parties who have frequently been able to combine fears of immigration with anxieties over jobs and welfare. The European wide trend to third way style politics has created space for such parties to exploit social fears. Such anxieties combined with the perceived loss of national sovereignty and the changes in the nature of employment are fertile ground for xenophobic currents. In other words, the transnationalization of the nation-state is occurring at the same time as the state is retreating from the social commitments it has been associated with it. The proposed European constitution did little to address such concerns and seemingly was a continuation of the transnationalization of the nation-state. The consequence was the affirmation of nation and statehood.

Further examples of the social malaise of Europe are the riots in France in November 2005, when ethnic minority groups, mostly of North African background, reacted to the death of two Muslim youths in a French suburb. This was the event that provoked violent clashes with the police and involved burnings of some 9000 cars and several public building. Widespread anger, resentment against poverty and marginalization against the circumstances in deprived working class suburbs were the background to these events, which were quickly repeated in several other European countries. Although on a small scale than in France where a state of emergency was declared, in Germany, Spain, Belgium, and the Netherlands there were also riots involving the burning of cars and buildings. It was not only resentment at high employment and social deprivation that played a role in the riots. The negative image of Islam in France and the popular view of the middle class that the French Muslim ghettos are hotbeds of Islamic militancy was an important factor in politicising the Muslim youths to

rebel against their social and cultural marginalization. The riots can be seen as symptomatic of a social malaise in western European countries where a new kind of poverty and social marginalization is developing and in which migrants and ethnic communities are most likely to be based. It may be an exaggeration to say that the traditional class conflict has been replaced by a conflict of migrants versus citizens, but there is some truth to it as far as the most visible cleavages today are concerned.

The controversy over Turkey's bid for EU membership is a further illustration of the the growing anxiety and uncertainty that has arisen around the European project. The resistance to Turkey is clearly linked to fears of immigration of large numbers of Turks. Already there are some 3.5 million Turks in EU countries, with the largest number in Germany. With a population of 70 million many people feared the capacity of the EU in its current form to absorb such a large country which shares borders with some of the least stable parts of the Middle East.

My thesis is that these crises are linked. The marginalization of minorities, the growing appeal of the extreme right and the popular rejection of the draft constitution are linked. The mobilization of migrants and ethnic groups in France in 2005 was driven by the same underlying social forces that have led to the rise of the extreme right, namely the undermining of the social bonds by capitalism and the retreat of the state from the social. Turkey's bid for EU membership has been linked with the spectre of an Islamification of Europe.

To appreciate the current situation attention must be given to the wider societal context. Two related factors can be commented on: the global context and the decline of the social democratic project. Although open markets for labour and capital are confined only to the EU area, the wider context of global markets is increasingly impacting on Europeanization, which is a process that interacts not only with the national but also with the global. It is possible to see Europeanization as expression of globalization in the sense of a movement towards transnationalization. The success of the EU has been partly due to its ability to offer protection against global markets for its member states organized into a Fortress Europe. The price of this has been a relatively small group of countries. The enlargement of the EU to 25, the uncertainty as to Turkey's eventual membership and the inclusion of other countries as well as the implications of the neighbourhood association relationships have led not just to a bigger EU but one that has less clear-cut borders. The EU itself is becoming more important as a global actor in what is becoming a multi-polar world. The relation with Asia is already becoming more important. The UK government favours a larger EU with as much trade liberalization as possible. A likely scenario for the future is that this pragmatic vision of Europe as a free trade zone will prevail. If this is the case there is likely to be a deepening of the crisis discussed above, with popular opposition against the transnationalization of the nation-state and growing hostility to migrants and Islam in particular. But it is not inconceivable that the EU in its current form will be able to build a Fortress Europe, without undergoing

major structural transformation. The draft constitutional treaty was itself an attempt to modify and clarify existing practices without any major change in direction. It was an attempt to reconcile the demands of the transnationalization of the state with the attempts to build a Fortress Europe offering minimal protection against globalization.

Already the European project is bereft of what it most needs, namely a social dimension. This has been in decline with the gradual turn to Third Way style politics, on the one side, and on the other the transformation of capitalism into new and more flexible forms of work. The EU in its early decades was built on the foundations of industrial society and the forms of social solidarity it produced: trade unionism, social democratic parties, the traditional loyalties of class and nation. In combination with long-term demographic change, leading to an older Europe, and a more multi-ethnic Europe changes to the nature of capitalism have far-reaching consequences.

Against this background, the argument given in this paper is that the apparent crisis of the European project must address the double challenge of the rise of the extreme right and marginalization of ethnic groups and migrants, for underlying both of these problems is a social malaise and crisis of values. Having outlined the context, I shall now in the next sections discuss the various dimensions of this, beginning with migration and the challenge of cultural diversity.

## 2. *Migration and the Challenge of Cultural Diversity*

According to the Geneva based International Organisation for Migration, there are about 150 million migrants worldwide, or just under 3% of the world population. That is 30 million more than 10 years ago. In Europe migrants comprise 4.5% of the total population and in many countries they are the main factor in population increase. There about 24.6 million recorded foreign nationals in European countries<sup>4</sup>. About 83 million people in Europe who were born in countries other than the ones in which they reside. There are about 10 million foreign workers currently registered in those European states. This figure obviously does not include a large number of illegal migrants. However, estimates differ. One view is that the wider European Economic Area hosts some 56.1 million migrants<sup>5</sup>. This of course includes only migrants, persons born outside the country in which they

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<sup>4</sup> This figure and other cited here are derived from J. SALT, *Types of Migration in Europe: Implications and Policy Concerns*, in *Demographic Challenges for Social Cohesion*, European Population Conference, Strasbourg, 7-8<sup>th</sup> April 2005, <[http://www.coe.int/t/e/social\\_cohesion/population/EPC\(2005\)K3.0%20Salt%20keynote.doc](http://www.coe.int/t/e/social_cohesion/population/EPC(2005)K3.0%20Salt%20keynote.doc)>.

