The great achievement of American foreign policy in the last third of the twentieth century was to establish more cooperative and productive relationships with the two largest communist states than either had with the other. Henry Kissinger famously called this “triangular diplomacy.” The United States drove a wedge between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China by cultivating the leaders of each society and offering arms control and trade agreements that tied Moscow and Beijing directly to Washington.
Since the establishment of bilateral relations between post-Soviet Russia and China,both sides have made considerable efforts to enhance strategic trust and establish an institutional infrastructure to deepen their cooperation in the military and general security fields. Both sides have similar views on the general international situation, and recently the progress of their military-to-military interactions sped up as their relations with the US sharply deteriorated.
Since March 2017, the autonomous region of Xinjiang has gained, once again, media coverage because of the continuous clashes between the local Uyghur population and the Chinese government forces.
Al summit del G20 tenutosi a Buenos Aires lo scorso fine settimana, gli Stati Uniti e la Cina hanno trovato un modo per smorzare i toni e il corso della guerra commerciale iniziata da Trump a luglio. L’ulteriore round di aumenti nei dazi sulle importazioni statunitensi dalla Cina, previsto a gennaio 2019, per il momento è stato sospeso. In cambio, la Cina ha promesso da un lato, di importare di più dagli States per ridurre il loro deficit commerciale, e dall'altro, di aprire più settori alle imprese americane.
The escalating trade war between the United States and China will be one of the hot issues during the Buenos Aires G20 meeting. This trade conflict, probably the most important since the second world war, started last January with the US introducing safeguard tariffs on imports from the world of solar panels and tariff rate-quotas on imports from the world of washing machines. These tariffs have been introduced in response to requests by US manufacturers.
Afghanistan remains an awkward fit within China’s Belt and Road Initiative concept. Look at most maps of Xi Jinping’s keynote foreign policy concept cutting a route across Eurasia, and they tend to go tidily around Afghanistan.
The twentieth summit between the European Union and China, which ended on 16 July 2018 in Beijing, reinforces the collaboration between the two actors both at the economic-commercial and the geopolitical levels.
With US President Donald Trump apparently hell bent on upending global rules, can Europe and Asia join forces to shore up a rapidly weakening multilateral order? New initiatives unveiled by the European Commission for revamping the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and setting governance standards for transport, energy and digital connectivity offer opportunities for more joint Europe-Asian action.
The state of relations between Europe and China on the issue of bilateral direct investments has recently become more and more delicate. Precisely since the end of 2017, which marked a milestone in Europe-China economic relations. For the first time ever, Chinese direct investment flows exceeded their German counterparts, traditionally the largest European investors in the Middle Kingdom.
Since the beginning of trade tensions with the US, Beijing intensified its outreach to Europe in search for allies. In a ‘charm offensive’, China showed goodwill by suggesting it would make economic and political concessions. Particularly, it addressed issues of reciprocity, i.e. EU requests to have equal access to the Chinese market as Chinese investors and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) do in Europe, and Europe’s concerns over Chinese initiatives undermining EU unity and rules.