“Every election in Ukraine is a crucial one”, so goes the joke among Ukraine experts, east and west. Just like with any joke, there’s some truth behind it. In the post-Soviet landscape, the country has always stood out as relatively pluralistic: its politics, though never completely democratic, are highly competitive, and its civil society is habitually described as “vibrant”.[1]
Indeed, this brand of post-Soviet politics is never boring. As Ukrainians are heading to the polls on March 31, it is worth remembering that they have re-elected their president only once since 1991. Moreover, attempts at pushing the system towards a typical presidential authoritarian regime culminated in popular unrest: the so-called Orange Revolution in 2004 and the Euromaidan in 2014.
Ukraine’s civil society has been an important ingredient in the country’s recent history. Yet things are hardly straightforward. After the Orange Revolution, reforms stalled and the executive was hostage to intra-elite brawls. It took little for a new authoritarian turn to materialize with former president Viktor Yanukovych staging a come-back and centralizing his power. At the time, a lot was said about the failure of the “street” revolution to channel its energy into institutional change and sustainable reform. In 2014, however, the Euromaidan turned out to be a very different kind of mass mobilization. Today, Ukraine’s civil society is much more diverse: new actors and new patterns of civic organizing have emerged, and society as a whole seems to be awakening from its post-Soviet slumber, taking a more active stance on a number of fronts.
Liberal pro-reform groups are more consolidated and more proactive. They have greater leverage thanks to unprecedented donor support and the convergence of their work with the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda. New collaborative platforms between civic activists, parliamentarians and members of the cabinet, including the so-called “reform offices” within ministries, have been instituted. Additional independent bodies, such as the Public Integrity Council, composed of civic activists and academics, have been created to provide greater oversight. Several civic platforms and initiatives have made direct contributions to reforms since the Euromaidan.[2]The annexation of Crimea and the military conflict in Donbass have given a boost to the previously modest volunteer movement in Ukraine.
At the same time, radical far-right groups that used to be marginal to Ukraine’s politics have gained prominence. They have increased their symbolic capital due to the military conflict in Donbass and are skillful at exploiting the war and the country’s increasingly polarized politics to their advantage. Although their presence in the parliament is almost negligible,[3]their extra-parliamentary power has been growing and their mobilization potential remains high, especially when compared to other civil society groups.
Public trust in civil society organizations has grown exponentially. According to the polling data from the Razumkov Centre, trust in civil society is at an historic high, while trust in political elites, especially the president, has plummeted. At the end of 2017, over 62% of respondents said that they “fully” or “mostly” trusted volunteer organizations, and 54% – civic organizations. Over 61% of citizens considered the influence of NGOs in contemporary Ukrainian society “strong” or “some”. About 19% of citizens are ready to give NGOs the right to represent their interests in socio-political processes.[4]Another study by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology underscores that voluntary groups enjoy the highest level of public trust among all civil society organizations. The comparison with the data from pre-Euromaidan years is striking: for example, the 2013 Razumkov Center polling data showed that only around 4% trusted NGOs whereas 18% “fully mistrusted” them. Although not many people participate in activities run by civil society organizations, many more donate money. Indeed, the proportion of people donating money in Ukraine more than quadrupled in 2014, and though it recently decreased, the level is still three times higher now than it was in 2013.[5]
At the same time, public trust in the government is low. In another Razumkov Center poll, 80% indicated they do not trust state officials, 77% that they do not trust political parties, 74% that they do not trust the government and 67% that they do not trust the president. There is a widespread sentiment that the ruling elite is back to business as usual.[6]A more recent survey by the IRI shows that the president, the prime minister, and the parliament all face “strong disapproval” from between 77% to 88% of the respondents.
The hope that civil society can be a source of renewal for Ukraine’s politics makes this election cycle different. It signals that civil society as a whole, notwithstanding its diversity, has become a much more political actor and a source of competing claims to legitimacy and authority. This has implications for both how the election will be held and its aftermath. The great professionalism of election monitoring groups and the outspokenness of civic activists in the public sphere raise the costs of open election-rigging and other violations before, during, and after the election. Should the presidential election conclude peacefully, everyone’s eyes will be set on the parliamentary election in October. New political forces stand a good chance of channeling their energy into party politics and bringing a much-needed renewal to Ukraine’s politics.
Such a peaceful scenario should not be taken for granted, however. The competition promises to be fierce and will take place against the background of growing polarization and radicalization in society. Should electoral contention spill into the streets, it is likely to get ugly. Over the past two years, a number of local protests have been highjacked by radical groups and street violence is on the rise.[7]Peaceful mobilization may easily turn into a stand-off between security forces and ultra-nationalist groups. A more conflictual scenario is sure to be exploited by the ruling elite and will be difficult to tackle with political means.
This commentary draws on the author's chapter "How Open Is the Civic Space in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine?" published here.
References
[1]As for example, registered by the USAID’s annual CSO Sustainability Index, see here for the most recent report that includes data on Ukraine
[2]Most notable cases include the Reanimation Package of Reform (RPR), Nashi Groshi,Nova Kraina, and the digital public procurement platform ProZorro.
[3]No radical right-wing group managed to enter parliament during the 2014 election. A few individual MPs, such as, most famously, the ex-leader of the Right Sector Dmytro Yarosh, did so through single-mandate districts.
[4]All the polling data is summarized in this report Razumkov Center. 2018. Ukraine 2017-2018: New Realities, Old Problems (Assessments). Kiev: Razumkov Center.
[5]For comparative data see CAF world giving index
[6]All the polling data is summarized in this report Razumkov Center. 2018. Ukraine 2017-2018: New Realities, Old Problems (Assessments). Kiev: Razumkov Center.
[7]ECRI. 2017. ECRI Report on Ukraine. ECRI Secretariat/Council of Europe; Likhachev, Vyacheslav. 2018. “Far-right Extremism as a Threat to Ukrainian Democracy” Nations in Transit Policy Brief, Freedom House, May 2018; Ishchenko, Volodymyr. 2018. “Nationalist Radicalization Trends in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 529, May 2018.
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