The post-Soviet space is fluid and competitive with many actors, besides Russia, chasing their interests. Recently, also China has
If US election opinion polls are anything to go by, Mitt Romney will not get a chance to rock the
boat of US-Chinese relations from November 2012 onwards. Most (moderate and well-informed)
analysts and commentators agree that this is good news given Romney’s announcements on how
he and his aides would be dealing with what they call a protectionist ‘currency manipulator’ trading
In the first fifteen years following the USSR dissolution, the process of hegemonic transition in post-Soviet Central Asia was defined by a deep dichotomy between opening efforts to cooperation with the West and Russia’s constant interference in the economic, strategic and cultural affairs of the region.
In this context, the People’s Republic of China progressive penetration in Central Asia, which originated in the mid-2000s, has radically changed the dynamics of regional cooperation.
The never-ending power vacuum in Afghanistan continues to be the most critical factor to the security in Central Asia. This is due to two factors: the threats thriving on socio-economic and political turmoil of Afghanistan and the strategic agendas of the external actors involved in the crisis.
The resulting confrontation has defined the geopolitical profile of the region, underpinning the consolidation of the Shanghai agreement between the Russian Federation and China and the following U.S. led intervention in the region.
This paper argues that coopera-tion between Russia and China in Central Asia is one of the im-portant aspects of their bilateral relations. The initial motivation for this cooperation was limita-tion of the Western influence in the region, primarily of the USA. Somehow, Russian-Chinese interaction in Central Asia is not limited to opposition to the “third party” and includes such important aspects as maintenance of regional security and equilibrium of interests in different spheres of economic ties.
Europe’s weakness and a stronger China in Eurasia pose new challenges, among them new possibilities for both competition and cooperation.
Nevertheless China and the EU are not only powers and factors of the geopolitical equation in Central Asia understood as macro-region.
Furthermore, Central Asia is in the process of positioning itself at the vanguard in some hot issues of the global agenda.
While nobody says so openly in Beijing, Chinese policymakers and Central Asian scholars are confident that Beijing will replace Russia as the region’s most influential and powerful actor, albeit ‘non-aggressively’. Beijing is already the largest trading partner of many countries in the region and its investments into Central Asian energy infrastructure are too massive not to translate into political dominance and hegemony rather sooner than later.
La progressiva ascesa di importanza di potenze regionali nel mondo di oggi costituisce la conseguenza diretta della fine del bipolarismo ma anche della crescente globalizzazione di alcuni grandi elementi propulsivi della società contemporanea, come la finanza o l’innovazione tecnologica.
North Korea will continue to remain East Asia’s trouble-maker. Pyongyang’s active missile and nuclear programs leave the region’s main powers - China, Japan, South Korea and the ‘offshore balancer’ US - stay on alert, sometimes higher, sometimes lower. Pyongyang has no intention whatsoever to give up and dismantle its missile and nuclear programs as it would leave the country with no bargaining tools to employ for its political blackmail policies. China remains a staunch supporter of the current status quo, i.e.
The transition of power in North Korea after the death of Kim Jong-il portends both change and continuity. The heir to power, Kim Jong-un, no doubt relies on advice if not pressure from an inner circle of generals and other senior leaders. So far North Korean policy appears extremely tough, but perhaps that's an attempt to buttress his image amid concerns about his youth and inexperience.