For Libya, 2021 will end with the betrayed hope of a change of course. The now postponed elections can only be the first step of a bigger transition.
2021 was an extremely complex year for Libya. It kicked off with the appointment of Jan Kubis as the new Special Envoy on Libya and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya. A former Minister for Foreign Affairs in Slovakia, Mr Kubis took over from Stephanie Williams of the United States. Ms. Williams and her predecessor, Ghassan Salamé, can take credit for the success of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum – a body made up of 75 members drawn from civil society and the world of politics – in the election of a new transitional government, the GNU, on 5 February, headed by the Prime Minister, Abdulhamid Mohammed al-Dbeibah. A businessman with a background of international study, who hails from an influential family from Misrata, Dbeibah, unlike his predecessor Fayez al-Serraj, gave high priority to international relations and economic agreements from the outset. Over the months, he has strengthened his position – both at home and abroad – and even succeeded in extending his influence to areas to which his government does not theoretically have access.
The GNU, after all, was established for transitional purposes only, to lead the country into the presidential and parliamentary elections, scheduled for 24 December 2021 and around which doubts and discontent have grown week after week. Many doubts remain, however, on both the political and social fronts. The country is emerging from a ten-year civil war, played out in three main stages (2011-2014-2019), which has further unravelled its social fabric and weakened its already fragile economy. To date, despite possessing considerable oil wealth, Libya still lacks the infrastructure network that is a prerequisite for economic progress. The majority of its citizens are State-employed, and this has damaged private enterprise, which even the 40-year dictatorship of Colonel Gaddafi never invested in. With the violent downfall of the latter’s government in 2011, the regime’s weapons stocks were plundered and fell into private hands. The arms embargo implemented and continuously renewed by the United Nations ever since the time of the revolution has never been complied with, and several foreign countries have been keeping the various militias on the ground supplied with light and heavy weapons.
Libya now has a population of around 6 million – including 585,000 migrants and refugees, as well as some 400,000 internally displaced people – and over 20 million weapons in the hands of groups that are not accountable to the State, which does not currently even have a monopoly on force. The two main regions – Tripolitania and Cyrenaica – veer between political tension and armed conflict, while total anarchy reigns in Fezzan, in the south. In these circumstances, structural reforms and a coordinated, inclusive institutional approach have been impossible, with the result that citizens still have no access to the most basic services, such as water (Libya has one of the world’s lowest volumes of drinking water per head), electricity and healthcare. On the economic front, the desperate need for diversification away from hydrocarbon production, in favour of investment in private enterprise, has never been met. In a country composed mainly of desert, with no organised control over its immense borders, there is little to stop illicit traffic and movements of armed men, including terrorist cells, as we have seen in the past. Paris’s decision to pull out of hot spots in the Sahel, furthermore, will facilitate not only the steady growth of criminal groups, but also the incursion of private contractors, such as the Russian Wagner Group, which already operates in many African countries, including Libya. The Russian presence poses a threat to any kind of democratic transition, but is not, apparently, being taken seriously enough by Western governments. Against this critical backdrop, the elections that have looked like the light at the end of the tunnel for most of the population, are at risk of remaining a mirage.
The possible scenarios for 2022 are inextricably linked with these elections. If the first round of the presidential election actually takes place at the beginning of next year, in such a polarised country, the result – whatever it may be – is likely to be disputed and there may be further armed conflict, which would delegitimise any new political scenario. If this happened, the parliamentary elections would be postponed indefinitely.
A more likely scenario, perhaps, is that covert efforts by certain Libyan political groups will cause the elections to be postponed to a yet to be defined date, thus increasing the population’s disillusionment with a ruling class that is incapable of addressing the real needs of its citizens. Although disappointing, this scenario poses the least risk to security. A conflict triggered by fraud and subsequent disputes would be devastating, not least because its repercussions would be long-lasting.
