Alberto Negri has been special and war correspondent for “Il Sole 24 Ore” for the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia and the Balkans from 1987 to 2017. At the beginning of his career, he was a researcher at ISPI and the editor of its weekly magazine “Relazioni Internazionali”.
Graduated in computer science, he’s been working since 2003 as information security and privacy consultant, focusing on risk assessment, security and compliance management using international standards. Certified CISA, CISM, ITIL and ISFS, he is a qualified ISO 9001 and ISO/IEC 27001 auditor, having edited the Italian translations of the latter standard.
Coauthor of the CLUSIT handbooks on PCI-DSS and on professional certifications, is an active QSA and a regular presence into events and publications on information security.
Paul Anderson is ECES’ Senior Global Communication Advisor.
The feeble surge in oil prices on April 3 reflected the markets’ optimism that a truce in the Saudi-Russian oil war may be at hand. As the OPEC+ producers prepare to meet on April 6, it is worth trying to assess the motivations behind Saudi Arabia’s decision to launch such a war, as well as its implications for the Kingdom itself.
In the last decade, the Mekong Region (MR) — that is, the area crossed by the Mekong River and encompassing Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam — has become central to the strategies of major global powers due to a series of economic and geopolitical factors. The most prominent are the region’s growing importance in global trade routes, its geographical proximity to major hotspots (such as the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait) and China’s growing regional activism.
Now more than ever we need politics to work and our ruling classes to be able to do it. It is a matter of democratic resilience. Indeed, the magnitude of the tasks our states are now facing, from managing the health crisis to mobilising resources to spur reconstruction, put pressure on our political institutions, especially the collective ones (parliaments or national assemblies). The obvious health concerns that arose with the spread of Covid-19 could hamper and even block parliaments’ activities.
The global Covid-19 epidemic that has hit Italy, in particular Milan’s region, has abruptly changed our ways of life, our relationships, our work. Reduced mobility and safety measures have put a halt to public events, conferences and many of the “social” activities that belong to a think tank’s daily life and work.
In the eyes of Western partners, the value of Chad’s political regime has decisively increased during the past decade, especially after France’s intervention in Mali in 2012. Having occupied the country’s highest position for nearly three decades, President Idriss Déby Itno is viewed by his international allies not only as a willing and reliable partner but also as an acute observer of the turbulent political landscape in the Sahel.
Last week, Lebanon's Prime Minister Hassan Diab officially confirmed that Lebanon would not pay a $1.2 billion Eurobond due to mature on March 9th. Lebanon’s default comes after an unprecedented wave of protests has caused growing political instability and economic uncertainty since last October. However, to understand the root causes and possible scenarios of the current crisis, an in depth analysis of the role and governance of Lebanon's post-civil war political and economic institutions is necessary. Where and how did this crisis start?
Lebanon’s sovereign default comes at a heavy price for Hezbollah. This is not simply because of Hezbollah’s powerful role within the government that failed to repay a $1.2 bn bond on 10 March 2020. This is mainly because Hezbollah’s rivals are likely to use the current financial crisis to impose an external authority over Lebanon and increase pressure on the ‘Party of God’ to disband its armed wing.