Crisis to watch 2023: Migrations
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The World Ahead 2023

Crisis to watch 2023: Migrations

Gerald Knaus
|
Pascal Franz
24 December 2022

In June 2022, as every summer, UNHCR published its Annual Global Trends report. UNHCR reported that the number of forcibly displaced people in the world had risen to 89 million. It also noted that the number of refugees under its mandate – individuals who received international protection, either as a group or following a positive asylum decision –stood at 21.3 million in December 2021.

This was a striking figure: the number of refugees under the UNHCR mandate worldwide had been 19.9 million in December 2017. While much of the communication of UNHCR focused on the headline figure of 89 million, the fact that in four years – from the end of 2017 to the end of 2021 – the number of refugees in the world had only increased by 1.4 million – should have led to serious reflections. Even more so, as UNHCR also noted that one of the most important ways in which this number increased was the births of an estimated 350,000 children to refugee parents each year.

There is a widespread assumption in many global discussions on refugee trends that the number of refugees in the world is bound to increase sharply in the future, partly because of the misleading impression that it has increased sharply in the recent past. The language of “migratory pressure” appears to suggest that this is an era of ever-growing refugee numbers, due to demographic trends and displacement driven by climate change. But this is misleading. Understanding why is key to predict what might happen in 2023 to refugee and irregular migratory movements.

The number of refugees in the world under UNHCR’s mandate increased by only 1.4 million in four years because the single most important variable determining it is politics - the policies of governments trying to stop irregular crossings of their borders. Conflicts or natural catastrophes trigger displacement. What they do not determine is whether those displaced are then able to leave their country, even if they wish. When governments close their borders by force, build walls and fences and engage in violent pushback, refugee numbers will increase little. There were few new refugees crossing Turkey’s borders in 2022, because Ankara’s policy had changed (and fences had been constructed) since 2015. There were no Syrian refugees crossing Israel’s borders since 2011, because Israeli policy was to prevent it. Where borders are closed by force, as is the case today in countries surrounding Syria and Afghanistan, and across much of the world, the number of displaced who are able to become refugees drops dramatically. When governments allow people in need of protection to cross borders, grant protection and ensure sufficient accommodation, the number of refugees in the world increases.

1.4 million: this is the number of refugees who fled from Ukraine to the European Union in just a few weeks following the Russian invasion on 24 February. They could enter the EU legally, without smugglers or risking their lives, and were granted immediate temporary protection. As a result, by the end of 2022 more than 4.6 million Ukrainians had applied for protection in the EU alone. They could do so because of a political decision. It is politics, not unmeasurable “migration pressures”, that determines the numbers of refugees in the world.

Politics is the key variable when it comes to understanding refugee movements in 2022 and 2023. The cause of the largest refugee movement in Europe since the 1940s has a name: Vladimir Putin. There were no Ukrainian refugees in the EU before the Russian president made the decision to attack his neighbour in February 2022. The course of the war, and in particular the success of the Ukrainian military to push back the invading army from April onwards, led to significant returns of Ukrainian refugees back to their homeland. From late February to mid-December there were 8.4 million crossings from Ukraine to Poland, but 6.6 million crossings the other way. The same happened at other EU-Ukraine borders.

So what will be the number of Ukrainian refugees in 2023? How many might flee, how many return? The only good answer is that it all depends on the outcome of the war. In case of a Russian defeat, it is plausible to assume that millions of Ukrainian refugees would return. In case of a Russian victory, or further destruction of essential infrastructure during a cold winter, it is responsible to prepare for millions more to flee. In that case, European democracies will face a refugee stress test unlike any since the 1940s. 

[1]

So far, most Ukrainians have been hosted privately in a small number of European countries (see tables). This remains the key to hosting so many decently: that private households continue to welcome them, and that European countries which welcomed few so far will accept more in 2023. France, Spain and Italy have together welcomed fewer Ukrainian refugees in 2022 than the Czech Republic (with less than 11 million inhabitants). Much will depend on whether this changes in 2023.

[2]

Other movements were significantly smaller. 2022 saw some 143,000 people cross the Mediterranean irregularly. Here the single most important factor has been the stark contrast between different routes. Almost 100,000 crossed to Italy, far more than reached Greece and Spain combined. The low numbers in Greece are the result of a government policy of aggressively pushing back migrants. The result: fewer Syrians and Afghans reached the EU in 2022 irregularly than Tunisians. The main nationalities currently arriving across the Mediterranean rarely qualify for refugee status.

And the rest of the world? There remain a significant number of Venezuelans – who are not counted by UNHCR as “refugees under its mandate” in its statistics – in neighbouring states. In the US, the Trump-era politics of pushing people back at the border with Mexico based on pandemic legislation has remained in place. It is a matter of politics and court decisions whether this continues. Asia remains an asylum desert, with borders largely closed to refugees. Most refugee movements outside of Europe have taken place in Africa in 2022. This is likely to continue.

The most important global trend in 2022 has been one that surprises many observers: Europe remains the main continent of refugees. It looks like this may remain true in 2023. As a result, the policies of European states and the course of war in Ukraine remain for now the most important determinants of global refugee movements.

 

[1] UNCHR, Ukraine Refugee Situation Dashboard, accessed on 12 December 2022.

[2] UNCHR, Ukraine Refugee Situation Dashboard, accessed on 12 December 2022.

 

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Versione stampabile

AUTHORS

Gerald Knaus
ESI
Pascal Franz
ESI

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