This paper will seek to do two things: Firstly providing the reader with an overview and an analysis of the EU’s political, economic and security relations with Japan, China and North Korea.
What does the EU “do” or does not do in terms of politics, economics and security with Tokyo, Beijing and Pyongyang? Are the EU and Japan doing what they have planned and envisioned to do with regards to Asian (and global) security or will their bilateral relations continue to be above all a trade and investment relationship?
Does China perceive Brussels as “real” security actor in Asia and what impact do EU-China trade and investment relations (and the problems associated with them) have on Beijing’s willingness to discuss and work on Asian security with Brussels?
What does North Korea want from Brussels: Aid, money and technical assistance only or also a role and engagement in Northeast Asian security and the resolution of the ongoing nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula?
Secondly, through the analysis of Brussels economic, political and security ties with these three countries it will be sought to draw conclusions on the EU’s overall role and engagement in Asian security.
What does and does not EU security cooperation with Japan, China and (to a lesser extent North Korea) say about the EU’s overall role and engagement in Asian security? Does Europe have a clear-cut and coherent strategy towards Asian politics and security or rather a “set” of ad hoc policies and strategies reacting to “events” on Asia’s political, economic and security agenda?