One of the most urgent threats to counterterrorism is now the reentry of jihad fighters, trained in and hardened by combat experience and able to execute complex and coordinated terrorist attacks in their countries of origin. Along with the menace of attacks, there is also an increased risk of tied to the rapid radicalization process that returnees can trigger in emarginated young people in the big Western metropolises, thanks also to the allure that veteran jihadists exert[4].

The purpose of this paper is to try to fill a void in sector publications, examining the current situation of Italian jihadist returnees from SIRAQ and the threat they pose to the nation. While their numbers are numerically small, the analysis takes into account the fact that the global jihadist phenomenon makes it impossible to assess the risks for Italy without looking at further facts and particularities.

This article examines the various types of returnees, from the disillusioned to the opportunists and the “sleeper” agents, because it is necessary to meticulously evaluate the threat posed by every single FTF returnee. And so we point out the potential ways and routes to reenter Italy and then cite the repressive measures that Italy has put in place, substantially based on previous experiences in combatting domestic terrorism and organized crime[5]. We also mention various European experiments in combatting violent extremism (CVE), with reference to the first Italian law bill aimed at preventing jihadist-based radicalization.  In the conclusions we attempt to delineate the jihadist situation in Italy and, finally, emphasize the need for a multi-disciplinary approach to deal with returnees and with violent radicalization, which combines security policies with long-term social-work strategies[6].

General information and FTF risks

The jihadist movement, constantly adapting to social dynamics and international politics, is currently in a stage of revamping after the self-proclaimed Islamic State’s loss of territory and resources. ISIS’ transformation from a “Caliphate” headed by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to a clandestine insurrectionist organization will probably allow it and its ideology to survive and restructure[7].

The other main jihadist group in the area, and traceable to the al-Qa’ida galaxy (Hayat Tahrir al Sham – HTS after the group’s latest name change) is strengthening and weaving new alliances, probably to step into the void ISIS has left behind; the al-Qa’ida leadership, consisting of “first-generation jihadists” had taken a more pragmatic approach to the Syrian-Iraqi conflict, lurking in Da’ish’s shadow while revamping its own logistic-operational network[8].

Assessing today’s terrorist threat requires analyzing the phenomenon of returnees, i.e., the FTF fighting in SIRAQ since 2011 and now going back to their home countries (or already arrived, as we shall see). To contextualize the situation we must first of all give an unequivocal definition to foreign terrorist fighter: in fact, the terrorist adjective is viewed rather differently in different parts of the world[9], so much so that in the international context it is impossible to find a shared definition. For the limited purpose of this article we will refer to the definition the United Nations gave in Resolution 2178/2014[10].

The FTF phenomenon is hardly new, when we think of the previous generation who fought, for example, in Afghanistan, Bosnia or Chechnya and returned to Western countries creating the “European al-Qa’ida network”[11]. Persons who can accomplish devastating attacks thanks to the experience they acquired in active combat, and also become jihadization vectors for other people because of the allure returnees have for individuals who feel marginalized from society, are in existential conflict and view jihad as a means of retaliating and claiming individual and social identity.

More than 42,000 FTF traveled to Syria and Iraq from more than 120 nations, which are now faced with the problem of returnee “management”. The UN estimates that about 30% of foreign terrorist fighters have already returned, raising great alarm about the possibility of attacks[12]. In Europe some 1500 mujahidin have returned, out of the 5000-odd who left for SIRAQ[13].

Citing some figures for European countries, in the United Kingdom alone about 400 FTF have returned, while in Germany the census is of 274[14]. According to the director of France’s General Directorate for Internal Security (DGSI), the number of returnees can be estimated as 400 to 500 while the Belgian authorities have counted 121. In Sweden some 140 FTF have come home[15].

These are numbers that Italy will have to reckon with, too, in addition to the groups of Tunisian returnees and those from the Balkans (800 and 300 individuals, respectively); the latter are from countries geographically close to Italy, making the country easy for them to travel to and a destination of choice[16].

And then we must consider the returnees still at large: not all FTF have been “registered” by police forces and some are authentic jihad “commuters” who travel from Europe to SIRAQ for short periods of time so that their absences are not noted. Furthermore, even for FTF identified as such, it is hard to prove their terrorist activities because of the scantiness of information coming from the combat areas and because they are unwilling to admit to any crimes they may have committed[17]. In most cases the returnees tell investigators that they “provided humanitarian assistance” or “logistic support”, denying having fought or been given paramilitary training.

However, a number of interviews Anne Speckhard and Ahmet S. Yayla held with individuals who defected from ISIS reveal that ISIS gave weapon and explosives training to all the FTF entering Syria and Iraq. The aspiring fighters were in fact sent to training camps where they remained for several weeks, getting paramilitary training as well as lessons in Islam and jihad ideology[18].

Returnees to Europe

The great risk posed by returnees regards their training and combat experience as well as their links to the international terrorism network. Their de-sensitization to the use of violence, together with the post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) that usually results from combat experience and their possible involvement in atrocities like those that ISIS has widely publicized, heightens the threat from returnees[19].

The UN Security Council’s Counterterrorism Agency stated, in fact, that while the earliest returnees from the Syrian-Iraqi conflict were mainly young men with little ideological indoctrination, the second wave of returnees – resulting from ISIS’ continual loss of territory - could consist of much more dangerous people able to carry out complex terrorist attacks[20].

Returnees have already played an important role in Europe in various recent terrorist attacks, beginning with the one Mehdi Nemmouche carried out in Brussels in 2014[21]; some of the worst attacks in Europe and the United States in recent years were perpetrated by one or more returnees from SIRAQ, at times together with young people radicalized at home, as in the cases of Paris and Brussels[22]. A recent study of the terrorist attacks in Europe and North America in the past three years also found a higher degree of lethality in attacks by commandos even just partially composed of returnees, confirming the aforesaid hypotheses[23].

