In the past few weeks, the treatment of waste has been receiving increasing attention in the media further to the proposal of the Mayor of Rome to build a large waste-to-energy plant to treat some of the capital’s refuse.
Before assessing the Italian situation, we should recall that the treatment of waste, and in particular its conversion into energy, is not happening in a legislative vacuum but it is strictly regulated by European Union laws.
Eleven years ago, as popular uprisings erupted across the Middle East and North Africa, Europeans imagined themselves as partners of choice for democratic and economic transitions that would create pathways to sustainable stability. This dream failed catastrophically. The region was overwhelmed by instability and conflict, and Europe, in turn, by waves of refugees and deadly terrorism. Through it all the European bloc found itself marginalized, crowded out by the more assertive interventions of regional and non-regional actors.
Lebanon’s economic and political crisis represents an important issue for European policymakers. Given the central role the country plays in the eastern Mediterranean region, its further destabilisation is likely to spread to the broader Middle East, with significant consequences also for Europe. Over the past twenty years, both the European Union and its member states, with France in the lead, have played a key role in sustaining Lebanon’s fragile economy and supporting the burden posed by the Syrian refugee crisis.
Economic sanctions imposed by the EU against Russia aim at weakening Moscow’s economy by cutting it off trade flows with European countries. So far, six rounds of sanctions have been introduced, but have they been effective? Are they going to harm European economies as well, and to what extent? In the short term, Europe growth prospects will be affected; but in the medium to long run, it might be possible for the EU to strengthen its trade partnerships with other countries thanks to its extensive networks of Preferential Trade Agreements.
A "side effect" of Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine is that Finland and Sweden may soon join NATO. What seemed an unthinkable prospect just a few months ago now looks increasingly concrete. In Finland, by 2019, over half of the population opposed joining NATO. Now, 62% are in favor (with an additional 11% since the start of the war), with the Finnish parliament potentially deciding to join as early as mid-June.
Russia’s war against Ukraine has dramatically changed not only the life of Ukrainians and Russians, but of Europeans, too. Many things that seemed impossible just before February 24th, 2022 now look more than probable. Among them is Ukraine’s EU membership.
Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine has consolidated EU elite opinion along anti-Russia lines. The days when a plethora of European voices encouraged understanding and strategic empathy towards Russia’s declared security concerns are unlikely to return for the foreseeable future.
Climate change necessitates a swift transition to clean energy and completely rethinking how we live, manufacture, produce and consume. In Europe commitments to do so are even time-bound under the EU Climate Law – 55% emissions reductions across the EU by 2030 and climate neutrality by 2050. Naturally, this will cost a lot of money and then some more to ensure that the transition is done in a fair and equitable manner.
The Covid-19 pandemic disrupted supply chains and economic activities across the globe. Japan is no exception because of its global supply chain vulnerability, notably its high concentration of production bases in China. This article first explains recent developments in Japanese supply chain policy over the past few years. It argues that Japan’s efforts in securing supply chain resilience have not been successful. It then highlights key challenges faced by the Japanese government in strengthening supply chain resilience.
The upgrading of EU-ASEAN relations from a dialogue partnership to a strategic partnership in December 2020 marks a turning point in their diplomatic relations, signifying not only that the previous donor-recipient dynamics have disappeared, but that both sides now seem to need each other more than ever. Facing the intensifying major-power rivalry, ASEAN needs to expand its strategic space by diversifying its external partners.
It is no secret that, contrary to prior beliefs and expectations, the EU has substantially failed to break its dependence on Russian oil and gas exports. Today, the European Union still relies on Russia for approximately 45% of its gas needs, with some EU countries – such as Italy – being more vulnerable than others. However, Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine is forcing Brussels to make difficult choices.
The presidency of Donald Trump terrified anti-corruption practitioners in both the US and abroad. Because of its role in enforcing anti-corruption legislation with extraterritorial reach, supporting civil society initiatives that fostered anti-corruption, and creating international legal instruments against corruption, the US was rightfully seen as one of the main promotors of anti-corruption measures.
