International relations and warfare technology have reached such sophistication that they have apparently rendered international wars a relic of the past. For these and other regional reasons, a conflict between China and Taiwan seems impossible to conceive. However, since national unification is the most important agenda of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan will return, in one way or the other, to the Mainland, as reported in the last Pentagon report on China, released in May 2019, “Taiwan persistently remains China’s main ‘strategic direction.’”

A strategic direction further highlighted by the recent Global Times editorial where the government’s newspaper explicitly talked about Beijing’s willingness to turn Taiwan into a new Lebanon if circumstances arise (referring to the Israeli bombing campaign against Lebanon in 2006). Along with the newspaper message, Chinese jet fighters crossed the Taiwan Strait median line in March 2019, a military action not undertaken since 2012. The question is, therefore, not if but when this could happen. Thinking outside the box is a necessary exercise worth practicing. Hence, the following analysis explains why 2019 could represent a turning point for current Sino-Taiwanese relations.

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s January 2019 speech directed at Taiwan compatriots and Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen’s counter-response represent two crucial settings shaping this year’s Sino-Taiwanese relations. Xi proposed the “one-country-two-system” model for national unification, while Tsai immediately rejected it, stressing that no proposal for unification coming from Beijing could be accepted. This clearly demonstrates the absolute political distance between the two political entities over any agreement leading to unification.

According to this exchange of messages, it is also clear that the agendas of Taiwan and China regarding Sino-Taiwanese relations are in direct conflict with one another, except, however, for one blurry aspect: the 1992 Consensus, whose aim was to acknowledge the existence of only one China, e.g. Mainland China (the PRC). Even if both parties still agree on the validity of the agreement, they apply, however, two contradictory interpretations of what it means to have only one China with Taipei and Beijing claiming respectively to be the real China.

Therefore, what elements would make 2019 the real showdown in current Sino-Taiwanese relations? There are historical as well as political reasons. Historically speaking, China cares a lot about date symbolism, especially when the number 9 is involved. In this case, 2019 represents the one hundredth anniversary of the so-called May Fourth Movement; a gathering of students criticizing the newly born republican institutions, established in 1911, for how the Chinese government handled the outcome of the First World War. The year 2019 also represents –  depending on how you look at it – the seventieth anniversary of the foundation of the People’s Republic of China (1949), or the thirty-year gap that separates China from the one-hundredth anniversary of the PRC (2049); the date in which Beijing, according to Xi Jinping’s plan, would definitely reach superpower status. The year 2019 also marks the fortieth anniversary of the first “Message to the compatriots in Taiwan,” through which Beijing has been trying to normalize its relations with Taipei.

Moreover, in 1959 China had to quell the Tibetan uprising. Ten years later, China and Russia had border skirmishes, while in 1979 China conducted its last major international war against Vietnam. In the same year, the US and Taiwan also signed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), a measure through which the US committed itself to providing defensive military equipment to Taipei in case of war. In 1989, the PRC, with bloodshed, suppressed the historic Tiananmen movement, in 1999 the NATO air force bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and finally in 2009 Beijing conducted a repressive campaign against the Uighurs, the ethnic Islamic group living in Xinjiang. According to this context, 2019 could seriously become a year worth keeping in mind for future generations and Taiwan seems to be the next target, since Xi Jinping seems determined to focus on the reunification issue during his presidency in order to reach national rejuvenation.

This last objective brings us to the political reasons. Because of growing domestic issues, Xi Jinping is eager to prove that his political authority – and therefore the Communist Party’s rule – over Chinese society bears fruit. For instance, at the military level, his political objective focuses on how China can perform and win military missions even if it has not fought a major war since 1979. Despite the rhetoric about the magnificent economic progress and military strength China has achieved under Communist leadership, Chinese people are growing impatient with the current trade war with the US and the evident struggle the Communist regime is experiencing in challenging it. Moreover, the Chinese government’s continuous expectation that its citizens conform to the 996 working system – which refers to working from 9am to 9pm every day, 6 days a week – is another example of why the Chinese people are becoming more frustrated with their government. A frustration that has also spread out on Github, the popular online platform where people post their grievances about 996. Part of the growing popular unrest is also related to the unfinished national unification that Beijing claimed to have the strength to complete.

In this regard, evidence has been provided about the existence of a Chinese military plan to attack and finally occupy the island by 2020. The so-called Joint Island Attack Campaign (联合夺岛行动 – lianhe duo dao xingdong) consists of a three-stage military plan to occupy Taiwan (aerial bombing, amphibious landing, and occupation). This plan envisions the application of joint operations, which involve the newly built Chinese navy, the army, the air force, cyber warfare, and also the asymmetric component of China’s maritime strategy, such as the Chinese maritime militia (海上兵民 – haishang bingmin). At the same time, for geopolitical reasons, the final reunification with Taiwan would allow Beijing to finally control “the unsinkable aircraft carrier” (as Taiwan was once defined) in order to break the so-called “first island chain” which is mainly used by the other regional state-actors as a means to control China’s regional expansion.

In addition, current Taiwanese domestic and international politics are further spurring Beijing to embark on this risky endeavor. The closeness between the two countries – symbolized by the historic November 2015 meeting between Xi Jinping and his Taiwanese counterpart, Ma Ying-jeou, leader of the Kuomintang (KMT) – was subsequently undermined by the election in January 2016 of the current Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen, leader of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and a strong advocate of Taiwan’s independence. However, Tsai’s constant, strong support for independence and for a closer military relation with the US, coupled with domestic issues, were at the heart of her defeat in the November 2018 local elections, forcing her to resign as leader of the DPP. This would consequently impede her from running for president in the next 2020 general elections. The result of the last elections clarified the fact that the Taiwanese still prefer to achieve a middle ground with Beijing rather than directly confrontational foreign policy. Taiwan’s currently murky waters politically could then encourage Beijing to move forward militarily. Its increasingly assertive foreign policy could also push Beijing to put the US’ TRA legal commitment to the test, especially now that Washington is run by a retreating and more isolationist administration.

Therefore, in 2019 it is highly possible that China could become more proactive towards Taiwan both for historical and political reasons. According to China’s strategy culture the height of skill is to win wars without fighting, as Sun Tzu’s classic military treatise emphasized, but it is also true that if a war takes place, China’s historic strategic principles put a premium on speed and flexibility.

Nevertheless, there are valid counter-arguments suggesting that 2019 may not be a turning point in Sino-Taiwanese relations: the current confrontation with the US over trade and technology; US President Donald Trump’s renewed commitment to supply Taiwan with weapons; slowing economic growth; the many domestic issues, and the uncertainties surrounding the current international system – like the future of North Korea and the Belt and Road Initiative, to cite just two – all run against a possible Chinese interventionist strategy toward Taiwan. However, if history is of any use, didn’t China, under Mao, at last decide to intervene in the 1950 Korean War even though all the odds were against it, such as the country’s international isolation?

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