<sup>5</sup> C. BOSWELL, *Migration in Europe*, paper prepared for the Policy Analysis and Research Programme of a Global Commission on International Migration, <<http://www.gcim.org/attachments/RS4.pdf>>.

are resident. It does not include ethnic communities with large numbers of permanent residents including those who have acquired the nationality of the country of their birth.

Views are divided whether migration has peaked and that there will not be major migration in the coming years. Migration into Europe increased since the mid 1990s and in the post-Enlargement period there has been considerable migration from central Europe westwards. In Ireland, for instance, the 2006 census reports that there are over 400,000 non-nationals resident in the country, making migrants about 10% of the population. Polish immigration is a major part of this. It has been estimated that up to 300,000 Poles have migrated to the UK since 2003. It does appear to be the case that migration into western European countries is relatively stable and fears of a massive influx of migrants are largely unwarranted. Recent research suggests that the relatively large-scale Polish migration will not be repeated when restrictions are lifted against Bulgarian and Rumanian migration after accession.

The term migrant is often used to cover individuals whose parents immigrated to the country in which they were born. Even though many such individuals may not have the citizenship of their country of birth, they are not technically migrants since they have not migrated. The category of migrants is closely linked with ethnic groups, since patterns of migration are often connected with the existence of an ethnic group that derives from the country of origin. Clearly the complicated mosaic of migrant and ethnic groups is different in every country. Germany has a large Turkish minority (c. 1.5 m) which includes second and third generation who can easily be termed migrants. This is also the case for France with its large north African minority. Other countries such as the UK, Belgium and the Netherlands have long established ethnic minority groups.

Migrants are a diverse group and migrate for different reasons. While many migrants move for reasons of work, others migrate for family reasons or to study. Others such as refugees and asylum seekers migrate for primarily political reasons. For these reasons migrants cannot be said to constitute a homogeneous group and caution must be exercised when using the term migrant. It should also be noted that migrants experience different kinds of inequality and marginalization. Ethnicity (as defined by nationality, language, religion), in combination with gender and class, produces many different kinds of exclusion. The implication of this may be that what is required today is a more differentiated notion of citizenship, an argument that Young (1990) has put forward.

Several decades of migration have transformed European societies. In the post war period, which saw the foundation of the European Union and the consolidation of national welfare states, most if not all European societies were relatively homogeneous. The one hundred years of nation state building from the middle of the nineteenth to the middle of the twentieth century had the effect that by 1950 in the aftermath of the Second World War national societies had

considerably reduced the size of their minorities either through forced assimilation and popular exchange, or had simply exterminated them. From c 1950 to the late 1970s the main cleavages in western European societies were associated with class. From about the 1970s this gradually changed as a result of labour shortages resulting in guest workers coming in substantial numbers but also as a consequence of decolonization. Several decades later we are in a different situation. The scale of migration has increased and European societies have experienced varying degrees of assimilation as a result of multicultural policies in education, changing patterns of consumption, intermarriage. While many migrants retained their distinctive culture, others adopted the culture of the host country and many evolved multiple identities. It is possible to speak of the emergence of a distinctive European Islam for instance. This is perfectly compatible with the broadly secular societies in which it exists.

Migration presents a challenge for European societies for several reasons. Firstly, European societies are aging. The birth rate in many countries is lower than the mortality rate. Migrants offer the best chance for European societies to increase the fertility rate. Secondly, many western European countries have labour shortages, especially of skilled workers. In several countries the service sector depends on labour from central and eastern Europe. Thirdly, there has been increased awareness in the post 11<sup>th</sup> September and Iraq War context that social marginalization and discontent among Muslim communities in western European cities has led to a political radicalization of Islam. Although the evidence for this is patchy, there is clearly a world-wide radicalization of Islam and it is not surprising that transnationally linked communities in European societies would have members linked to it. The riots in French cities in 2005 are an example of a wider dissatisfaction with long-term marginalization. Fourth, migrants are now more effectively organized than they were a few decades ago and have a greater capacity to mobilize. Fifth, migrants are more likely to have education and many are less inclined to give up their ethnicity and take on the culture of the majority population. The phenomenon of the veil is a pertinent example of a cultural development that points to a change in identities. It is often educated and relatively independent women who choose to wear it for reasons that cannot be explained by reference to the force of tradition. It is in short a product of individuated life choices.

These are just examples of the challenges that migration presents. The current reality is that migration has been politicized. The rise of the extreme right and negative images of migrants and their culture in recent years have led to a situation in which Europe cannot ignore the politicization of migration. Islamophobia as well as anti-Semitism are on the increase. Negative perceptions of migrants, and of Islam in particular, is on the increase across Europe. The episode in September 2005 when offensive cartoons depicting the Muslim prophet Muhammad appeared in Danish and Norwegian Newspapers encapsulate this trend. This was not an isolated episode. The cartoons were

reprinted in many European countries. The immediate consequences were not just confined to Europe but were global, with public burnings of the Danish flag in many Islamic countries throughout the world. In some cases the EU flag was burnt. It should be noted that the politicization of migration is not confined to western European countries. It is arguably the case that western countries have lower levels of racism and xenophobia than central and eastern European countries. It is common place to remark that the reality of migration is not in proportion to the public representation of it by the right wing media and extreme right as well as the established parties. The case of anti-Semitism in Poland is a good example of this phenomenon whereby an obsession with the Other is possible despite the non-existence of that very Other. With national differences becoming less important between European countries, migrants are becoming the principal reference points for national self-identification. Nationalism of the traditional kind involving patriotic expressions of national superiority is giving way to more populist expressions of xenophobia. These new discourses combine national rhetoric with what is often covert racism to stigmatize migrants and to portray them as others. Aside from the more overt expressions of racism associated with the extreme right, a good deal of political discourse today has normalized xenophobic attitudes and dispositions.