Assessing the returnees risk

The first information important to assessing a returnee’s threat is the length of their stay in SIRAQ; the longer they lived in the conflict area the greater their combat experience and ideological convictions will be[24]. A short stay in those territories might instead imply a FTF’s disenchantment with his direct experience of the so-called caliphate, which could be utilized as a weapon to counter jihadist ideology[25].

And then we have to analyze the reasons for the mujahidin’s return home, comparing the declarations made with the results of in-depth investigation to verify what was stated; family pressures, nostalgia for one’s former life, illness and wounds do not, in fact, presuppose a basic renunciation of jihad tenets.

Jihad returnees can be divided into four large categories, bearing in mind the risk that such generalizations have in assessing individuals whose personal experiences may be totally different. The first category, already pointed out, is the disillusioned and traumatized who voluntarily left Da’ish-controlled territories; a second group of returnees is instead composed of so-called “opportunists”, persons not ideologically disillusioned by jihad but “compelled” to leave for family reasons, illness, wounds or other. These are people who could depart for other combat zones because of their unchanged ideological motivation or become recruiters at home.

The third category of returnees consists of the captured or in any case repatriated against their will; for them the prison environment may become a springboard for extremist ideas, enabling already radicalized and violent people to create a network of persons potentially receptive to antisocial messages[26]. It should be borne in mind that various terrorist cells were formed during their members’ concomitant incarceration, as occurred in Camp Bucca (Iraq); from 2004 on that camp served as prison for the most dangerous local jihadists, who formed alliances and planned creation of the group that would eventually become ISIS[27].

The final group of returnees, surely the most dangerous, is composed of sleeper agents. Returnees who run sleeper cells and organizations in Europe or other nations for the purpose of attacking and further shifting media focus from the Middle East to the West. According to intelligence estimates, hundreds of these agents have already returned to Europe (see, for example, the Paris massacre in November 2015) and form the backbone of ISIS on the continent, a reference point for FTF still in Turkey or about to leave SIRAQ[28].

Italian foreign terrorist fighters

According to the latest official estimates, there are 125 Italian foreign terrorist fighters; of them thirty-seven are believed to have died in SIRAQ while another twenty-two have returned to Europe. Ten of these have returned to Italy[29]. The group of Italian returnees can also be divided into the preceding categories and Italian intelligence’s assessment of the threat they present requires an in-depth analysis of their lives and experiences. The following are the histories of a number of returnees that give an idea of the Italian jihadist panorama, with its particularities and differences from the rest of Europe. The information was gathered from published open-source intelligence (OSINT) on individuals registered as FTF.

Some have already returned and are being treated in clinics for mental disorders, such as Giampiero Filangieri, arrested in Erbil (Iraqi Kurdistan) in 2014 and extradited to Italy in May 2015[30]. Age thirty-seven, Calabrian in origin and a resident of the Bologna province, Filangieri was considered by his relatives to be “a problem-ridden kid, easily influenced” who converted to Islam and began to frequent radical circles. In 2008 he traveled to Granada, Spain, where he was hospitalized after being beaten. Fleeing the hospital despite a 90-day prognosis, he disappeared until he was finally located on the Turkish border thanks to conversations traced on Whatsapp[31].

There was a similar history for Dannoune el Mehdi, Morocco-born but a naturalized Italian citizen who lived in Biella; the twenty-three year old was cited by various open sources as having spent some time in Syria, after which he returned to Europe where he was treated for mental disorders in a medical facility outside Italy[32]. In both cases, therefore, the decision to join the fighting in SIRAQ was based on their psychological problems and not on the ideological or religious convictions usually associated with FTF.

A different group of returnees instead consists of the so-called “Cologno Monzese fighters”[33], a group of Syrians living in Lombardy who as early as 2012 had attacked their embassy in Rome and carried out reprisals against pro-Assad persons in Milan[34]. While these are Syrian mujahidin they fall into the FTF category as residents of a country different from where they went to fight[35]. The best-known returnee to Italy is surely Ammar Bacha, thirty-nine, who returned in July 2013 for treatment of a combat wound. After his passport was seized, Bacha was interviewed about his experience and stated that he had fought against Bashar al-Assad’s troops, specifying that he was willing to return to Syria[36].

The leader of the group of Syrians departing from Cologno Monzese was forty-four year old Haisam Sakhanh; after leading the attack on the Syrian embassy in Rome in 2012 he left with his friends for Syria, adopting the kunya of Abu Omar in the “katiba Suleiman”[37]. He engaged in armed combat and was immortalized in a video (later published by The New York Times) while killing soldiers in cold blood. In 2013 he managed to enter Belgium and afterwards Sweden where he demanded political asylum as a Syrian refugee. The Swedish police arrested him after comparing his fingerprints with those provided by Italian investigators. Sakhanh was recently given a life sentence for war crimes[38].

Another Syrian departing from Cologno Monzese was Anter Chaddad, who went to Syria with his brother Manar in 2012 and then reentered Italy (Erba) in 2015. A local deputy consulted the Ministry of the Interior to find out about Chaddad’s activities in Italy and the level of police surveillance he was being given[39].

Twenty-six year old Eldin Hodza is another returnee from jihad in SIRAQ; from Kosovo and a resident of Bolzano, he was arrested during the Carabinieri’s  “JWEB” operation in November 2015. Hodza was part of a terrorist cell operating in Trentino with ties to at least five other nations and led by the extremist preacher Faraj Ahmad Najmuddin, alias Mullah Krekar. The Kosovar went to Syria in 2014 thanks to the logistic and financial support of the transnational organization. After a period of arms training, Hodza reentered Italy where he engaged in proselytism and recruitment[40]. The Bolzano Court of Appeals recently confirmed first-judgment sentences for all the members of the Merano cell[41].

