Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) policy is at the centre of Tokyo’s economic and security strategy in the Indo-Pacific Region. Although Japanese policymakers do not admit to that in public, the FOIP is not only aimed at enabling Tokyo to economically compete with China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) but is also – and indeed equally importantly – ‘about China’, so to speak. Next to what is referred to as ‘Quality Infrastructure’, i.e.
The expansion of Tokyo’s security and defence ties in East, Southeast and South Asia inspired Washington – together with India and Australia – to get on board Tokyo’s strategy to deter or indeed contain China. Japanese policymakers and the pro-defence government led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe continue to invest enormous political capital and resources into seeking to keep China’s economic, territorial and security ambitions in the region in check.
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“The Chances of the Indo-Pacific Project”
In the last five years, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have forged the association between China and infrastructure in the global imaginary, and with good reason. With over one-thousand infrastructural projects concluded in over sixty countries, China’s $900 billion project involves 62 percent of the global population. However, Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
"Downward pressure on the Chinese economycontinues to increase, growth in consumption is slowing, and growth in effective investment lacks momentum.” With these words, China's Prime Minister Li Keqiang announced that Beijing has lowered its target for the country's economic growth this year, blaming the slowdown on a “profound change in the external environment”: a clear reference to the trade war with the United States. According to
If there is one thing that the Chinese leadership hates, it is not being in control of something crucially important. In the context of its authoritarian political system, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) remains in power with no need to compete with another political party. However, regime security remains its number one concern (or core interest) and, more than anything else, it relies on the fact that the party is seen as legitimate ruler.
Over 2018, China’s relations significantly sharpened with both the US and the EU. The most consequential of these is with the US, where the imposition of trade tariffs from later in the year was the first tangible sign that the relationship was entering an era of overt strategic competition.
China’s growth stopped at 6.5 percent in 2018. And the effects of the trade war have not yet been felt. The real crux is the high level of corporate indebtedness. But the authorities do not seem to have adequate solutions.
The process of economic development in China has always been characterized by a remarkable regional heterogeneity due not only to specific amenities and local factors (such as geographical position, demographic structure, resources, and so on), but also to the development policies implemented by central and local authorities over time.
With a population of just over one billion and 400 million individuals, China is facing a demographic crisis that could slow down economic development and threatens social welfare. The leading indicators reveal indeed that the “demographic window” – the stage that helped China to create the conditions for such unprecedented economic growth – is closing.