Migration has become a major issue for the EU, which so far has not succeeded in creating a common policy on migration. Although one of the founding pillars of the EU is the freedom of labour, the simple reality is that despite labour shortages labour is not free. Undoubtedly considerable progress has been made at the EU level and also at the level of many national governments, but the daily experience of migrants suggests that marginalization and discrimination is deeply engraved in the social fabric of European societies. The leitmotif of the EU's cultural identity, "unity in diversity" is simply inadequate. This slogan has emerged in response to the need to balance the unity the European project aims to achieve with the continued reality of distinct national and regional cultures. The various cultural policies of the EU have reflected this embracing of diversity. The problem is that this official understanding of diversity does not address the kinds of diversity associated with ethnic pluralism. Moreover, the problems associated with the integration of minorities cannot be solved by cultural policies alone.

The general point emerging from this is that the challenge presented by ethnic diversity and the cultural pluralism that several decades of migration has brought is one that goes to the heart of European integration. It is not something that can be reduced to migration policy alone since the issues it brings to the fore are inseparable from wider social, cultural, and political processes. An aspect of this that has not received much attention is the question of social justice. The challenge for Europe is not merely the integration of minorities, but whether the political community can be based on the values of solidarity and social justice.

### 3. *The Problem of Solidarity and Social Justice*

The argument advanced in this paper is that social justice is a new political context for the European project, which until now has been mostly bound up with economic and political integration. The challenge that migration and ethnic pluralism presents is not only a cultural problem, but a social one. Cultural integration without social integration does not produce lasting results.

It is of course true that European integration had a social dimension, but this has been limited to societal cohesion. The EU has not been very successful in creating a social model. The Social Charter, promoted by Jacques Delors, aimed to reflect the interests of workers as opposed to employers. In that sense it reflected a concern with social justice. In 1991 all EU member states, with the exception of the UK, signed the Charter of Fundamental Rights for Workers, which was the foundation of what has become known as the European Social Model (the UK signed in 1997). The main focus of this has been the issues of employment and social policy. The context for its emergence in the 1990s was the challenge presented by globalization to Europe<sup>6</sup>. A clarification of a European social model was supposed to be the basis for a European social identity.

The European Social Model has generally been seen as weak. National societies with their own traditions of solidarity have stronger social models. The European Social Model has not been successful in any terms in reversing the subordination of society to markets. The last twenty years have seen a European wide shift from protective and redistributive forms of solidarity to competitive and market oriented ones. There is in effect no functionally effective model of society in the European project. As a policy area, it is limited in scope and little more than rhetoric. In *Rethinking Europe*, Chris Rumford and I argued that the EU needs a new debate on its social model. It has the potential to place a concern with the social at the centre of Europeanization. However the problem is that the social model is generally interpreted as a means through which society can be organized by the state rather than seeing it as having the potential to drive European transformation<sup>7</sup>.

The limits of the idea of a European Social Model can be partly explained by contrasting it with the quite different notion of a European Model of Society, an idea with which it has often been confused. While the idea of a European Social Model was primarily based on state policy towards society, the latter notion – popular for a time with the Delors Commission in the 1980s – suggested a wider vision of society and one that did not subordinate society to the market. So social cohesion and harmonisation could be achieved by a mix of market and social

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<sup>6</sup> G. DELANTY – C. RUMFORD, *Rethinking Europe: Social Theory and the Implications of Europeanization*, London, 2005, pp. 107-113.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibidem*.

policies. But at the end it is market regulation that has been dominant. The result has been the decline of solidarity at the European level.

There is an urgent need to revive this notion of a European Model of Society in different terms than the relatively narrow terms of a social model. It is necessary in order to resist social and cultural fragmentation. The declining significance of the nation is only one aspect of the consequences of transnationalization of national societies. The other side of the coin is the declining significance of class as a focus of consciousness and political identification.

Many theorists – Claus Offe and Pierre Manent, for instance – who are sceptical of the capacity of the EU to create forms of solidarity tend to look to the national state<sup>8</sup>. These criticisms are justified and there is no doubt that national models are more effective, but the critical point here is that this concerns only national social models. While it is unlikely that the EU will succeed in creating a viable social model of its own, there is a chance that a wider Model of Society can be initiated. This can only be possible at the European level since the issues relevant to its creation require a wider conception of the social than the national level is capable of articulating, even if in the final analysis it will be implanted by national societies. In this context issues related to migration are highly pertinent. To articulate such a vision of society a debate on values is needed. This is why a perspective on rights alone is insufficient, however important rights are. Rights do not offer a vision for a society but a means to enable liberty and justice. Before discussing in the next section rights in relation to citizenship, further consideration of core European values is warranted.

When one looks at European society from the outside, as it were, as opposed to a view from a national standpoint, what is striking is the presence of core values that have defined social and political struggles in the modern era and which have been reflected in the modern national state. Solidarity as associated with social justice is one of the most characteristic features of European society and a stark contrast to other parts of the world. It is in this context that the question can be asked whether there are core European values that could be the basis of a new European Model of Society. Despite the apparent absence of a transnational European identity that unites all Europeans, there is more commonality than is often thought. What does it consist of?