A case that caused a sensation in England concerned Sicilian Gianluca Tomaselli, who moved to England and converted to Islam. Married and the father of two children, he rapidly radicalized and in 2013 went to Syria to join the ranks of a group connected to ISIS, using the nom de guerre Abu Abdullah al-Britani. Reentering England in late 2014, he returned to a normal life, even getting a job as parking attendant at a London hospital[42]. The Telegraph made an example of his case to emphasize the very low percentage (12.5%) of FTF that have been arrested and sentenced on their return to England[43].

Tunisian Moez Abdelkhader al Fezzani, in Italy known as Abu Nassim, is instead a first-generation jihadist, whose first arrest in Italy for terrorist acts dates from 1997. Fleeing to Peshawar, he joined the jihad and became the emir of the Tunisian contingent of al-Qa’ida. After capture he was imprisoned at the Bagram base in Afghanistan and then sent to Guantanamo, from which he was extradited to Italy in 2009. When his sentence terminated in 2012 he was deported to Tunisia where after the Arab Spring he joined the Ansar al-Shari’ah group and moved to Syria to fight in ISIS ranks, becoming the leader of the special forces of the notorious al-Battar battalion[44]. In 2014 he was sent to Libya to set up training camps in Sabratha and recruit fighters[45]. Al-Fezzani appears to have been arrested in November 2016 in Sudan, where he had hidden to avoid capture. He was apparently betrayed by his contacts with the old Milanese jihadist network, which recruited FTF and financed his stay in hiding.

Eli Bombataliev is a 38-year-old Czech citizen arrested in Foggia in July 2017. In Italy since 2012, the man was targeted by European intelligence because of his movements between Italy and Belgium after returning from Syria in 2015. Bombataliev had taken part in the attack on the “Press House” in Grozny in 2014, going on to wage jihad with ISIS in Syria in 2014 and 2015. His work of proselytism and recruitment in a cultural center in Foggia, as well as the risk of his returning to Belgium to stage a suicide attack, raised alarms and led to his arrest[46].

The most recent case is that of Lara Bombonati, a twenty-six year old convert to Islam, who took the name of Khadijah. Married to Francesco Muhammad Cascio, also a convert, she went at least twice to Syria, returning the first time after her husband’s death in combat. She was arrested on grounds of association for terrorist purposes on her second return to Italy after being stopped on the Turkey-Syrian border[47]. She had been tasked with proselytizing in Italy and with finding a new husband, to then return to Syria. Her role was presumably that of “courier” between jihadists outside SIRAQ and the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham terrorist group[48].

And then there are cases of people trying to return from combat zones after the Western offensive and territorial collapse of ISIS: the following are some examples of mujahidin who left Italy for Syria or Iraq and have yet to return. We cite them to further convey the extreme diversity of the types of potential returnees in view of the individual assessment that is indispensable when a fighter returns to his country of provenance. One Italian example is Monsef el Mkhayar, a resident of Milan. Fostered by a Milanese family until he came of age, he drank alcohol and also pushed hashish, for which he was arrested and held in San Vittore prison, where he was quickly radicalized. He left for Syria in 2015, aged eighteen, with a friend the same age who had been with him in foster care; in March of this year he told relatives in Italy that he intended to come home. In April he was sentenced by default to eight years’ imprisonment for terrorist acts and recruitment for ISIS, a fact that will probably make him reconsider returning to Italy[49].

Worthy of special mention is one of the best-known Italian FTF, Moroccan Anas el Abboubi. Raised in Italy and a rapper, he quickly radicalized and founded Sharia4Italy, a local section of the better-known Islamist network Sharia4Belgium, responsible for recruiting many Belgian FTFs. In 2013 he was arrested for allegedly planning an attack in Italy but released after 15 days. A group of Balkan jihadists helped him flee Italy and enter Syria, where he took the name Anas al-Italy[50]. In March 2016 a database of more than twenty thousand names of ISIS mujahidin was delivered to German intelligence by a turncoat; the names included that of Abu Rawaha al-Italy, alias Anas el Abboubi, whose file indicated that he had died in a suicide bombing[51]. However, on 28 September 2016 el Abboubi was nonetheless included in the American State Department’s “global designated terrorist” list due to his extreme dangerousness and lack of proof of death[52].

Returnees to Italy: routes and reasons

In addition to the mujahidin who departed from Italy, other FTFs from different nations could reenter Europe through this country, especially if they have been identified at home and have criminal records there. Da’ish fighters in SIRAQ were divided into “homogeneous” battalions based on geographical provenance (Maghreb region, Balkans, etc.) or language (French-speaking, English-speaking, etc.). The networks and ties created during their stays in ISIS-controlled territories can now be used as a logistic network for their return, abetted by the radicalization hubs present in many European metropolises[53].

The importance of personal ties prior to joining a terrorist group is well-known, for another reason as well: to bridge the gap between a radicalized person’s local environment and a transnational jihadist organization you need an enabler. Enablers provide the logistics the future FTF needs to get to the combat zone. In addition, the enabler makes it possible for jihadist groups to preventively vet future mujahidin; this is usually done by means of a tazkiyah, i.e., a recommendation of the future jihadist from a “trusted” member[54].

