The current stance of Italy towards the crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean between Turkey and its western and southern neighbours (Greece, Cyprus, Egypt) on the delimitation of the Economic Exclusive Zones (EEZ) can be best understood by referring to the traditional approach of Italian foreign policy in the Mediterranean.
It is widely believed the COVID-19 pandemic that has recently hit and paralysed the international community has accelerated processes already underway. These include the redefinition, certainly not the disappearance, of what is often termed globalisation. A trend, the latter, that – despite trade wars, shrinking supply chains, reshoring of companies – is destined to permanently characterise international relations, marking the end of traditional space-time limits and expanding their scope as never before.
This time it's different. The ongoing oil shock has a precise origin: the new SARS-COV-2 coronavirus pandemic. During the 2007-2008 subprime mortgage crisis, the collapse of international trade was linked to the fear of a crack in the financial system. In this case, the lockdowns in Asia, Europe, Africa, Oceania, North America and South America are having a greater magnitude. And the volatility of the oil price reflects this new dimension. Italy is not immune to contagion. The consequences can be long-term.
COVID-19’s lethality in Italy is a highly discussed figure. When compared with other major countries, Italy’s 9.9% case fatality rate (CFR) as of 24 March 2020 is the highest by far. But relying on this figure is misleading. By itself, the CFR tells us almost nothing about COVID-19’s plausible lethality (infected fatality rate, or IFR). On the opposite, recent studies place China’s IFR at 0.7%. By relying on this figure, ISPI’s best estimate for COVID-19’s plausible lethality in Italy is 1.1%.
The terrorist attack on London Bridge and the alleged terrorist attack at Pensacola, Florida (USA), late last year have once again demonstrated that jihadism is not dead. Indeed, despite the downscaling of al-Qaeda and the military defeats of the Islamic State, both groups are still active in waging wars on their “distant enemies” in the West.
On Tuesday 17 September 2019, at around 10:45am, in the square in front of Milan’s Central Station, a young man attacked from behind an Italian soldier on duty for a “Safe Streets” service in the city.
Italy has a migration problem, just not the one it thinks it does. To illustrate the challenges facing the country, Interior Minister Matteo Salvini continues to point south, at people coming by boat across the Mediterranean.
The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) concluded at the end of March between China and Italy drove the global community into a frenzy of excitement. Indeed, Italy was the first amongst the Group of Seven industrialized nations (G7) and the founders of the European Union (EU) to commit to China’s infrastructure projects in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
It has often been stated in the past that with the EU, China likes to divide and rule. But in the new, complex period we are all moving into, for once the case may be that the tables have turned, and now for relations with Europe, China is being divided and ruled.