One of the core European values is that of solidarity and a concern with social justice. This is often overlooked in account of European identity where the emphasis is often on cultural differences as linked to national and ethnically specific concepts of culture. This perspective is often overlooked in views of cultural diversity that stress the separateness of groups. The result is a neglect of the role of social values in European modernity. Such values have a greater

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<sup>8</sup> P. MANENT, *A World Beyond Politics? A Defence of the National State*, Princeton, 2006.

salience today as the European project enters a new phase in which social issues have moved to the fore.

The tradition of social solidarity has been reflected in trade unionism, social Catholicism, charity, and many civil society movements. The very notion of solidarity derives from medieval Christian notions of a harmonic order. The later tradition of Christian charity and modern Christian social thought have promulgated social values. Early twentieth century Catholic corporatism promoted the related notion of subsidiarity, which was later to enter into the political vocabulary of European integration. In addition to the religious origins of the solidarity the European political traditions of radical liberalism and socialism were critical in the development of a social agenda in modern politics. From its origins in socialism and the trade union movement, the modern welfare emerged along with the rise of social democratic parties with its policies of redistributive justice.

A broad view of this would suggest that modernity was heavily influenced by the value of social justice. It is possible to see modernity as a process that has been shaped by the specific ways in which the state, market and civil society have interacted. A feature of the European political heritage is that this triple interaction did not allow for the rule of the market or the domination of the state over society. Due to social movements, class conflict and traditions of civic autonomy, European modernity was never entirely a product of the state tradition. The result of this has been a relatively strong concern with social justice and one which can be related to resistance to both capitalism and the state. The specific form the state took in Europe was influenced by civil society and processes of democratization of which the most significant was the labour movement. The welfare state and the institutionalization of redistributive justice in the post 1945 period was in many ways a uniquely European achievement. The welfare state too was the model in which multiculturalism developed. Despite the trend towards economic liberalism and third way politics, the welfare state is far from demise and it is arguably stronger than ever despite greater demands placed on it. But what has changed is that the social and economic foundations on which it was created have been eroded. The post Second World War project of creating full employment – which was not only a project of the social democratic Left – has become obsolescent and there have been major changes to the class structure, the nature of work as well as to capitalism. Full employment based on industrial manufacture is no longer a likely prospect and not a viable basis for social integration. Trade Unions are no longer the principal actors in the public sphere, and the traditional political cleavages of right and left have lost their capacity to shape politics, opening the political domain to many new actors.

The obsolescence of the older social democratic project does not mean either the end of the welfare state or the project of bringing about a more inclusive kind of

society. Pierre Bourdieu argued for the recreation of a radical project of the Left on a European level and a new debate on capitalism<sup>9</sup>. The chances that this might happen are slim and while there is no movement in the direction of a European welfare state for the reasons discussed earlier, it is not untimely for a debate to commence on the creation of a European Model of Society. The terms of such a debate will have to include the experiences of minorities, for migration has brought about a new context for issues of social justice. That is why the older social democratic project, which developed within exclusively national contexts, is ill-equipped for this purpose. The argument made in this paper is that what is needed is a notion of a European commonwealth that goes beyond national contexts. In order to develop this notion some consideration will now be given to citizenship and the related notions of inclusion.

#### 4. *Human Rights and the Rights of Citizenship*

Citizenship is primarily a relation based on rights and is generally considered to be a relationship established with respect to the state. Citizenship defines the relation of an individual to the state. It is now possible to speak of citizenship with respect to transnational processes. In the past decade there has been widespread interest in the idea of global citizenship and various forms of citizenship beyond the nation-state. The intensification of global communication has had implications for citizenship throughout the world and has been instrumental in bringing about the rise of new kinds of citizenship that go beyond the classic rights and duties associated with the nation-state. It has also led to the recognition that the nation-state is unable to provide a framework for all aspects of citizenship. We are witnessing an decoupling of nationality and citizenship. This is reflected in a number of developments such as the blurring of the difference between national rights and international human rights, the rise of cultural rights, the challenge of technological citizenship, the emergence of a global political community<sup>10</sup>. Nowhere is the changing landscape of citizenship more evident than in the case of Europeanization.

Since the early 1990s the idea of citizenship became linked with the creation of a post-national kind of political community in Europe. This represented a significant shift in the very idea of a European political community since it suggested a model of Europe based on rights. A rights based European polity has emerged as an alternative to a purely instrumental conception of the European project. One of the most well-known advocates of such a rights based understanding of the polity is Habermas's theory of a postnational European civil

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<sup>9</sup> P. BOURDIEU, *Acts of Resistance: Against the Myth of Our Time*, Cambridge, 2001; *Idem*, *Fighting Back*, Cambridge, 2003.

<sup>10</sup> See N. STEVENSON, *Cultural Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Questions*, Buckingham, 2002.

society based on constitutional patriotism, that is an identity defined in terms of the rights of citizens rather than substantive forms of life<sup>11</sup>. Suggested in this is a shift from peoplehood to personhood. Other approaches to the question of European citizenship have taken a more pronounced cosmopolitan position. Balibar for instance has argued for a vision of Europe without borders that has generally been associated with a transnational kind of citizenship, while Beck and Grande have argued for recognition of an emerging European cosmopolitanism<sup>12</sup>.

The EU is indeed a unique example of a polity based to a considerable degree on rights as opposed to substantive notions of peoplehood. There are probably no examples of states, the majority of which are tied to a notion of nationhood that claims to be based exclusively on rights. There are certainly no comparable transnational organizations that are rights based. It is therefore inevitable that some of the conflicts that have been central to modern citizenship would come to the fore on the European level. But the kind of citizenship that the EU has established has been fairly limited. The EU has not been successful in going beyond a fairly narrow rights based conception of citizenship. It has, however, been highly successful as a democratizing force.