Where return routes for FTF are concerned, they are generally the ones already set up by the jihadist network to take FTF to Syria and Iraq; using so-called “broken trips”, intermediaries and logistics hubs in Turkey send mujahidin back to their home countries[55]. The preferred routes of return to Italy are the Balkan (via Greece) and the Libyan; which overlap with the flows of migrants entering Italy, with obvious complications for refugee management[56]. Moreover, in some cases the mujahidin fake their deaths in order to travel incognito, especially when they possess fake documents[57].

In general, returnees have different ways of getting home, depending on their situations; they can first of all request help from their consulates, especially if they need new documents, or assistance for under-age children or require hospitalization. Some use the enablers on the Turkey/Syria border that had “handled” their entry into SIRAQ. Finally, others (especially those with criminal records) try to travel with fake documents to intermediate countries in Europe. This latter possibility, already abundantly documented, necessitates greater international police cooperation in sharing FTF data and preparing an investigative interview plan (if possible, prior to veteran reentry).  Cooperation that also aids monitoring the transnational ties, routes and methods used by returnees[58].

Another critical issue is fake papers: passports of dead Syrians, or fake identities printed on valid documents crafted in various places set up for the purpose[59]. A recent report from Italian intelligence also cites the possibility of using the deep web to obtain excellently made biometric passports prepared by organized crime in Italy, which would permit people to enter England with a new identity[60].

Counterterrorism strategies and deradicalization

The strategies utilized in view of a possible surge in foreign terrorist fighter returns to their home countries are many and reflect the different situations of the countries concerned. In response to the heightened threat of terrorism in recent years, repressive measures remain one of the approaches most favored by legislators. However, there also exist grey areas of people expressing extremist ideas, resentment and rage; these situations, which absolutely cannot be likened to terrorism, nevertheless still require delicate assessment and constant monitoring of possible developments to better understand and prevent further and graver problems.

Based on different historical-cultural routes and different national experiences, strategies of prevention, deradicalization and rehabilitation from militant jihadism have been put in place. Some countries, for example, use rehabilitation and radicalization- and discrimination-prevention work, as in the case of Denmark’s Aarhus; other programs aim at combating violent extremism generally, for example Holland’s Hedayah (Exits). Germany has set up a network of consultancy and deradicalization (Hayat) affiliated with the Federal Immigration and Refugee Office (BAMF); in Great Britain, the Prevent program is one of the four pillars of CONTEST, the country’s counterterrorism strategy[61].

Where the most repressive measures are concerned, revoking citizenship, seizing passports, forbidding entry to returnees (in addition, obviously, to trials for crimes committed) are part of the European panorama. These measures are intended to limit the effects of FTF returns in the short term but also reveal the difficulties encountered in trying returnees due to the lack of certain proof of crimes committed and of ties to terrorist organizations; so sometimes lighter sentences are handed down in view of lesser, but ascertained, crimes. Furthermore, various authors contest the long-term validity of these measures, suggesting possibly counterproductive outcomes and further risks of radicalization and proselytism in prison for the condemned[62].

Another subject of debate is the reentry of minors who accompanied FTF to SIRAQ and the entry of children conceived there[63]: should they be primarily considered victims, or guilty parties if they committed crimes? Are they European citizens even if born in Syria or Iraq and therefore protected by/subject to European laws? Evaluations of this kind are fundamental to dealing with minors who have undergone indoctrination and training processes and participated in violent activities with consequent socialization as per Da’ish dictates[64].

On the basis of these assessments and a long-term approach, Western governments, as we have seen, are increasingly relying on programs combatting violent extremism (CVE). These measures aim at preventing radicalization and also at deradicalizing and rehabilitating returnees, bearing in mind their different situations (hardened fighters, the disillusioned, victims of jihadist recruiters, children, etc.). A balanced system that foresees repressive measures but also “softer” approaches provides the possibility of working even with situations where it is impossible to try the returnee for crimes[65].

The Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN) is a European organization that researches and proposes re-inclusion and deradicalization strategies. The network is composed of experts with different backgrounds from all over Europe who are involved daily with people at risk or already radicalized. They include police and prison authorities but also people not usually involved in counterterrorism work like teachers, social workers, representatives of local communities, psychologists, etc. In July of this year RAN published a manual useful to returnee management: it distinguishes between the different categories (disillusioned, opportunist, attackers sent to Europe, captured/forced to return), the different reasons why they left and the different roles performed by the FTF (depending on whether they were men, women or children). The manual lists a number of points key to creating an efficacious program for managing returnees on the basis of best experiences: a priority is in-depth assessment of the risk each individual poses; there must be individually tailored deradicalization plans, involving various governmental agencies and NGOs; emphasis is put on the need for coordination between the agencies involved; and the manual confirms the need for local communication strategy adapted to the variegated social weave[66].

The Italian legal framework

In Italy repressive measures are constantly updated and adjusted to the evolution of the threat, thanks also to past experience in combatting domestic terrorism and organized crime. Dedicated laws, along with personal and patrimonial prevention measures (special surveillance, sojourn prohibition and/or enforcement, etc.) and deportation to prevent terrorism, form a legal framework that is complete and suited to the returnee phenomenon[67]. Recent additions include institution of a study commission and a law bill aimed at the prevention of radicalization and violent extremism of a jihadist matrix[68].

The commission, composed of different exponents of the academic, research and communication worlds, is tasked with identifying pathways to jihadist radicalization in Italy and proposing policies to adopt for prevention and to deradicalize persons at risk. The final report the commission issued pinpointed two pathways, one physical (prison) and the other virtual (the web) that have assumed great importance in disseminating and inculcating jihadist ideology in this country.

