China

Can the United States rely on cyber-deterrence – the threat to retaliate in kind if attacked in cyberspace in very damaging ways? The difficulties in attribution were thought decisive until DoD leaders argued that attribution was actually good. Perhaps the attribution of those who repeatedly penetrate systems, haul away copious information, and fear no consequences (e.g., Chinese hackers) is good (it never gets tested). But attribution for cyberwarriors who need only penetrate once, need not haul away large amounts of information, and may well bear consequences is a different thing entirely. The paper also moots how deterrence measures may be applied to stop Chinese hacking when their activity (espionage) is sanctioned by international norms and carried out by other countries (albeit for different reasons), and where the harm done is hard to quantify.

Beijing would vote for Angela Merkel in Germany’s upcoming general elections. 

The July 10-11, 2013 US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) made major strides in stabilizing and moving forward US-China relations, building upon the momentum spurred by the June presidential summit between US President, Barack Obama, and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, in Sunnylands, California. The US and China have hosted the annual S&ED since 2009, and before then as a separate Strategic Dialogue and Strategic Economic Dialogue, which were initiated in 2005 and 2006 respectively.

Abstract
While the US is seeking a way of rebalancing China in East Asia its approach left space for interpretation. The strategy of positioning itself in Asia on basis of concrete security issues and alliances while keeping its involvement open is seemingly only one aspect of the new game. Today a more or less refined toolbox of ‘strategic persuasion’ was designed in order to deal with an increasingly influential and powerful China. Instead of engaging in a non-desirable and costly direct military opposition to China, the US tries to pull all the strings in order influence its behavior towards moderation particularly in East Asia. In so doing, Washington is encountering an expectation-perception gap. So far the strategy has not necessarily proven successful. In Beijing, strategic maneuvers were often not fully understood and responses did not turn out not as initially desired. The US’ pivot to Asia has aroused a primordial fear in modern China: containment by outside powers. With a return to more traditional language of balancing, in China the situation was better understood. Yet, the implication remains the same. China has in reaction adopted a more assertive stance in military affairs while gradually trying to limit political damage in the ASEAN framework.

Abstract
Since the partition of the Korean peninsula, the crises between Seoul and Pyongyang have ranked high in the US political agenda. Nonetheless, the profile that the Obama administration has chosen to keep is relatively low. This choice has triggered criticisms, however the posture has brought its own benefits. Moreover, in a difficult economic situation, and in the face of increasing pressures for the curtailing of government expenditure, the ‘low profile’ approach meets the demands of a Congress whose support the White House increasingly needs. The main uncertainty is in the attitude of the PRC. However Beijing, more than any other nation, has a keen interest in keeping East Asia stable. This does not mean that China will become a sort of ‘US cop’ in East Asia. However, some forms of localized cooperation can be envisaged; a cooperation that could strengthen, as China will progress in occupying the international position that its leadership believes the country deserves.

Abstract
“Rebalancing” to the Asia Pacific is the signature foreign policy initiative of the Obama administration. Despite the attention it has rightfully garnered, the rebalance remains poorly understood. In addition to misapprehension about its fundamental principles, discussion appears to be dominated by what this policy isn’t rather than what it is. This essay aims to clear up the confusion, explain what the U.S. is doing as it shifts its strategic focus to the Asia-Pacific region, and its implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Abstract
Although the US’s recent ‘pivot’ toward the East Asian region has been much discussed, inadequate attention has been paid to the political and economic consequences of this initiative. This paper considers the political-economy of the pivot and suggests that it is best understood as part of a long-standing pattern of American engagement with the region. However, the rise of China is placing important new constraints on America’s ability to use economic leverage as an element of its overall policies in the region. The paper explains why and details some of the most important elements in the evolving Asia-Pacific political-economy.

Abstract

This essay discusses the new US grand strategy towards the Asia Pacific, epitomized by the slogan "Asia pivot". It does so by describing the main drivers behind the renewed geopolitical centrality of Asia for the United States, the objectives of the Obama administration in the region and the tools deployed by Washington as a consequence of this new approach. The conclusions briefly examine the limits, dilemmas and contradictions of the "Asia pivot" and of the US attempt to re-balance towards the Far East.

Abstract
The existence of territorial and diplomatic disputes in East Asia raises serious concerns and, if escalated, could risk the region’s stability and prosperity. Focusing on three territorial and diplomatic disputes involving Japan, the Northern Territories, Takeshima, and the Senkaku Islands, this article explores ways to manage those disputes so as to maintain regional stability and prevent the situation from escalating in consistent with international law, practice and norms. The most basic principles to be adhered in this regard include, first, allowing the other party (or parties) to disagree, and second, maintaining the status quo not trying to change it by force. While these measures cannot by themselves solve the disputes, we at least need to prevent the current tensions from escalating into armed conflicts amongst the involved parties.

On December 17, 2010, Tokyo adopted new defense guidelines, the “National Defense Program Guidelines” (NDPG). The December 2010 defense guidelines outline the country’s ten-year defense strategy and call for the establishment of a flexible armed forces structure with mobile units capable of rapid deployment in the case of a regional military crisis.