The Arab Spring, which started in Tunisia in 2011, reaching Libya, Egypt, Syria, and Yemen, lay dormant for over a decade until 2019, when it shook four other countries which stood on the sidelines in 2011: Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon, and Iraq. This second wave, with more or less the same collective action repertories, showed that the spirit of revolt was still very much alive and that the Arab Spring is not dead. It is a ongoing process.
Although the outcomes differed, autocrats provided citizens with generous handouts (when available) in exchange for political calm and a sufficient dose of repression to silence the last voices of dissent. The demonstrators' demands for political participation, less corruption and nepotism, more social justice, jobs, and dignity were not met anywhere.
On the eve of the year 2023, the fundamental causes of the Arab Spring continue to simmer under the surface of Arab politics. State policies in the MENA region continue to neglect social, economic, and political grievances, which may again plant the seed for instability in the region. The revolts of 2011 produced those of 2019, which will morph into a new protest wave, which might be less silmiya (pacific) and hadhariya (civic) than in 2011 and 2019. The triggers of a potential third wave are related to 1) immutable socioeconomic challenges, 2) government-related challenges, and 3) globally connected challenges.
While it is true that the war in Ukraine is offering oil- and gas-rich countries opportunities to sustain their inefficient economies a bit longer, it is beyond argument that the rentier state is not sustainable, and the size of the carrot is shrinking. In many countries, basic needs are not met, food prices are skyrocketing, and the war in Ukraine aggravated the food security crisis.
Countries have not been hit evenly: Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia, Sudan, and Yemen have been hit harder than Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria. Lebanon imports 80% of its wheat from Ukraine, Tunisia 48%, and Sudan imports 90% of its wheat from Russia. On the other hand, Jordan imports only 17%, Morocco 7%, and Algeria less than 4%.
However, food insecurity plagues majorities of citizens in six out of 10 countries surveyed by the Arab Barometer in 2021-2022. Majorities ranging from 53% in Libya to 68% in Egypt report running out of food before having the funds to purchase more. In nine out of ten MENA countries, more than half of the population is concerned about running out of food before they can obtain more.
The Covid-19 pandemic also aggravated already fragile economies. Inflation rates stood at 6% in the Middle East against 7.2% in North Africa. There has been a massive loss of jobs during Covid-19. In Algeria, for instance, no less than half a million people lost their jobs due to the pandemic. In Jordan, 47% of those employed before the lockdown (1-5 March 2020) were out of work a year later. A majority of Arab states cannot afford to provide jobs even at the local level because of the serious weakness of the industrial sector, the decline in agriculture, and the massive urbanisation exacerbating territorial inequalities.
This has an impact on citizens’ trust in the government. Trust in institutions has eroded throughout the pandemic: only 10 % in Libya, 19% in Iraq, 19% in Lebanon, 20% in Tunisia, and 33% in Sudan, to give a few examples from the latest Arab Barometer. To add a layer of complexity, there is no intergenerational transition and an aging elite that sees itself and is perceived by many in the population as the last bulwark against the political vacuum.
During the Covid-19 pandemic, which impacted the health and education sectors, citizens saw how catastrophic crisis management was. While there is little spending on education and health, defence spending exploded in the region. In 2020, defence spending represented 6.7% of GDP in Algeria, increasing to 9.1% in 2021; 6.5% in Kuwait; and 15.5% in Libya.
Finally, global issues will also contribute to triggering the third wave, such as climate change and its effect on water. Current water usage patterns and the consequences of climate change will lead to serious water scarcity in the MENA. Worldwide, 12 of the 17 most water-stressed countries are situated in the MENA: Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Yemen, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman. Water demonstrations broke out in Libya and Algeria, among others. Lebanon is another example: Shortages of funding, fuel, and supplies have affected water pumping, restricting people's access to safe water.
The above factors might lead to another wave of upheaval in the next five years. There is also a serious risk of intra-regional conflicts as conflicts start to expand, and everything is connected and thus more complicated to solve. The regional rivalry between Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel must be taken into account when thinking about Arab futures as well.