Before proceeding further clarity is required on the meaning of citizenship. Theories of citizenship tend to emphasize two main dimensions. The liberal tradition stresses the formal status based largely on rights, while the republican tradition stresses participation and identity. To an extent communitarianism has attempted to link these strands with notions of cultural citizenship and collective rights. It is now generally recognised that such concessions do not undermine the individual person as the bearer of rights, but is an essential dimension of democracy which is enabled rather than hampered by cultural rights, which can be seen in terms of a policy of recognition based on pluralism<sup>13</sup>. This different approaches may make the concept theoretically confused since it includes many different dimensions and is highly contested. However the notion of citizenship is relevant to current developments since we do not have another concept that is capable of addressing issues of rights, social integration, and belonging in quite the same way. It is not as its critics have claimed a purely instrumental instrument of state control over populations<sup>14</sup>. There is now a substantial literature defending

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<sup>11</sup> J. HABERMAS, *The Inclusions of the Other: Studies in Political Theory*, cit.; *Idem*, *Why Europe needs a Constitution*, cit. and see also E. ERIKSEN (Ed.), *Making the Euro-Polity: Reflexive Integration in Europe*, cit.

<sup>12</sup> E. BALIBAR, *We the People of Europe: Reflections on Transnational Citizenship*, Princeton, 2004; U. BECK – E. GRANDE, *Kosmopolitisches Europa*, Frankfurt am Main, 2004 (forthcoming: *Cosmopolitan Europe*, Cambridge, 2007).

<sup>13</sup> J.K. COWAN *et al.* (Eds.), *Culture and Rights: Anthropological Perspective*, Cambridge, 2001.

<sup>14</sup> M. MANN, *Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship*, in «Sociology», 1987, 3, pp. 339-354; B. HINDESS, *Divide and Rule: The International Character of Modern Citizenship*, in «European Journal of Social Theory», 1998, 1, pp. 57-70.

its application to the post-national context<sup>15</sup>. In formal terms, citizenship can be understood in terms of rights, but also includes duties. The classic rights of citizenship are political rights (the right to vote and stand for election), civic rights (which generally concern individual liberties) and social rights (rights to public goods, such as education and health care, and generally social protection from the free market). These rights are underpinned by duties, such as the duties of taxation, jury service, mandatory education, and in some cases conscription. In substantive terms, citizenship is expressed in active public participation, such as voluntary action – as in the notion of the virtuous citizen – and in collective identities, as for example in national identity and loyalty to the state or nation. Taking this rough working definition of citizenship as a multi-faceted set of relations that define the relation of the individual to the state, the following can be noted about post-national citizenship and Europeanization.

There are two main ways of looking at post-citizenship in Europe: the official kind of European Citizenship and, secondly, the Europeanization of citizenship. Firstly European Citizenship refers to the category of citizenship codified by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993<sup>16</sup>. Often regarded only as superficial and an exercise in legitimizing the EU as a constitutional polity, it did have some implications. The most important implication was that it defined citizenship in terms of residence as opposed to birth or descent. This led to a gradual erosion of national citizenship since citizens could now make claims on the basis of where they lived. The implications for migrants was very limited even though the distinction between nationals and citizens became less clear-cut. The main limitation was that it promulgated a notion of citizenship that in effect was based on nationality. As a legal category, it presupposed nationality and only pertained to the holders of EU member states. Despite this limit and given the diversity of national policies of immigration and naturalization, it did mark a gradual loosening of the tie between citizenship and nationality.

We can agree that the significant development was less the creation of an official European citizenship than the Europeanization of citizenship. Although the creation of EU citizenship did not result in the end of national citizenship but has existed along side it, the national tradition has not gone unchanged as a result of wider processes of Europeanization. The real legacy of the EU as for citizenship concerns the capacity of the EU to bring about change on the national level. The EU has been an important agent in enhancing the social rights of workers and in bringing about the democratization of national societies (no where is more clear

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<sup>15</sup> G. DELANTY, *Citizenship in a Global World*, Buckingham, 2000.

<sup>16</sup> P. LEHNING – A. WEALE (Eds.), *Citizenship Democracy and Justice in the New Europe*, London, 1997; A. WIENER, *European Citizenship Practice: Building Institutions of a Non-State*, Boulder, 1998; R. HANSEN – P. WEIL, *Towards a European Nationality: Citizenship, Immigration, and Nationality Law in the EU*, Basingstoke, 2001; K. EDER – B. GIESEN (Eds.), *European Citizenship: National Legacies and Transnational Projects*, Oxford, 2001.

than in the case of central and eastern Europe). A significant legacy too has been in bringing about equality for women and more recently anti-discrimination for minorities<sup>17</sup>. The Europeanization of citizenship has been achieved through legal implementation whereby national states change their legislation as a result of EU directives. This dimension of European citizenship is often ignored in discussions of European citizenship where the assumption is that citizenship must be defined in terms of a passport or a clearly codified bundle of rights underpinned by a clear set of values. The Europeanization of citizenship can be seen as a gradual process of societal convergence, although it is unlikely to lead to a situation of total uniformity due to the continued diversity of national traditions. Social, civic and political rights are generally emphasised to the neglect of cultural rights. The meaning of citizenship has been erroneously changed as a result of cultural rights pertaining to issues of access to information, issues related to consumption, the expression of cultural identities, the protection of heritages, minority related demands<sup>18</sup>. The Europeanization of citizenship has not occurred separately from such developments which form the wider societal context for citizenship. Citizenship has now come to reflect the pluralism of contemporary culture and the fact that there is no single national culture but contested sites of belonging.

