The COVID-19 pandemic represents a major threat to all Gulf states. Nonetheless, some in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have seen this crisis as a valuable opportunity to bolster their images and reputations before the world. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a salient example of how a Gulf country has engaged in “virus diplomacy”.
“The people of Sudan have suffered immensely, and this revolution will not be complete unless we recognise the immense grievances of those who have been systematically targeted by those who were responsible for their protection”. The peace process with the Sudanese armed movements is the “main priority” for the transitional government, according to Abdalla Hamdok’s recent words, filled with strong symbolic and political meaning.
One year ago, the mass mobilization of Sudanese civil society led to Omar al-Bashir’s removal from office, marking the end of one of the longest-ruling regimes in Africa. The aftermath of the revolution saw the unfolding of a social, political and economic crisis with a growing risk of violent destabilization. The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the changing priorities of external actors are adding further uncertainty to the country's future.
For the past 15 years the figure of Omar al-Bashir, the former president of Sudan, has epitomized the struggle of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to fulfill its mandate, i.e. to end impunity for the worst crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.
Since the removal from power of Omar al-Bashir in April 2019, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have been stepping up their role in Sudan’s transition, reflecting a broader trend of Gulf powers’ growing interest in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region. Though they do not always see eye-to-eye, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been coordinating their efforts at least since 2014 to project greater power across the
The first hundred days of Prime Minister Sabah Al-Khaled Al-Sabah’s first, and Kuwait’s thirty-sixth, government have passed without much fanfare. The new PM has the novel coronavirus both to blame and thank.
While many that research jihadism have focused on how the Islamic State (IS) has responded to the coronavirus pandemic, IS no longer actually controls territory in Iraq or Syria. Therefore, at best all they can do is provide guidance.
Describing a decade of developments in North Africa is no simple task. The last ten years have offered each North African State its own redefining moment(s) to grapple with, making a case for observing their distinctive contexts and the complex processes stemming from the different choices and strategies adopted by these countries.
As the Covid-19 spreads rapidly on a global scale and states worldwide are struggling with the pandemic, many concerns are arising over the future of fragile and conflict-torn countries in the Middle East and North Africa, where the consequences of the coronavirus are expected to be direr and more destabilizing.
Iraq’s Shiite militias have reached the pinnacle of power and politics in recent years, in large part because of the emergence of the so-called Islamic state (IS) and the collapse of the Iraqi army but also because of the diminished capacity of the Iraqi state after more than a decade of corruption and political instability.
