Washington’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 created a problem for China on the border of one of its most volatile regions in Xinjiang. While Beijing was not always entirely enthusiastic about a US military presence on its border, it could see the benefits of having someone else take on the security burden. It even went so far as to cooperate with the United States in Afghanistan – something which stood in stark contrast to the rest of its relationship with the US.
Great power competition in Asia comes with the need for China and the US to secure alliances and partnership in the region. In the first half of the 2022, four of the major players – Japan, South Korea, Australia and Philippines – changed the government or held elections. In each of these countries how to relate with China was one of the biggest issues in foreign policy.
For Asia, the first half of 2022 has been marred by the implications of the war in Ukraine – as everywhere else in the world – but it has also been a time for elections in the region’s key countries.
Political instability continues in Central Asia. A series of protests that began on 1 July in Nukus, the capital of Karakalpakstan, an autonomous region of western Uzbekistan, has turned into tragedy. The toll is 18 dead and 243 injured among protesters and law enforcement.
The past few months have witnessed a new Middle East full of complexity and contradiction. On the one hand, some of the tensions that have gripped the region over the past decade now show signs of abating, with various adversaries engaging in dialogue and rapprochement.
We all know that international affairs are currently dominated by the war in Ukraine. This, however, forms just part of the agenda of the Madrid Summit, which was planned under very different auspices.
Readers who are interested in these matters, which are nothing other than matters of international security, may remember that a Summit was held in London in December 2019, at which it was decided to reform the organisation, for the first time in 70 years.
On June 23rd-24th, Chinese President Xi Jinping will (virtually) chair the 14th BRICS Summit, gathering leaders from Russia, Brazil, India, and South Africa. After losing steam over the last few years, the meeting has gained newfound significance, due to the rekindling between China and Russia as a consequence of the war, India’s renewed role on the international stage (neutral with Russia yet active in the Indo-Pacific), and the perception of developing economies vis-à-vis mounting great power competition.
On June 23rd-24th, China will virtually host the 14th BRICS Summit. This event comes at a relevant time as the world order goes through a structural transition. To be sure, the great power competition between China and the US had already started with the Trump administration, in particular after the Trade War was launched in March 2018. However, between the pandemic and the war in Ukraine the US-China rivalry has been significantly accelerated.
Following other publications from this Dossier, this commentary examines the Russo-Ukrainian war by pondering the implications for Asia’s balance of power and multilateral institutions. Despite the geographical distance from the violence, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has rekindled anti-colonial sentiments around Asia.
On March 2nd 2022, the United Nations General Assembly voted for a resolution demanding Russia immediately end its military operations in Ukraine, giving the impression that Moscow was isolated: only four countries — together with Moscow — voted against (Belarus, North Korea, Eritrea, and Syria). Nonetheless, this initial impression had to be nuanced a month later.
US President Joe Biden has arrived in South Korea, the first stop in a five-day Asian tour that will also bring him to Japan. The trip – Biden's first to Asia since taking office – is meant to reaffirm the US commitment to restraining China, despite the recent focus on the Ukraine war. How Biden intends to pursue this objective, however, remains unclear. His main economic tool to contain China — the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) — and its participants will be finally unveiled.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shaken the foundations of the global order, and the extent and outcome of the conflict are not yet clear. What is clear is that basic principles underpinning almost seventy years without major power conflict are at stake. If a significant power’s attempt at territorial aggression against a sovereign neighbour – no matter the complicated history – is successful, we will have reverted to a less peaceful era.