The Europeanization of citizenship refers both to formal interventions of the EU in national legislatures as well as a wider sphere of cultural transformation that does not specifically emanate from the EU but from the rise of normative transnationalism. Of particular importance in this context are human rights. The relation between human rights and the rights of citizenship has greatly changed. Migrants can make increasing claims on the basis of human rights, which are now incorporated into national legislations<sup>19</sup>. The result is a blurring of national rights and human rights. In this sense there has been a partial institutionalization of cosmopolitanism. The EU is one of the best examples of a polity that has given a concrete form to universal human rights. This development does not mean the end of citizenship, as Soysal has argued, since this has a relatively narrow area of application<sup>20</sup>. Migrants may be able to invoke human rights within EU countries and thereby gain certain privileges.

This is also the problem as far as the integration of minorities is concerned. Reliance on human rights is a slim basis for political community. Moreover, it reflects a narrow conception of citizenship as exclusively a matter of rights. European citizenship and the overall Europeanization of citizenship has certainly enhanced rather than diminished the cultural pluralism of European societies. But

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<sup>17</sup> E. MEEHAN, *Citizenship and the European Community*, London, 1993.

<sup>18</sup> E. ISIN – P. WOOD, *Citizenship and Identity*, London, 1999; N. STEVENSON, *Cultural Citizen: Cosmopolitan Questions*, cit.; B.S. TURNER, *Outline of a Theory of Citizenship*, in «Sociology», 1990, 2, pp. 189-217; *Idem* (Ed.), *Citizenship and Social Theory*, London, 1993.

<sup>19</sup> R. KASTORYANO, *Negotiating Identities: States and Immigrants in France and Germany*, Princeton, 2002; Y. SOYSAL, *The Limits of Citizenship*, Chicago, 1994.

<sup>20</sup> Y. SOYSAL, *The Limits of Citizenship*, cit.

it has not provided a durable model of social integration. This brings us back to the problem of a rights based model of the polity. What is needed is a broader concept of European citizenship than a rights based one. As argued above, citizenship also entail duties, participation and identity. The Europeanization of citizenship in any case is largely a development that takes place through national regimes of citizenship. It lacks a specific form of its own, save for the official notion of a European Citizenship. It is thus more of a reflective process, that is a process that produces legal norms without itself having any substantial content. While the ensuing rights are independent of national citizenship, they exist only as rights that can be evoked in different countries. So the result are legal rights that, while transcending nationality and constituting a de facto European system of citizenship rights, do not produce citizenship. The rights in question do not constitute a package or bundle of rights that can be the object of identification, and are not related to corresponding duties. As merely a set of legal norms, post-national citizenship does not offer an alternative to the traditional understanding of citizenship as entailing participation in the political community. This dimensions, along with a notion of the duties of citizenship and identity, is particularly striking in the case of migrants. Rights may empower minorities and migrants and provide an important defence against discrimination and exploitation, but an exclusively rights based practise of citizenship is too narrow as a model of integration.

Migrants need to be included in the political community in ways that are not just rights based. This is not only a challenge for the integration of migrants and other minorities, but has a broader relevance to the wider society. This problem was well illustrated in the rejection of the draft constitutional treaty in 2005. When put to the test, a model of Europe that was strongly rights oriented was not popular with voters. The draft constitutional treaty did not offer a model of citizenship for instance, even if it provided a framework of rights. Without a basis in a system of shared values, a rights based model of citizenship is not likely to be effective in gaining popular support or in achieving anything but a limited degree of social integration of minorities.

Is it possible for rights and values to be linked? This is in part a question of whether the formal dimension of citizenship can be linked to substantive dimensions. This is the essence of the problem. National regimes of citizenship are able to combine both the formal and the substantive components of citizenship more successfully than anything that can be realistically achieved on a European level. Does this mean that the Europeanization of citizenship is confined to a norm creating process? How do normative regimes become effective in national cultures and take on the character of value commitments and symbolic forms?

## 5. *Culture as Communication*

The argument that has been advanced so far is that rights and values need to be linked in order for citizenship to be effective as a means of achieving social integration. European societies need to create a new model of society of which the core value should be social solidarity. This model of society does not have to replace national social models, for the lesson so far is that national societies will continue to be the most effective means of implementing transnational norms. But it does need to offer an additional dimension. There is not likely to be a unified European social space or a European people, but it is possible to create a European public culture based on shared values. These values are not necessarily specific to particular national groups.

Culture is often mistakenly associated with group identities. As a result cultural divisiveness is needlessly emphasised. Culture has a wider meaning that extends beyond identities. Identity is the wrong way to view culture. Identities entail group boundaries, but culture is not per se a matter of group differences. Culture is itself a mode of communication by which societies constitute themselves. According to Habermas, communication is the basic feature of cultural possibility and is the basis of social action. Culture consists of different forms of classification, cognitive models, narratives, forms of evaluation, collective identities, values and norms, aesthetic forms. Some of these will be shared, others will not. Culture is primarily a system of communication rather than a form of integration and is always open to different interpretations and to new codifications. We have only to consider the role of the internet to see that culture cannot be separated from its modes of communication.

National culture can no longer be identified with the state: the nation has become too entangled in wider cultural processes to be easily tied to the project of the state. The globalising world has brought about a new situation for the nation, especially in relation to authority and loyalty, conceptions of territory and sovereignty, national narratives and symbolic structures. The traditional forms of authority have been undermined and new loyalties are emerging. Loyalty today is becoming increasingly conditional and can no longer be regarded as a durable resource to be tapped by political elites. Loyalties can be recalcitrant and unpredictable and this is especially the case where political elites are perceived as having betrayed democracy. Today more than ever loyalties are refracted through democracy and cannot be simply derived from the uncritical values of duty, patriotism or obedience. Culture in this sense is pervaded by communication through which inter-subjective forms of self-understanding develop. One of the aims of European integration should be to enhance and foster such forms of cultural self-understanding.

