The European Union needs to be strategic in its engagement with the outside world in 2023. This is particularly true in relations with the United States, China and Russia. That strategic engagement will involve making hard choices — choices that too often hide behind the phrases that show up in European strategy documents, like principled pragmatism, effective multilateralism, cooperative regionalism and strategic autonomy. Europeans have a strong sense of shared values. They believe in the importance of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, environmental sustainability and the peaceful resolution of conflict. Where Europeans struggle is when those values appear to be in tension with one-another either because resources are limited and priorities differ from one European to the next, or because outside forces and actors force Europeans to make compromises. These are the moments when values are not a good guide, because they exist on all sides of the argument.
The transatlantic relationship presents a host of tough decisions. Europeans and Americans have different ways of thinking about public procurement, for example. This has become a major concern in the European response to the Biden Administration’s Inflation Reduction Act. Europeans believe strongly in levelling the playing field; Americans want the home team to have a local advantage. This difference in public procurement has always existed. Europeans have no more hope of convincing Americans to stop buying local than Americans have of convincing Europeans to abandon their rules for state aid when different Member States have such different abilities to distort market competition.
By the same token, Europeans have a strong interest in seeing the United States take effective climate action. Despite its name, the Inflation Reduction Act is the most important piece of climate legislation passed through Congress in recent memory. Europeans should be hoping for the success of that legislation. Europeans also have a strong interest in encouraging greater transatlantic trade and investment. Most important, Europeans need to work with the United States in matters of security, technological innovation and the joint exercise of global leadership. Whatever Europeans choose to address in this tangled web of concerns, that choice should be strategic.
The choices Europeans face in dealing with China should be strategic as well. Europeans have a long history of making difficult compromises where China is concerned. China’s record in terms of human rights and the rule of law is no secret. Neither is China’s approach to foreign direct investment, public procurement or market competition. In many ways, the obvious nature of the compromises required to do business with China made it easy to focus on the economic gains to be had from engagement. The European Union did not play a strong role in the deepening involvement of European governments, firms and individuals in China; these actors were free to make their own compromises in the pursuit of unique advantages.
Now it is clear that this individualistic approach has reached its limits. China is too influential and the compromises the Chinese government can demand from individuals, firms and national governments are too important for Europeans as a collective to ignore. Moreover, the Chinese government has a different agenda in those areas where European values are most affected. If Europeans are to assert their interests, they will have to do so together. Indeed, China may be powerful enough that Europeans will only have an effective voice when working in partnership with the United States. That is a choice Europeans will have to make.
A third set of choices concerns Russia and Ukraine. The European Union responded to Russia’s war on Ukraine with unity, determination and flexibility. The introduction of sanctions, the provision of assistance and the reception of innocent civilians displaced by the conflict has been impressive. So has the ability of European institutions to redeploy finances, to coordinate assistance and create new forms of institutional solidarity for the people of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. The hard choice is what to do next. This war represents a major turning point in European political development where muddling through is not an option. Having Member State governments use the war as an opportunity to play games with the European Union’s decision-making procedures should not be an option either.
The choices Europeans face in the Russia-Ukraine war will have global implications. They will have a powerful impact on relations with the United States and China. They will also have an impact on how the European Union relates to Ukraine and Russia. Somehow Europeans will have to balance the desire for peace with the requirements for stability, both now and over the longer term. More fundamentally, the European Union will have to decide whether to treat Ukrainians and Russians as ‘European’ — as actors and not objects in this collective decision-making. That choice may sound like a matter of identity politics, but it is strategic. How the European Union chooses to treat Ukrainians and Russians in resolving this conflict will determine how those people regard their position in Europe. And it is a choice that Europeans cannot escape.
Unfortunately, this kind of strategic decision making is easier said than done. The European Union is capable of great solidarity and focus, as the early response to the war in Ukraine illustrates. The incoming Swedish Presidency will work hard to maintain that level of unity to begin preparing for the huge efforts that will be required to help Ukraine recover once the war comes to an end. And yet the governments of Europe are also easily distracted and divided. The debate over the Inflation Reduction Act is likely to continue focusing on the needs of individuals sectors, like automotive or batteries. The debate over China will take place primarily at the national level, with countries like Germany and Hungary seeking to carve out special relationships. The challenge for the European Union will be to avoid such distractions and focus on the wider European interest.
Erik Jones is Director of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute.
