Since the terrorism wave in Europe started with Charlie Hebdo and the Paris attacks in November, Brussels has been presented as the crib of foreign fighters in Europe. The attacks of yesterday morning in the city, which is the heart of the European Institutions, have demonstrated that Brussels is not just the nest where the eggs are brooded, on the contrary it could be the vulnerable theatre of terrorism and fear.
Alexander Lukashenko that hosted the summit in Minsk could barely hide his happiness. He did not take a direct part in the 16-hours long negotiations, but got a precious opportunity to transform his status from the one of “the last European Dictator” into the one of the main European peace-maker with the European leaders paying a visit to him.
As the dust and emotions still settle over the attacks by jihadists in Paris, there has been a great deal of commentary on the lessons we should derive from this tragedy. The focus has largely been on free speech, integration, intelligence failures, and the competing claims of responsibility by the Islamic State and Al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). So what lessons should we draw?
A Matter of Integration?
International reaction to the attacks on the satirical magazine “Charlie Hebdo” and the Hebrew shop in Paris, in which seventeen people lost their lives, is not comparable to the attention for the Boko Haram massacre of an estimated two thousand people in Baga, North Eastern, Nigeria, earlier that same week.
Italy and European integration: general background
Despite periodical, yet relatively short fluctuations, support for the European Union (EU) has been a virtually constant guideline in Italian foreign policy for a number of reasons, notably EU’s perceived role as a vehicle of pan-European geopolitical stability, economic re-distribution and socio-cultural modernisation.
To what extent has the French intervention weakened the African Union leadership on the Malian crisis?
François Hollande and Nicolas Sarkozy are often said to be deeply opposed. The first would be more inclined to maintaining public spending, which does not fit with the current European budgetary discipline policies. The second, more experienced at the helm, would have the benefit of greater credibility on European issues. This crude opposition is too simplistic to be satisfying.