The time has come. The 20th Communist Party Congress, starting on October 16th, is expected to confirm Xi Jinping as Party General Secretary for a third five-year term. Such an outcome has been very likely ever since 2017, after the 19th Party Congress included Xi Jinping’s in the Party Constitution and no plausible successor emerged. A few months later, a new amendment in the Constitution granted him the role of President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for more than two mandates.
Ascension of a leader
At the time of its ascent to the top of the party, Xi Jinping was not intended to become an unrestrained leader. After the rule of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, the role of General Secretary was rather modelled on a dual leadership. Thus, Xi was meant to share the power with the Party’s number two and Premier of the State Council Li Keqiang. Despite that, he immediately overshadowed the rival and centralised the power in his hands. At the Third Plenum of the Party’s Central Committee in the fall of 2013, he reformed the intra-party decision-making system by creating the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms. This body, later rebranded as a “Commission”, put any policy implementation under his direct control. At the end of the 18th Party Congress in November 2012, Xi also issued two essential policies to consolidate its hold over the country: a massive anti-graft campaign and the launched, so-called “China Dream”.
The campaign came at the time of a widespread corruption and allowed Xi to strengthen the Party’s legitimacy, as well as to get rid of his rival factions. While consolidating its grip over the party, Xi also elaborated a clear vision for the future of the country. The “China Dream” may then be seen as a comprehensive manifesto of Xi’s rulership, which revolves around the concept of national rejuvenation. This means bringing China back to the greatness of its ancient past to gain a powerful status by 2049, when the PRC will celebrate its (first) century.
2017: A new thought for a new era
If in the first five-year mandate as General Secretary, Xi Jinping strengthened his power, he dedicated the second one to consolidate his position and to define his role in the Party history. The 19th Party Congress in 2017 represented a watershed moment in the pursue of this aim. At that time, Xi got rid of the vestiges of any political collegial leadership and rose as a de facto absolute dominator of the Party’s life. This is the time when his name was carved into the Party Constitution, with the part dedicated to the political contribution of the Fifth generations, mentioning Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.
Such a formulation anticipated the Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century, promulgated in 2021. This historical document, the third of its kind within a century, declared the 18th Party Congress in 2012 as the start of a new era characterised by the pursuit of socialist modernisation and national rejuvenation. However, the Resolution also paid particular emphasis on stressing its legacy with the previous experiences of the “new democratic revolution”, the “socialist revolution and construction” and the “reform and opening up of socialist modernisation”, led respectively by Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.
On top of consolidating his personal power, Xi dedicated his second term also to calling the Party to remain united against internal and external enemies, which could appear in the guise of “black swans” – unforeseen incidents – and “grey rhinos” – known but ignored risks. In order to prevent the emergence of threats to political stability, Xi Jinping increased China’s securitisation and tighten the Party’s ideological stance.
Xi Jinping fears that China could face the same fate as the Soviet Union, which collapsed after 70 years of steady rulership, a milestone that the PRC overcame in 2019. However, the rise of Xi’s ideological leadership led to the consolidation of a hostile international environment, as Xi himself often noted.
The age of competition
Power centralisation and consolidation, internal and external struggles characterized Xi’s first ten years in power. Now the 20th Party Congress is expected to discuss mainly about Xi’s future, defining his relationship with power, his ideology and his legacy for years to come. The whole debate will be informed by the concept of “Two Establishes” - Xi himself and Xi’s thought as core of the party politics.
This should also imply discussing about his succession. Xi Jinping was selected as the future leader in 2007, five years before being nominally granted the title of Party’s General Secretary. Therefore, his heir was supposed to emerge in 2017, which did not happen. Given that Xi sees himself as the guarantor of either the Party and China’s success, it is unlikely that someone will be chosen as future leader during the Congress. Indeed, such a decision would implicitly call for an end (even if only in the future) of Xi’s rulership, undermining his legitimacy. Ironically, Xi’s carefully planned rise to power was seen at the time as the final step of the journey from Maoism to institutionalisation. What in fact happened was exactly the opposite, so future cadres will have to rebuild an institutionalised mechanism to replace a charismatic and personalistic leadership.
Now, in his third term, Xi has to take a stand about the degree of openness that he wants for his country. The pre-existing fears of political stability, combined with the strict rules enacted to control the pandemic, led to a halt in international access to China. Domestic mobility is also affected by the unpredictable measures to curb the virus. Moreover, the goal of political stability is also pursued through a strict control of private entrepreneurship, which represented one of the recipes for the success of China’s economy in the last four decades.
In summary, Xi will have to find a new place in the world for China, since his idea of national rejuvenation and the autocratic characteristic of its rulership put the country in direct contrast with the United States of America. What is coming is, as described by the Biden-Harris Administration’s National Security Strategy published on October 12th, an “age of competition”.
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