Against the myth of cultural conflict, I argue that there are more social commonalities uniting Europeans than is at first sight apparent. The integration of

minorities is not inhibited by the existence of cultural differences. The process of Europeanization and globalization provides ample evidence of the capacity of national cultures to undergo change. Minority cultures are also not self-enclosed cultural worlds that do not change as a result of interaction with the societies into which they come in contact. Moreover all cultures, whether national or ethnic, majority or minority, are in a constant process of change as a result of their interaction with global culture.

At the present time the degree of cultural change that is emerging as a result of cultural interaction is relatively limited. It would be tempting to distinguish, in the terms of Michael Walzer, between “thick” national culture and “thin” European culture, but such distinctions fail to grasp the interaction of both. A gain in one is not a loss to the other since what is occurring is a transformation of both. Indeed, it could be said that the principal mode by which European identification is expressed is precisely through national frames. So national cultures are becoming more Europeanized without being replaced by a transnational European culture. In these terms it makes little sense to speak of “thick” versus “thin” cultural forms. To the extent to which such terms are useful, it might be argued that national cultures are increasingly “thin” in that no national culture can claim to be unaffected by the influences of other cultures. All cultures, whether national or transnational, are mixed, hybrid flows of changing identities, values and orientations. All cultures contain within them contested claims and competing conceptions of the common good. Moreover, universalistic principles have had a major impact on national cultures to an extent that the national and the cosmopolitan can not be separated. It is not the case that a thin universalistic culture inhabits a space outside the national culture. National identities are not immune to the growing sense of the interconnectivity of the world, the emergence of global civil society, world ethics, planetary problems and, within its member states, the EU and the emergence of a post-national European public sphere. These expressions of political community have had an undeniable impact on the capacity of national identity to define political community exclusively in particularistic terms.

If such a characterization of national culture as hybrid, contested, and in flux is accurate, the creation of a more inclusive kind of society is not possible without addressing the reality of the Europeanization of national societies. Rather than looking to see how a new kind of European society might be possible, the aim should rather be to work with the existing national models and to explore how alternative forms of social integration might be possible. As previously argued, Europeanization appears to operate through largely reflexive processes whereby it brings about change by acting about national levels of governance rather than constituting a separate level of governance. This has important implications for how we might conceive alternative models of social integration. The upshot of this is that we have to begin with the assumption that European societies have been radically transformed by Europeanization and wider transnational processes.

The chance to create inclusive cosmopolitan multicultural societies is not one that is simply in the hands of the EU to create against the resistance of national societies. The thesis of the paper is that this is a dialogue all societies can be involved in. At the moment no such dialogue exists. The integration of minorities and immigration is largely in the hands of national societies who are merely required to operate within a transnational normative framework. The following section discusses just one aspect of this, namely what model of multiculturalism might be a basis for social integration.

## 6. *Social Integration and Multiculturalism*

Multiculturalism, as a formal policy aimed to achieve the social integration of minorities, has developed only with difficulty in Europe, where immigration occurred relatively late and took variable forms. Unlike North America, the European experience has been a difficult one and no specific European kind of multiculturalism has emerged. This may be due to the fact that the United States and Canada have been societies founded on various waves of immigration and also have pre-settled native populations. This is also true of Australia and New Zealand, which embarked on multiculturalism at a later stage and arguably have had better success than Europe. This however does not mean that these societies offer a model for Europe to adopt.

The classic American model was the so-called melting model whereby migrants would form a common American society while retaining their native culture in private. This presupposed in practice hyphenated identities, such as Italian-American, Irish-American, etc. This kind of multiculturalism has generally been regarded as less relevant today as a result of the rising potency of the politics of race and the ethno-cultural politics of diverse groups who do not seek integration into a common society. Given the smaller scale of migration into Europe and relatively large majority populations, the melting pot analogy does not have a lot to offer Europe since the category of European does not have the same resonance as the category of American in the USA. The Canadian model is more promising but ultimately is also not transferable to Europe. This can be characterized as liberal communitarianism, that is liberalism modified by communitarianism. The basis of Canadian multiculturalism is the public recognition of large-scale ethnic groups formed as a result of migration. This understanding of multiculturalism does not require a strong commitment to a common national culture but does require strong state recognition of cultural diversity. Unlike the US model, groups rights are central to Canadian multiculturalism. This ultimately amounts to a pluralism that does not require a common public culture. It is a model of multiculturalism that is not without its critics. Kymlicka argues that there is an important distinction between the claims of migrants and the claims of pre-settled population and only the latter should be the recipient of group rights (there is the

quite separate question of national self-determination for autonomous political entities)<sup>21</sup>. While some degree of group rights are an essential part of every democratically constituted society in order to reduce inequalities, social integration requires more secure foundations. The Canadian model of multiculturalism is a rights based approach that does not aim at creating a common public culture, but at creating viable ethnic communities. This may be a viable model for Canada, but for Europe it would convert diversity into fragmentation.

Europe must create its new forms of multiculturalism. The various national traditions do not offer a basis. As it is well known, France adheres to a strict separation of the private and the public making impossible the public recognition of ethnic communities. More flexible than France with regard to the public recognition of ethnicity and group specific demands, German nationality is principally determined by descent or blood rather than by birth, and dual nationality is not possible. The result of this is that many members of ethnic minorities who have been born in Germany do not have German citizenship by virtue of birth and are unable to acquire it without surrendering their other nationality. Multiculturalism in Europe has generally been understood to be a means of containing minority cultures within their respective communities. It presupposed a clear separation from the majority culture of the host society. This approach did not entail a coherent policy as in Canada today whereby minority communities have official recognition and receive state support for schools. Multiculturalism in Europe was less formal and often shaped by the social circumstances of migrant and ethnic communities. In many cases the assumption was that migrants would return to their country of origin and would not have any significant impact on the host country.