Law bill 2883 can be viewed as a compendium of experiences seen in other countries and in its backers’ intentions foresees a top-down approach through creation of a National Radicalization Center (CRAD) tasked with devising a strategic nationwide plan for prevention and for recouping radicalized persons; this nationwide strategy goes hand in hand with concrete application of the plan on the local level, delegated to Regional Coordination Centers (CCR) set up at the prefectures of regional capitals.

Foreseen is creating a parliamentary commission to monitor jihadist radicalization, to learn more about the phenomenon through hearings with the authorities or actors involved in the sector in various ways; also foreseen is an annual report to be presented to parliament to describe the work performed and formulate proposals or raise pertinent issues.

Two articles in the bill specifically address preventing radicalization and recouping persons already radicalized in schools (art. 8) and prisons (art. 11), proposing that targeted work be done by intercultural mediation experts able to provide a narrative counter to jihadist ideology that can be effective in such contexts.

An essential point of the law bill is utilizing experts in areas of interaction with persons at risk or already radicalized, such as schools, prisons, places of worship and social aggregation and the web. According to sustainers of the project, this strategy will be implemented not only to recoup FTF but, in a wider framework, to permit government to “enter the world of sympathizers with and the curious about (jihadist ideology), which is a potential threat”[69].

Foreseen for this purpose is specialized training for all the professional and religious figures connected with this work so that the approach to local communities and individuals is thereby tied to nationwide strategy as well as giving uniformity to standards for data assessment and interpretation; always bearing in mind that the focus of deradicalization work must always be the individual.

Conclusions

The future evolution of jihadism worldwide depends on various factors not easy to decipher at this time, but it is clear that the current situation of IS retreat will have a negative influence on the allure that the “Caliphate” has exerted both ideologically and geographically. As Rik Cooksaet emphasizes, this situation is currently providing a window of opportunity for eradicating the favorable conditions that enabled Da’ish to become the success and media sensation of recent years[70].

The number of returning Italian jihadists, like that of FTF traveling from Italy to Syria and Iraq, has not yet reached the alarming proportions of other European countries but this threat to national security must be dealt with in advance, defusing the extremist propensities of certain individuals before the phenomenon becomes alarming in Italy, too[71]. The cases of Anis Amri and Ahmed Hanachi, the transits through Italy of Abdelslam Salah and Khalid el Bakraoui, moreover underscore the extreme ease with which jihadists move to and through various European countries, requiring a more structured analysis of risks for Italy[72].

In Italy potential risks still mainly consist of registered immigrants and what Lorenzo Vidino calls “citizens that are sociologically such”[73]. In fact, Italy has fewer second- and third-generation Muslim immigrants (who are more susceptible to jihadist propaganda) than other European countries.

This means that Italy still has the chance to observe and put into practice the best prevention and deradicalization programs implemented in Europe, adapting them to the context and to Italy’s cultural substratum. The number of returnees to Italy is still low enough to be able to work with composure, combining a structured deradicalization program with careful and delicate work of monitoring and mediation. An integral part of this strategy must be preventing future radicalization, especially in the environments and contexts that the radicalization study commission has shown to be at risk in Italy.

To be avoided above all are generalizations, stereotypes and hasty decisions taken in emergency situations, which risk fostering, not preventing, violent jihadist radicalization[74]. Even the debate about refugees and the relative risk of terrorist infiltration must be kept out of xenophobic or populist demonstrations to avoid supporting the jihadist recruitment narrative[75].

So the problem must be dealt with from a structural, long-term viewpoint within the social context to develop “antibodies” strengthening individuals’ resistance to jihadist radicalization. The prevention and deradicalization measures Italy intends to implement must of necessity be based on rigorous and uniform assessment standards as well as work on two interconnected levels: from an ideological standpoint, delegitimizing the jihadist narrative and its dictates, and on the practical side giving returnees the tools for social re-inclusion.

 

 

[1] Also identified by the initials ISIL, ISIS, IS or the Arabic acronym Da’ish; simplifying, these definitions – by now in common usage – will be used interchangeably in this article.

[2] J. Bennett, “National Counterterrorism Head: many if nor most foreign ISIS fighters will fight to the death for the caliphate, Daily Caller, 21 July 2017, http://dailycaller.

com/2017/07/21/national-counterterrorism-center-head-many-if-not-most-foreign-isis-fighters-will-fight-to-the-death-for-the-caliphate/

[3] An acronym for Syria and Iraq, the area of conflict involved in the phenomenon analyzed.

[4] S. Carenzi and A. Varvelli, “After the Caliphate: what scenarios for the Islamic State”, Focus Mediterraneo allargato (Focus on the broader Mediterranean), no. 5, ISPI on behalf of the Osservatorio di Politica Internazionale (International Political Observatory), July-September 2017, p. 66, https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/focus-mediterraneo-allargato-n...

[5] S. Kirchgaessner and L. Tondo, “Why has Italy been spared mass terror attacks in recent years?”, The Guardian, 23 June 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/23/why-has-italy-been-spared-...

[6] S. Fillion, “What we can learn from France’s failed deradicalization center”, La Stampa, 2 September 2017, http://www.lastampa.it/2017/09/02/esteri/lastampa-in-english/what-we-can...

[7] B. Powell, “As ISIS caliphate crumbles, jihadi tactics are evolving”, The Independent, 21 October 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/as-isis-s-caliphate-...

[8] G. Giacalone and N. Spagna, “A new jihadist group: Hayat Tahri al-Sham (HTS)”, Italian Team for Security, Terrorist Issues & Managing Emergencies, 13 February 2017, http://www.itstime.it/w/un-nuovo-gruppo-jihadista-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-h...

[9] A.P. Schmid, “The definition of terrorism”, in The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, Routledge, 2011.

