The Russian-Ukrainian war will definitely be one of the key factors in determining political and economic processes in Europe, Eurasia, and globally in 2023.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, as well as the West’s decision to support Ukraine and introduce unprecedented sanctions against Russia,[1] has put an end to a long period of what – with some effort – could be called peace and cooperation in Europe and northern Eurasia. In reality, for three decades after the end of Cold War we saw various bloody conflicts in the region, for example in the western Balkans, in the southern and northern Caucasus, and in the Donbas region. But these hostilities had only a limited influence on the social and economic life of the continent and the world at large. On the contrary, Putin’s decision to launch an invasion, the consequent Russian-Ukrainian war, and consolidation of the US, UK and EU alliance around Ukraine in a newly united West have triggered tectonic changes in the world order and dramatically reinforced the negative socio-economic trends that emerged in the years of Covid-19 pandemic.
Though the Ukrainian army has succeeded in liberating a great deal of territory, the war has not yet ended and prospects for victory over the invaders remain remote at the end of 2022. In fact, the war is dragging on with stabilised frontlines, and has every chance of turning into a long-term, open, military conflict that will divide Europe and world into camps and blocks. Given this context, two main scenarios are possible for the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2023: a protracted military conflict or some form of unstable peace agreement.
Scenario #1:aprotracted military conflict
If the war goes on and all sides continue increasing the numbers and weaponry of their troops, a protracted war on Ukrainian soil is the most probable scenario for 2023. Western allies have already created a system for supporting the Ukrainian government and army financially and militarily, while Moscow is urgently restoring its military-industrial complex and creating new allies to supply missing weapon types.[2] Mass mobilisation keeps feeding more and more personnel into the Ukrainian and Russian armies and troop numbers on both sides are likely to reach around 400-500,000 by March 2023. Neither Kyiv nor Moscow communicate directly and both seem unprepared to enter into peace talks at this stage. This funnel of violence is dragging more and more people and nations into the conflict.
A protracted war will continue snowballing the death toll among civilians and combatants, as well as destroying Ukraine’s towns, critical infrastructure, industry, and energy system. In this scenario, emigration from Ukraine to Europe and Russia will continue growing, while those who migrated in 2022 will likely ditch plans to return home soon. Existing and new sanctions will further undermine Russian economic strength, but will also backfire on Western economies, possibly leading to mass protests in the countries worst affected. No economies on the European continent will be able to maintain the living standards enjoyed before 2022. A protracted war in Ukraine will therefore deepen existing and engender new risks for all societies in Europe and northern Eurasia.
Scenario #2: an unstable peace agreement
There is nevertheless a possibility that sort of deal may be reached to dampen or freeze the conflict for some time. The liberation of the Kharkiv and Kherson regions by Ukrainian forces – with the West’s unprecedented military and economic support – has shaken the reputation of Russian forces as the “second most powerful army in the world” after the US. Now in late 2022, Ukrainian forces have developed into a well-equipped army able to hit every Russian position on the occupied territories and in many southwestern regions of Russia. Its own weakness, Ukraine’s military successes, and continued western sanctions may motivate the Kremlin to agree some form of armistice or temporary peace agreement with Kyiv. In parallel, the Ukrainian government, despite recent military successes, may accept an interim peace agreement to stop the destruction of its cities, energy system, and critical infrastructure, as well as to prepare more effectively for the next phase in the war.
In the case of a lasting armistice and a freeze of the conflict along approximately current frontlines, Ukraine and its allies will have time to improve the country’s ability to resist the invasion both militarily and economically. Reconstruction of critical Ukrainian infrastructure may also lessen the burden of the war on the country’s population; some of the 10 million Ukrainian refugees may also choose to return home if the shelling stops. Western and Russian armies may use this time to replenish their arsenals and increase the potential of their military-industrial complexes. This scenario also envisages a certain reduction in the social and security risks that a protracted war may bring to Europe.
Still, neither party in the war will have achieved its aim, and both will retain enough resources and political will to pursue victory. Peace in Ukraine can therefore only be temporary: without a full victory over Russian aggression, there can be no stable peace for Ukraine or eastern Europe as a whole.
Whichever scenario emerges in the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2023, we shall witness certain common trends both in Europe and other regions of the world.
Firstly, the nations of the European continent, and many in Asia too, will probably be forced into joining one of the two competing blocks. The member-states of both blocks will have to securitise their politics, militarise their economies, and radically revise those developmental models not compatible with a war footing. These changes may well run counter to peace-time approaches to economic crisis and may increase the risk of widespread social unrest in the East and the West alike. Neutral status will become mission impossible, at least in Europe: countries on the Old Continent will have to make their choice of block in 2023. It will become harder even for non-European countries to stick to neutrality.
Secondly, the geopolitical role of states is changingwithin the emerging blocks: certain countries, once peripheral, have become elements of the global core in 2022, and this will probably be even more evident in 2023. Due to its unshaken resistance, Ukraine has gained far greater political influence, leading to the creation of a military alliance with the West, a stronger voice in international relations, and candidate status for EU accession. It is quite probable that Ukraine will deepen its ties with the West to ensure long-term unity of interests with its new allies. Poland and some other new European democracies are also gaining a stronger hand in matters of security and international relations, while old democracies like France and Germany seem to be losing the lead in common European matters.
Thirdly, the war in Ukraine impacts the security of European and Eurasian nations. Three groups are emerging, divided on the basis of level of insecurity. The countries in the first group (Belarus, Moldova, and at least seven of Russia’s western and southwestern regions) face a very real risk that the war unleashed against Ukraine will spread on to their soil. In the second group of nations, frozen rivalries stand a growing chance of renewal while simmering conflicts may boil over with renewed vigour. These countries include Moldova, the nations of Central Asia, the southern Caucasus, and the Balkans. In the third group, which includes all other European countries, changing socio-economic models and war-driven political developments may increase the chance of populist groups coming to power. This may also trigger an arms race and drag now free nations towards illiberalism,[3] or into a third wave of autocratisation on both continents.[4]
Finally, after failure in the war and with a declining population and economy, the Russian Federation may fall into rapid decline as a power. This would mean a power vacuum in eastern Europe and northern Eurasia and create opportunities for the West, China, Turkey, and Iran to increase their presence in the region in search of regional influence, triggering new conflicts among themselves. Isolated and impoverished, Russia will most likely enter China’s growing area of influence. If this happens, the East European block may well become part of a Beijing-led greater Eurasia, and any future European perspective will most probably become unrealistic.
Notes:
- “The Impact of Sanctions and Export Controls on the Russian Federation”, the US State Department, October 20, 2022, https://bit.ly/3ETiR9o
- “Treasury-Commerce-State Alert: Impact of Sanctions and Export Controls on Russia’s Military-Industrial Complex”, The US Treasury, October 13, 2022, https://bit.ly/3gUOG9M
- Hilary Appel, (2019) “Can the EU Stop Eastern Europe's Illiberal Turn?”, Critical Review, 31:3-4, 255-266, DOI: 10.1080/08913811.2019.1647956
- Anna Lührmann & Staffan I. Lindberg, (2019) “A third wave of autocratization is here: what is new about it?”, Democratization, 26:7, 1095-1113, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2019.1582029