The assumptions of multiculturalism have been undermined by social and cultural developments relating both to ethnic communities and to the wider society. In many countries ethnic communities have become large-scale minority groups who have become permanent residents. While many have been assimilated into the mainstream population, many others have developed strong ties to the host country while remaining within their traditional communities. In such cases it is not possible to speak of separate cultures that have to be separately managed. The assumption that ethnicity belonged to the private domain separate from the shared culture of the public domain has also been undermined. Despite controversy about the Muslim women veiling in public contexts, the general trend in European societies has been towards a less clear-cut separation of the private and the public. In several countries there has been official recognition of ethnic diversity. Multiculturalism has entered the mainstream society through changing life-styles and new forms of consumption. The mainstream society is no longer culturally

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<sup>21</sup> W. KYMLICKA, *Multicultural Citizenship*, Oxford, 1995.

separate from ethnic communities whose culture has become diffused in many ways. Many critics most notably have argued that group differentiated rights are more important than the collective rights of ethnic communities<sup>22</sup>. This argument effectively undermines multiculturalism in shifting the focus away from cultures as holistic groups to specific groups as defined by social disadvantages. The aim of a more pluralistic multiculturalism should be the reduction of such disadvantages rather than pursuit of cultural autonomy or even diversity.

Patterns of migration have changed. Many migrants are individual and are not easily located within minority cultures. While an individually based rights approach has tended to replace multiculturalism, it has not solved the problems of the social integration of minority groups. For these reasons it is time to look for a different kind of multiculturalism that is more in tune with the reality of European societies. There are different objectives to be considered. The promotion of diversity as a desirable goal is often taken to be the aim of multiculturalism today, replacing notions of assimilation and integration. This will entail policies aimed at increasing the representation of minorities in public institutions, for instance, and more general positive recognition of ethnic cultures. A different objective is to remove discrimination and various social disadvantages without aiming at cultural assimilation but also without aiming at cultural separation. This may be along the lines of group differentiated rights. Multiculturalism can also entail a different objective, more akin to the Canadian example, namely the public recognition of distinct cultural communities. These objectives are not incompatible. In order to avoid ghettoization, the third objective will need to coexist alongside the first. The current situation of multiculturalism in Europe entails a mix of all three approaches.

Social integration understood as maximizing social justice can be summed up as entailing the following three characteristics: recognition, redistribution, and citizenship. Recognition entails the recognition of identity claims. A multicultural society must recognise the validity of the different cultures within it. Recognition can take various forms, including the legal recognition of rights as well as the absence of discriminatory practices. Without a commitment to redistributive justice, multiculturalism is weak. Solidarity is a key component of multiculturalism. Citizenship as participation in the political community is also an essential part of multiculturalism, which traditionally has tended to ignore citizenship.

In sum, the creation of a pluralist, multicultural and democratic society requires a strong commitment to rights, but requires a more broadly based framework of values. These values will not entirely flow from rights but will also not on their own be adequate to sustain a multicultural society. The values that need to be

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<sup>22</sup> I.M. YOUNG, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, New Haven, 1990.

developed pertain to wider issues of social justice. The normative implication of this is what can be called cosmopolitan social justice. Conceived in terms of cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism includes the project of creating a more inclusive kind of society. European societies need to give expression to a cosmopolitan public culture in which all social groups find a way to live with differences. This cannot be achieved only by the state or by the EU but requires the active involvement of different groups. It does however require a new way to imagine Europe. In this context the notion of a European commonwealth can be introduced.

### *Conclusion: The Idea of a European Commonwealth*

The project of European integration is today faced with several crises: 1) widespread social fragmentation and new forms of social exclusion; 2) the marginalization of migrants and ethnic minorities; 3) the rise of the extreme right and xenophobic currents and 4) the failure of the EU to secure popular legitimation. Instead of becoming a source of hope, the project of European integration has become a focus of anxiety. It would appear the European project is in the throes of a major crisis of legitimation. This is more than a crisis of political legitimacy; it is more far-reaching and could be called a crisis of values. The truth is that the EU no longer has a cultural or political sense of direction. It lacks strong appeal for citizens who also are not fundamentally opposed to it. This does not mean that nation-states have the appeal the EU lacks. The collective sense of purpose that was a feature of most post-1945 societies has ceased to inspire today, save for what is preserved in nationalist rhetoric. Social values are in crisis everywhere. The problems of the integration of minorities is only one aspect of a wider sense of social fragmentation.

The idea of a European commonwealth suggests a vision of Europe that is more inclusive than the existing models, which are ultimately based on various degrees of trade-offs between the national and the transnational. None of these models of Europe offers a reference point for identity or loyalties. The creation of a European commonwealth places the public at the centre of Europe. This is a cosmopolitan conception of Europe as a multiethnic and multinational political community that is also constituted as a normative regional order in the world. Cosmopolitanism concerns processes of self-transformation in which new cultural forms take shape and where new spaces of discourse open up leading to a transformation in the social world. It has a critical role to play in opening up discursive spaces of openness. As a cosmopolitan political community, such a European commonwealth entails the interaction of its components. It is not merely a matter of diversity. Such interaction takes many forms, but most importantly it is achieved through public communication.

There is a need for a wide-ranging debate on political community in Europe. The debate in 2005 on the draft constitutional treaty was the beginning of such a debate. Although this was in many ways inadequate and referenda are not the ideal way for a society to deliberate on its values and orientation, it has precipitated a crisis. The current hiatus offers important opportunities for the European project to be relaunched around new ideas.