Cina e Taiwan si incontrano e il momento ha il sapore della storia. I ministri per le relazioni tra Repubblica Popolare Cinese e Repubblica di Cina (Taiwan) sono i primi rappresentanti dei due governi a incontrarsi ufficialmente. Per almeno quarant’anni, i partiti che dominano i due paesi, Partito comunista cinese e Guomindang (Partito nazionalista), si sono infatti affrontati con aggressività in campo internazionale per contendersi la legittimità politica di rappresentare il popolo cinese.
Where is China under its (relatively) new president Xi Jinping heading to politically and economically? That question is as open as ever and those analysts and observers who over the last two years sought to make predictions on Beijing’s preparedness to adopt economic and political reforms, have come to realize that China’s political and economic policymaking processes remain too opaque and non-transparent to make predictions which go beyond guess-work.
Xi Jinping's first year in power has been all about signalling the challenges to the party's grip on power and indicating how these challenges might be met. Despite a change in emphasis, these challenges have long been established and identifying them is not the same thing as solving them.
Shaun Breslin, is Director of the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at The University of Warwick, where he runs a large EU funded project on the EU in a multipolar world.
Can the United States rely on cyber-deterrence – the threat to retaliate in kind if attacked in cyberspace in very damaging ways? The difficulties in attribution were thought decisive until DoD leaders argued that attribution was actually good. Perhaps the attribution of those who repeatedly penetrate systems, haul away copious information, and fear no consequences (e.g., Chinese hackers) is good (it never gets tested). But attribution for cyberwarriors who need only penetrate once, need not haul away large amounts of information, and may well bear consequences is a different thing entirely. The paper also moots how deterrence measures may be applied to stop Chinese hacking when their activity (espionage) is sanctioned by international norms and carried out by other countries (albeit for different reasons), and where the harm done is hard to quantify.
Beijing would vote for Angela Merkel in Germany’s upcoming general elections.
The July 10-11, 2013 US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) made major strides in stabilizing and moving forward US-China relations, building upon the momentum spurred by the June presidential summit between US President, Barack Obama, and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, in Sunnylands, California. The US and China have hosted the annual S&ED since 2009, and before then as a separate Strategic Dialogue and Strategic Economic Dialogue, which were initiated in 2005 and 2006 respectively.
While the US is seeking a way of rebalancing China in East Asia its approach left space for interpretation. The strategy of positioning itself in Asia on basis of concrete security issues and alliances while keeping its involvement open is seemingly only one aspect of the new game. Today a more or less refined toolbox of ‘strategic persuasion’ was designed in order to deal with an increasingly influential and powerful China. Instead of engaging in a non-desirable and costly direct military opposition to China, the US tries to pull all the strings in order influence its behavior towards moderation particularly in East Asia. In so doing, Washington is encountering an expectation-perception gap. So far the strategy has not necessarily proven successful. In Beijing, strategic maneuvers were often not fully understood and responses did not turn out not as initially desired. The US’ pivot to Asia has aroused a primordial fear in modern China: containment by outside powers. With a return to more traditional language of balancing, in China the situation was better understood. Yet, the implication remains the same. China has in reaction adopted a more assertive stance in military affairs while gradually trying to limit political damage in the ASEAN framework.
Since the partition of the Korean peninsula, the crises between Seoul and Pyongyang have ranked high in the US political agenda. Nonetheless, the profile that the Obama administration has chosen to keep is relatively low. This choice has triggered criticisms, however the posture has brought its own benefits. Moreover, in a difficult economic situation, and in the face of increasing pressures for the curtailing of government expenditure, the ‘low profile’ approach meets the demands of a Congress whose support the White House increasingly needs. The main uncertainty is in the attitude of the PRC. However Beijing, more than any other nation, has a keen interest in keeping East Asia stable. This does not mean that China will become a sort of ‘US cop’ in East Asia. However, some forms of localized cooperation can be envisaged; a cooperation that could strengthen, as China will progress in occupying the international position that its leadership believes the country deserves.