la questione uigura nella regione cinese dello Xinjiang è tornata a far parlare di sé dopo che lo scorso autunno Ilham Tohti, ex docente uiguro di economia internazionale in carcere dal 2014 con l’accusa di istigamento al separatismo, ha ricevuto il
Le elezioni americane potrebbero determinare un cambiamento della posizione americana verso l'Iran e un riallineamento con l'Unione europea, riportando in vita un JCPOA 2.0. Tuttavia, le sfide vanno oltre e coinvolgono l'intera regione.
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di Annalisa Perteghella, ISPI Research Fellow
In the Balkans it is often said that “everything started in Kosovo and everything will end there”, meaning that the cancer of nationalism that destroyed Yugoslavia began exactly there and that the Yugoslav conflicts had begun in Kosovo and would end there. Three decades after the beginning of those conflicts it is still hard to say that the processes they had unleashed have finished.
After almost eight years as Prime Minister, Abe Shinzo retired. On 16 September the national Diet (Japan’s parliament) nominated Suga Yoshihide as his successor. Since Abe announced his intention to resign on 28 August, the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) has gone through three frantic weeks to find an agreement on the succession.
Mentre la Cina ha detto che l'impatto di COVID-19 sulla BRI è stato minimo, il primo trimestre del 2020 ha visto un notevole rallentamento dei nuovi progetti e il ritmo incerto della ripresa dell'economia cinese potrebbe distogliere l'attenzione dai progetti BRI anche nel prossimo futuro.
Si è spento a 91 anni l’emiro Sabah al-Ahmed al-Sabah, dopo una vita trascorsa in diversi ruoli sempre a servizio del Kuwait, un paese la cui importanza per gli equilibri regionali è spesso sottostimata. Il successore designato è l’83enne principe ereditario Nawaf al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah, ma sono in forte ascesa le quotazioni del 70enne figlio dell’emiro, Nasser bin Sabah al-Ahmed al-Sabah.
Since 2011, the Egyptian armed forces have played an unusual political role, at the center of Egyptian governance on a very wide range of matters. The set of crises imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic is shaping — and even diminishing — parts of that role in some ways that are subtle but still very clear from the public record. The result is the emergence (or re-emergence) of a wider field for the cabinet and civilian technocrats.
On August 25th, 2020, the Director and co-founder of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS) Bahey Eldin Hasan was found guilty of “publishing false news” and “insulting the judiciary.” Tried in absentia while in self-imposed exile in Tunis, he was sentenced to 15 years’ prison for tweets critical of the regime. The trial by the Fifth Terrorism Circuit of Cairo’s Criminal Court marks a new low for Egypt’s judiciary.
In the aftermath of Egypt’s July 2013 coup that ousted the Muslim Brotherhood President, Mohamed Morsi, and set the stage for the country’s current military-led political order, the regime of President ‘Abd Fattah al-Sisi has single-mindedly and ruthlessly sought to eliminate independent political life in Egypt. While the initial focus of the al-Sisi regime was the repression and eradication of the Muslim Brotherhood, the security establishment quickly pivoted to a much broader course of repression to include any and all independent civilian political actors or parties.
One of the key developments in the Middle East in the last few decades has been the growing alliance between Egypt and some of the Gulf Cooperation Council states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates/UAE). For most of the 1950s and 1960s Egypt, under President Gamal Abd al-Nasser, viewed the Gulf’s ruling families as reactionary and medieval regimes whose days were numbered. Meanwhile, the Gulf leaders felt threatened by Nasser’s vision of Arab nationalism and socialism.