Catherine WIHTOL de WENDEN is Director of research at CNRS (CERI). For 30 years she has been a researcher on international migration, from a Political Science and Public Law approach. She studied in Sciences-Po Paris and University Paris I (Panthéon- Sorbonne) She got her Ph D in Political Science in 1986. She has published 20 books, alone or as co-writer and around 150 articles.
Fabio Petito is Senior Associate Research Fellow in ISPI and Head of the "Religions and International Relations" Programme promoted by ISPI and the Freedom of Religion or Belief & Foreign Policy Initiative (FoRB&FPI), University of Sussex - UK. He is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sussex. He has taught at SOAS in London, the ESCP-EAP in Paris and at ‘L’Orientale’ in Naples.
Erik Jones is Professor of European Studies and International Political Economy, and Director of European and Eurasian Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Professor Jones is author of The Politics of Economic and Monetary Union (2002), Economic Adjustment and Political Transformation in Small States (2008), Weary Policeman: American Power in an Age of Austerity (2012, with Dana H. Allin), and The Year the European Crisis Ended (2014).
Researcher at the Department of Asian and North African Studies of Venice “Ca' Foscari” University, Carlo Frappi is Associate Research Fellow for the Russia, Caucasus and Central Asia Centre at ISPI. Frappi, who holds a Ph.D. in European History, is also Adjunct Professor in Regional Studies at Catholic University of Milan and, since 2013, is a Member of the Board of Directors at the "Association for the Italian Study of Central Asia and the Caucasus" (ASIAC).
The COVID-19 lockdowns had an immediate and drastic impact on transport systems and mobility, in particular on the mobility patterns of people. Strict regulations imposed by governments around the world have affected the delivery of and demand for public transport services in and across many cities and countries as highlighted in Figure 1.
In June, the British foreign policy apparatus made an announcement that surprised everyone, and no one, at the same time. The Department for International Development (DFID), which for over twenty years served as the government's primary agent of its global development policy, was to be merged into the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).
Unprecedented and unpredictable: this is how US President Donald Trump's administration has repeatedly been labelled during its first term. Beyond the frequent tweets and bombastic rhetoric, however, lie a more conventional four years, as the United States navigated an ever-evolving international reality, compounded by a global pandemic and one of the deepest economic recessions in over a century.
On August 25th, 2020, the Director and co-founder of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS) Bahey Eldin Hasan was found guilty of “publishing false news” and “insulting the judiciary.” Tried in absentia while in self-imposed exile in Tunis, he was sentenced to 15 years’ prison for tweets critical of the regime. The trial by the Fifth Terrorism Circuit of Cairo’s Criminal Court marks a new low for Egypt’s judiciary.
One of the key developments in the Middle East in the last few decades has been the growing alliance between Egypt and some of the Gulf Cooperation Council states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates/UAE). For most of the 1950s and 1960s Egypt, under President Gamal Abd al-Nasser, viewed the Gulf’s ruling families as reactionary and medieval regimes whose days were numbered. Meanwhile, the Gulf leaders felt threatened by Nasser’s vision of Arab nationalism and socialism.
The Nile River conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia still appears to be at an impasse. But even if an agreement is reached on the filling and operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), Egypt will be on the losing side. For decades, Cairo had opposed any expansion of the water infrastructure on the upper reaches of the river. However, the country was unable to prevent dam construction in Ethiopia. Such dams are particularly dangerous from an Egyptian perspective because over 85 percent of Egyptian Nile water comes from the Ethiopian highlands.