[10] Resolution 2178/2014 of the United Nations Security Council defined FTF as “individuals traveling to a state different from their nation of residence or citizenship for the purpose of carrying out, planning, preparing or participating in acts of terrorism or to provide or receive terrorist training”.

[11] R. Gunaratna, “Inside al Qaeda: global network of terror”, Columbia University Press, 2002, p.115.

[12] A. Reed and J. Pohl, Tackling the surge of returning foreign fighters, International Centre for Counter Terrorism – ICCT, 14 July 2017, https://icct.nl/publication/tackling-the-surge-of-returning-foreign-figh...

[13] “Responses to returnees: foreign terrorist fighters and their families”, Radicalisation Awareness Network, July 2017, p. 15, https://ec.europa.eu/homeaffairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/ran_br_a4_m10_e...

[14] J. Dettmer, “Britain Strips More Than 100 Islamic State Fighters of Citizenship”,VOA News, 30 July 2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/britain-stips-is-fighters-of-citizenship/39649... D.H. Heinke, “German foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq: the updated data and its implications”, Combating Terrorism Center – Sentinel, vol. 10, no. 3, 10 March 2017, p. 17, https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/german-foreign-fighters-in-syria-and-iraq-the...

[15] N. Vinocur, “France’s mutating terror threat”, Politico, 7 December 2016, http://www.politico.eu/article/frances-mutating-terror-threat-islamic-st... L. Gustafsson and M. Ranstorp, Swedish foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq: an analysis of open-source intelligence and statistical data, Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies – CATS, 15 June 2017,https://www.fhs.se/Documents/

Externwebben/forskning/centrumbildningar/CATS/publikationer/2017/Swedish%20Foreign%20Fighters%20webb.pdf

[16] M. Argoubi, “Tunisian foreign fighters to be dealt with under anti-terrorism law: PM”, Reuters, 30 December 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-tunisia-security-

idUSKBN14J1AL; AA.VV., “Balkan jihadists. The radicalization and recruitment of fighters in Syria and Iraq”, Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, March 2016, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/file/show/Balkan-Jihadists.pdf

[17] R. Nordland, “Captured ISIS fighters refrain: ‘I was only a cook’”, The New York Times, 1 October 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/01/world/middleeast/iraq-islamic-state-kurdistan.html?mcubz=0

[18] A. Speckhard and A. Yayla, ISIS defectors. Inside stories of the terrorist Caliphate, Advances Press LLC, 2016.

[19] B. Schuurman and L. van der Heide, “Foreign fighter returnees & the reintegration challenge”, Radicalisation Awareness Network, November 2016, p. 4.

[20] “U.N. counterterror chief: Europe faces return of 'dangerous' IS fighters”, Reuters, 18 May 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-attacks/u-n-counterterror-chie...

[21] C. Dickey, “French jihadi Mehdi Nemmouche is the shape of terror to come”, The Daily Beast, 9 September 2014, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/09/09/the-face-of-isis-terror...

[22] R.K. Cragin, “The November 2015 Paris attack: the impact of foreign fighter returnees”, Orbis, vol. 61 no. 2, pp. 212-226; E. Graham-Harrison, A. Nelsen and P. Greenfield, “Brussels attacks: last gasp of ISIS terror in Europe, or sign of growing threat?”, The Guardian, 27 March 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/27/brussels-bombing-last-gasp...

[23] L. Vidino, F. Marone and E. Entenmann, Fear thy Neighbor. Radicalization and Jihadist Attacks in the West, Milano, Ledizioni-ISPI, June 2017, p. 61, https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/fear-thy-neighbor-radicalizati...

[24] AIVD, “Focus on Returnees”, General Intelligence and Security Service, 15 February 2017, p. 4, https://english.aivd.nl/binaries/aivd-en/documents/publications/2017/02/...

[25] A. Speckhard and A. Yayla (2016).

[26] J.P. Bjelopera, “American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat”, Congressional Research Service, 2013, pp. 23-25.

[27] M. Chulov, “Isis: the inside story”, The Guardian, 11 December 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/11/-sp-isis-the-inside-story

[28] L. Tondo, P. Wintour and P. Messina, “Interpol circulates list of 173 suspected members of ISIS suicide brigade”, The Guardian, 21 July 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/21/isis-islamic-state-suicide...

[29] “Barcellona, sull’Europa l’ombra di 3mila foreign fighters. Numeri e identikit”(“Barcelona, on Europe the shadow of 3,000 foreign fighters. Numbers and identikits”), Affaritaliani, 18 August 2017, http://www.affaritaliani.it/cronache/barcellona-sull-europa-ombra-dei-fo... G. Longo, “Quei 6 radicalizzati in casa finiti nel mirino dell’intelligence” (“Those 6 radicalized at home in the sights of intelligence”), La Stampa, 25 June 2017, http://www.lastampa.it/2017/06/25/italia/cronache/quegli-radicalizzati-i...

[30] V.R. Spagnolo, “Indagini. Rimpatriato il primo jihadista italiano” (“Investigations. The first Italian jihadist repatriated”), Avvenire, 5 May 2015, http://www.avvenire.it/Mondo/Pagine/Estradato-il-primo-jihadista-italian...

[31] See for example, P. Berizzi, “Un jihadista italiano in carcere a Erbil”, la Repubblica, 10 February 2015, http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2015/02/10/u... N. Tempera, “È tornato l’aspirante jihadista: ricoverato in una struttura”, il Resto del Carlino, 6 May 2015, http://www.ilrestodelcarlino.it/bologna/cronaca/isis-aspirante-jihadista...

[32] “Sono 1.500 i foreign fighters tornati in Europa e pronti a colpire” (“There are 1,500 foreign fighters back in Europe and ready to strike”), Il Tempo, 6 April 2016, http://www.iltempo.it/esteri/2016/04/06/news/sono-1-500-i-foreign-fighte...

