Smart infrastructures require governance, specifically governance of intelligence and intelligence-enabled control. For example, in some very important respects, smart infrastructures should be dumb and that will take governance. One way to quickly see the point is by way of analogy to the Internet and the decades-long and still ongoing debate about network neutrality. The end-to-end architecture of the Internet and open Internet regulation govern certain uses of intelligence and thus intelligence-enabled control by infrastructure owners.
International relations and warfare technology have reached such sophistication that they have apparently rendered international wars a relic of the past. For these and other regional reasons, a conflict between China and Taiwan seems impossible to conceive.
A few weeks ago official celebrations for the 100th anniversary of the May Fourth Movement (or simply “Wusi”, five-four, in Chinese) took place across China amidst the Party/state growing anxiety and concerns about potential threats to regime stability.
Thirty years after student protests flooded Tiananmen Square in 1989, political contestation ramified into three interconnected threats identified by the country’s political leadership as “three evils” – that is, terrorism, separatism and religious extremism. Despite assuming different forms, the three evils are eradicated in the common element of defiance of the Communist ruling over the country.
In early April 2019, General Khalifa Haftar instructed the Libyan National Army (LNA) to take Tripoli by force, initiating Libya’s Second War of Post-Qadhafi Succession. Drawing upon the Libya-Analysis proprietary real time militia mapping project, this paper examines the main armed groups involved in the war: ascertaining their strengths, weaknesses, command and control structures, motivations, alliances, military capacities, and financing. It illustrates how all armed groups in Libya exploit the country’s dysfunctional war economy.
In policy circles the challenges associated with Africa’s unfolding urban transition is typically reduced to the need for infrastructure to ensure effective urban management. However, what is meant by urban infrastructure, what is the scale of the deficits and how these can be financed, are often obscured.
The inadequacy of Africa’s urban housing markets is evident across the continent, expressed in the cost and scale of housing being delivered, and visible in the very poor housing circumstances of the majority. That over 60% of urban dwellers live in slum conditions is in part a consequence of income, but more significantly one of an inefficient housing ecosystem in which neither price nor scale is achieved.
Last April, a Bosnian court sentenced Munib Ahmetspahic to three years in prison after a guilt admission agreement with the prosecutor. From 2013 to 2018, Ahmetspahic fought in Syria with Jabhat al Nusra and returned to Bosnia with a serious leg amputation. He was detained at the airport in Sarajevo in November 2018. However, Ahmetspahic was not the first returning foreign fighter to be convicted in Bosnia.
With only few days left ahead of the European Union parliamentary elections, the fear of foreign actors trying to influence the democratic voting process has spread rapidly across the continent. On a daily basis, news headlines point fingers at those “bad actors” allegedly responsible for the downfall of the West and at the role that social media plays in the process.
The outbreak of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) crisis on 5th June 2017 led to dramatic polarization between United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Bahrain plus Egypt and, on the other hand, Qatar, due to Doha’s alternative foreign policy supporting Muslim Brothers’ political ideology, especially during the Arab spring revolts. On the other side of the GCC, Kuwait tries to multiply its mediator efforts and Oman has strengthened its commercial relations with Qatar to avoid its isolation.