Muslim terrorist organizations in Central, South, and Southeast Asia frequently blur the lines between “jihadist group” and “Muslim separatist movement.” As a result, a spectrum exists from strictly transnational jihadists, to Muslim separatists utilizing jihadist rhetoric and perhaps accepting assistance from transnational jihadist groups, to violent separatist groups that simply happen to identify as Muslim.
Terrorism is becoming a growing concern in Asia: More than 250 people have been reported killed and hundreds more injured after at least seven explosions have hit churches and several hotels in Sri Lanka on April 21, Easter Sunday. Other countries in Asia have been hit in recent years, too, especially after the progressive demise of the Islamic State in the Middle East.
Administrative expulsions for national security reasons have played a growing role in the Italian counter-terrorism strategy. As of October 18th, 2018, there have been 106 deportations on the grounds of extremism in 2018, surpassing last year’s 105 expulsions. The number has been growing since 2015, and their use has become more common. The provision can only be employed against foreign individuals present on Italian territory and once an individual is deported they are issued a prohibition from reentering the country for a period of at least 5 years.
On May 20th, a group of four attacked the Archangel Michael Orthodox Church in the downtown of Grozny, Chechnya’s capital city. The attack came during a mass and killed a churchgoer and two police officers who came to the rescue.
The anti-terrorism operation carried out today in Foggia, Southern Italy, marks an important moment for Italy’s counterterrorism. The raid comes as the culmination of a longer investigation initiated by Bari’s DIGOS (the national police’s special unit, which was monitoring a small, unauthorized place of worship named Al Dawa, located near Foggia’s railway station. Indeed, two recently arrested jihadists — including a former Chechen foreign fighter — were known to have regularly attended the mosque.
Whereas most large European countries have been greatly affected by Islamic State-inspired terrorism, Italy has not seen the same degree of radicalization and extremist activity. With a much smaller number of foreign fighters, no terrorist attacks to date, and less developed terrorist networks, the country has been able to cope with the latest wave of transnational terrorism. With the offensives to crush the Islamic State now winding down, however, authorities fear that returning foreign fighters may generate a new surge in terrorist attacks.
Il panel da sinistra: Andrea Manciulli, Paolo Magri, Olivier Roy.
The opening of the so-called Western Balkan route in the summer of 2015 brought the region back to our living rooms and to political boardrooms. One could sense relief and hope among those long advocating for increased efforts on the side of the EU for the Thessaloniki agenda to reach its finalité. Relief because it looked like the immense strains the refugee wave put on the countries along the route did not seem to endanger the regional stability still feared to be fragile.
Over the last three years Europe and North America have been hit by an unprecedented wave of terrorist attacks perpetrated by individuals motivated by jihadist ideology. Who are the individuals who have carried out these attacks? Were they born and raised in the West? Or were they an “imported threat”, refugees and migrants? How did they radicalize? Were they well educated and integrated, or social outcasts? Did they act alone? What were their connections to the Islamic State?
The answers to these and other questions have large implications for our understanding of the threat facing us and, consequently, help us design sounder policy solutions built on empirical evidence. This study, the first of its kind, seeks to analyze the demographic profile, radicalization trajectories and connections to the Islamic State of all the individuals who have carried out attacks.
After the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood in July 2013, Sinai Peninsula became a safe haven for many radical Bedouins and Jihadists, who used Morsi’s ouster both to legitimize their ideological and political battles in Egypt and to enlarge their strategic range from the Sinai Peninsula to the immediate neighborhood of the Egyptian Peninsula. Indeed, during these years’ attacks and violence increased exponentially of the 69% in Sinai and in Egypt.