[33] M. Serafini, “L’elettricista che odia Assad, Haisam da Cologno alla Siria” (“The electrician who hates Asaad. Haisam from Cologno to Syria”), Il Corriere della Sera, 28 August 2014, http://www.corriere.it/cronache/14_agosto_28/elettricista-che-odia-assad...

[34] “Terrorismo, la Digos di Milano controlla alcuni siriani comaschi” (“Terrorism, the Milan section of Digos keeps an eye on Como-area Syrians”), Il Corriere di Como, 8 January 2015, http://www.corrieredicomo.it/terrorismo-la-digos-di-milano-controlla-alc...

[35] In addition to UN Security Council Resolution 2178/2014, see the definition of FTF given by Thomas Heggammer: T. Heggammer, “Should I stay or should I go? Explaining variation in Western jihadists’ choice between domestic and foreign fighting”, American Political Science Review, vol. 107, no. 1, February 2013, pp.1-15. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-revie...

[36] P. Berizzi “Ammar Bacha: ‘Non taglio gole, voglio solo giustizia’”, (“Ammar Bacha: ‘I don’t cut throats, I only want justice’”, la Repubblica, 10 September 2014, http://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2014/09/10/news/ammar_bacha_non_taglio_g...

[37] Kunya is an Arabic patronymic referring to the name-bearer’s first-born son. Jihadist fighters often also use it as a nom de guerre.

[38] G. Santucci, “Ergastolo per Haisam: ‘l’elettricista di Milano’ massacrò militari siriani” “Haisam gets life: the Milanese electrician massacred Syrian solders”), Il Corriere della Sera, 17 February 2017, http://milano.corriere.it/notizie/cronaca/17_febbraio_18/ergastolo-haisa...

[39] “L’intelligence: ‘Via Pino sotto controllo’”(Intelligence: ‘Via Pino under surveillance’”), Il Corriere di Como, 15 January 2015, http://www.corrieredicomo.it/lintelligence-via-pino-sotto-controllo/

[40] A. Palazzolo, “Terrorismo, due foreign fighters arrestati in Trentino Alto Adige” (“Terrorism, two foreign fighters arrested in Trentino Alto Adige”), Il Giornale, 14 November 2015, http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/cronache/terrorismo-due-foreign-fighters-a...

[41] “Confermate in appello le condanne per i quattro jihadisti di Merano” (“The sentences for the four Merano jihadists confirmed in appeal”), Il Foglio, 13 February 2017, http://www.ilfoglio.it/cronache/2017/02/13/news/confermate-in-appello-le...

[42] M. Ledwith, R. Pendlebury and J. White, “Ticketing cars at London hospital, the British jihadi who’s back from fighting on the front line in Syria”, Daily Mail, 14 May 2016, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3589889/Ticketing-cars-London-ho...

[43] R. Mendick and R. Vervaik (2016).

[44]  For a more complete biography of Abu Nissam, see https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/moez-fezzani

[45] P. Biondani, “Il tunisino di Milano, jihadista da 25 anni” (“The Tunisian from Milan, jihadist for 25 years”), l’Espresso, 29 July 2015, http://espresso.repubblica.it/plus/articoli/2015/07/29/news/il-tunisino-...

[46] G. Foschini, “Terrorismo, a Foggia bloccato foreign fighter ceceno: spingeva seguaci ISIS al martirio” (“Terrorism, a Czech foreign fighter blocked in Foggia; he spurred ISIS followers to martyrdom”), la Repubblica, 8 July 2017, http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2017/07/08/news/bloccato_a_bari_un_fore...

[47] C. Rocci, “Lara domani davanti al giudice, cercava un nuovo marito per tornare in Siria” (“Lara before the court tomorrow, sought a new husband to return to Syria”), la Repubblica, 25 June 2017, http://torino.repubblica.it/cronaca/2017/06/25/news/lara_domani_davanti_...

[48] Translatable as the “Organization for the Liberation of Syria”, the most recent name for the pro-al-Qa’ida front, Jabhat al-Nusra, to which many jihadist groups belong although they can all be traced to Qa’ida ideology.

[49] “Dalla comunità di Milano in Siria La storia di Monsef il reclutatore” (“From Milan to Syria. The story of Monsef the recruiter”), Corriere della Sera, 9 March 2017, http://milano.corriere.it/notizie/cronaca/16_agosto_10/isis-terrorismo-c... F.Q., “Terrorismo, foreign fighter condannato a 8 anni a Milano. ‘Dalla Siria propaganda e proselitismo’” (“Terrorism, foreign fighter gets 8-year sentence in Milan. ‘From Syria propaganda and proselytism’”), Il Fatto Quotidiano, 13 April 2017, http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2017/04/13/terrorismo-foreign-fighter-co...

[50] L. Vidino, Il jihadismo autoctono in Italia: nascita, sviluppo e dinamiche di radicalizzazione (Homegrown Jihadism in Italy: birth, development and radicalization dynamics), Milano, ISPI, 2014, pp. 60-70, https://www.ispionline.it/it/EBook/Il_jihadismo_autoctono_in_Italia.pdf

[51] E.A. Haq, “Exclusive: 1736 documents reveal ISIS jihadists personal data”,Zaman al Wasl, 8 March 2016, https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/14541.html

[52] US Department of State Executive Order no.13224, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/defaul... G. Olimpio, “ISIS, ricercato Anas el Abboubi il rapper bresciano nella lista dei super ricercati dagli USA” (“ISIS, Anas el Abboubi, Brescian rapper, the USA’s most-wanted black list”), Il Corriere della Sera, 28 September 2016,  http://www.corriere.it/esteri/16_settembre_28/isis-ricercato-anas-el-abb...

[53] K.Mezran and A. Varvelli (Eds.), Jihadist Hotbeds. Understanding Local Radicalization Processes, Milano, Epoké-ISPI, 2016, https://www.ispionline.it/it/EBook/Rapporto_Hotbeds_2016/JIHADIST.HOTBEDS...

[54] T. Holman, “’Gonna Get Myself Connected’: The Role of Facilitation in Foreign Fighter Mobilizations”, Perspective on Terrorism, vol. 10 no. 2, 2016, http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/497/985

[55] “Broken trips” are trips initially to countries other than the final destination, continued using other means to put police on the wrong track. M. Chulov, “Moroccan Isis terrorists pose a threat on Europe’s doorstep”, The Guardian, 19 August 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/20/spain-terror-attacks-isis-...

[56] S. Mancinelli, “In Italia nove kamikaze dell’Isis” (“Nine ISIS kamikaze in Italy”), Il Tempo, 2 October 2017, http://www.iltempo.it/cronache/2017/10/02/news/in-italia-nove-kamikaze-d... L. Tondo, P. Messina and P. Wintour, “Italy fears Isis fighters slip into Europe posing as injured Libyans” The Guardian, 28 April 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/28/islamic-state-fightersinfi...

[57] G. Van Vlierden, “Profile: Paris attack ringleader Abbdelhamid Abaaoud”, Counter TerrorismCenter – Sentinel, vol. 8 no.11, 15 December 2015, pp. 30-33, https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/profile-paris-attack-ringleader-abdelhamid-ab...

[58] C.P. Clarke, “Round trip tickets: how will authorities know when foreign fighters have returned”, Lawfareblog, 24 September 2017, https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/09/round-trip-tickets-how-willauthorities...

[59] S. Taber, “ISIS and the fake passport industry”, Dailywire, 20 September 2017, http://www.dailywire.com/news/21345/isis-and-fake-passport-industry-sara...

[60] R. Russo, “Napoli, passaporti falsi sul web. Allarme dei servizi segreti” (“Naples, fake passports on the web. Secret service alert”), Corriere del Mezzogiorno, 8 February 2017, http://corrieredelmezzogiorno.corriere.it/napoli/cronaca/17_febbraio_08/...

[61] A description of the Aarhus can be found at https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/node/7423_en; for the Dutch program see http://www.hedayahcenter.org/ftfprograms/program/exits/; German strategy is explained at http://hayat-deutschland.de/english/; and for the British program go to https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fil...

[62] A. Reed and J. Pohl (2017).

[63] L. van der Heide and J. Geenen, Children of the Caliphate. Young IS returnees and the reintegration challenge, International Centre for Counter Terrorism – ICCT, August 2017, https://icct.nl/wpcontent/uploads/2017/08/ICCT-vanderHeide-Geenen-Childr...

[64] Ibid.

[65] A. Reed and J. Pohl (2017).

[66] “Responses to returnees: foreign terrorist fighters and their families”…, cit.

[67] F. Roberti and L. Giannini, Manuale dell’antiterrorismo. Evoluzione normativa e nuovi strumenti investigativi, (Counterterrorism manual. Legal developments and new investigative tools), Laurus Robuffo, 2016.

[68] For Commission composition see http://www.governo.it/articolo/insediata-commissione-di-studio-su-fenome... the text of the law bill can be consulted at http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/01036546.pdf

[69] Hon. A. Manciulli, “Minutes of the meeting on measures to prevent radicalization and violent extremism of a jihadist matrix”, Palazzo di Montecitorio, Roma, 17 October 2017.

[70] R. Coolsaet, Anticipating the post Daesh landscape, Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations, 3 October 2017, http://www.egmontinstitute.be/anticipating-post-daesh-landscape/

[71] M. Groppi, “The terror threat to Italy. How Italian exceptionalism is rapidly diminishing”, Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel, vol. 10 no. 6, pp. 20-28, 4 May 2017,  https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-terror-threat-to-italy-how-italian-except...

[72] M. Menduni, “I killer di Berlino e Marsiglia sono passati da Aprilia” (“The Berlin and Marseilles killers passed through Aprilia”), La Stampa, 3 October 2017, http://www.lastampa.it/2017/10/03/italia/cronache/lo-strano-caso-di-apri... F.Q., “Attentati Bruxelles, Khalid el Bakraoui passò dall’Italia nel 2015: da Treviso a Venezia, prima di arrivare ad Atene” (“The Brussels attacks: Khalid and Balraoui passed through Italy in 2015: from Treviso to Venice before arriving in Athens”), Il Fatto Quotidiano, 28 March 2016, http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2016/03/28/attentati-bruxelles-khalid-el...

[73] According to L. Vidino’s definition, citizens that are sociologically such are persons who, legally resident and raised in Italy (although coming from another country) have absorbed the culture, values and local perceptions of events, L. Vidino (2014).

[74] S. Fillion (2017).

[75] H. Rafiq and N. Malik, Refuge: Pathways of Youth Fleeing Extremism, Quilliam Foundation, http://www.quilliaminternational.com/shop/e-publications/refuge-pathways...

 

Alessandro Boncio, is an Ispettore (NATO designation OR9) of the Italian Carabinieri Corps. He currently serves as a lecturer and analyst at the Carabinieri Advanced Institute of Investigative Techniques. He has deployed on a number of international missions in the Middle East, the Balkans and Africa as a J2 (intelligence) asset and counter-terrorism consultant. He is also a member of the EENet (European Network on Terrorism Issues) as an analyst of the foreign fighter phenomenon, with a specialization on Itay