Algeria’s military apparatus, the National Popular Army (NPA) — with its diverse cliques and personalities, vaunted counterterrorism experience, and intelligence capabilities — encompasses internal security structures and plays an important (if oversized) role in deterring and dictating the country’s political affairs and policies. The military has been able to subordinate peer groups within significant power structures, be they the political class, technocrats, the business elite, civil society, or the media.
The trajectory of Algeria’s armed forces as the foundation of the modern state, the guardians of the secular state during the decade-long civil war, and as a counter-terrorism powerhouse has solidified its inextricably dual security and political role. After a brief interlude following the civil war, when former President Abdelaziz Bouteflika sought to check some of the military’s expansive prerogatives, the military is emerging once again as the uncontested and most powerful domestic actor. It shapes domestic and foreign policy with the blessing and submission of the political class. The military’s supremacy was evident during the country’s top-down transition out of Bouteflika’s rule following the 2019 Hirak. After months of sustained mobilization against ailing President Bouteflika’s fifth term, the military facilitated his departure and took the reins of the political transition.
Having played such a guiding role, the military overcame the uncertainty of the moment by dictating its parameters, including replacing former president Bouteflika through a presidential election that favored the rise of Abdelmajid Tebboune; a constitutional revision; and parliamentary election. The transition also set the stage for a more powerful military engagement in the country’s political affairs.
This is evident in — and facilitated by — three key elements. First, the military-led institutional restructuring has placed internal security services firmly under the armed forces’ authority after Bouteflika’s efforts to wrestle some control over the intelligence services out of the military’s hands in 2015. Though the Ministry of Interior runs its own security service, Renseignements Generaux (General Intelligence Department), their role and impact are minimal compared to the more powerful security apparatus under military oversight.
This recent restructuring relies on real and imagined threats of domestic terrorism and separatism as well as a desire to silence dissent and stifle any impetus for another popular movement. Second, the increase in national oil and gas income will facilitate greater military spending, reinforcing the state’s ability to spend lavishly on its military procurement and preparedness. Finally, Algeria’s foreign policy posture keeps regional tensions with neighboring Morocco at the forefront while maintaining same long-term alliance with Russia, even as Europe and the US seek to alienate the Kremlin from the international stage through a careful rapprochement with Moscow’s traditional partners.
An Institutional Setup
Since the collapse of Bouteflika’s reign, military and personnel restructuring and administrative reforms have sought to achieve two key objectives. First, to streamline security institutions under military command. Second, to eliminate — or lessen — internal disagreements within the institution.
Under President Bouteflika, the Director for Security and Intelligence (Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité, DRS) led the state’s intelligence activities under military oversight. Part of Bouteflika’s efforts to check the armed forces’ dominance was to give the service some civilian façade by distancing it from military leadership and placing it under presidential oversight. This was facilitated in part by the In Amenas attack and the hostages' situation in Tiguentourine in 2013. Eventually, the entire DRS was replaced by three separate departments attached to the presidency instead of the military leadership. Even the DRS’ powerful leader, Mohamed Mediène (often called Toufik), was dismissed in 2015. At the time, these changes aimed to "reduce the influence of the intelligence apparatus in the political scene and civilizing political life".
However, though the DRS has not been reinstituted, its various networks have made a comeback, including former DRS leadership figures closely associated with Mohamed Mediène, who returned to power in 2020. For example, the General Directorate of Internal Security (DGSI) was put under the leadership of Major-General Djamel Kehal, a former trainee of the DRS school in Algiers. Another example is epitomized by the General Directorate of Documentation and External Security (DGDSE), led by Major-General Abdelghani Rachedi.
The personnel reshuffling that took place during the 2019 transition initially also took on the rhetoric of accountability and anti-corruption. Nonetheless, it eventually settled into what can be partially explained as minor differences on the extent of the military’s political role. Some of the squabbles remain personality- and power-driven, lacking a broader ideological bend. But there is also divergence between military figures and their associates, who favor a more traditional approach to the military’s endeavours, including around foreign policy issues.
The People’s Guardians
The military leadership has argued — buttressed by civilians’ position as articulated by President Tebboune — that the 2019 protests were hijacked by violent extremists. This required a firm security approach, which added validity to the army’s claim over domestic security. Among the threats identified by the military there are the rise of the Hirak movement and the presence of radical opposition groups, such as the Islamist Rachad Movement and the Movement for the Self-determination of the Kabylie (MAK). The government has designated them as terrorist organizations, prompting authorities to restructure the national security sector.
Another example of the armed forces’ reach is the High Security Council. As a crisis management institution that is convened as needed, it gathered again in 2021. In previous iterations, the council would not exceed two or three military members — as was the case during the unrest of the late 1980’s, the civil war, and various counter-terrorism campaigns. However, a recent law changed the council’s composition to 6 civilian members (including the President as Chairman) to 5 military figures, including the Chief of Staff. This is a further codification of the National Popular Army’s increased scope in countering domestic opposition. Other examples include the high-profile military trial of Louisa Hanoune, the Head of Algeria’s Workers’ Party, and of Said Bouteflika, the former President’s brother and advisor who effectively ran the country during his brother’s incapacitation. Hanoune’s trial marked the first time that a military court presided over the trial of a leading politician since the civil war. The trial also involved Mediène and another military figure, Athaman Tartag, known as Bachir. This took place despite the 2018 amendment to military penal code which came to ban such practices.
Financial Largesse
Since the country’s’ independence in 1962, the military has been the only institution in Algeria that enjoys popular support and immunity. This extends to financial matters, too. Prior to Algeria’s 60th independence celebrations, President Tebboune published a letter in the army’s official magazine, El Djeich, vowing to continue investing in the military industrial complex. Algerian military spending ranks among the highest in the region, second only to Israel (without counting Turkey and the Gulf countries). According to SIPRI data, Algeria spends on average six percent of its GDP on the military. Compared to its African neighbors, it ranks as the highest military spender. Moreover, the country’s military budget has steadily grown over the past 10 years by an average of 16%.
|
Type of change |
Throughout 2000-2020 |
|
Change in defense spending |
+416% |
|
Change in share of GDP |
+97% |
|
Change in share of govt spending |
+25% |
Yet, there is little transparency or accountability on how the military budget can be overseen. Despite the existence of a parliamentary committee on defense and security, its mandate remains unspecified beyond reported parliamentary diplomacy. Thus, information about the military institution, including budgetary details, is not easily accessible. While Hirak has drawn attention to the need for accountability, the armed forces will likely keep efforts to interfere with their budgetary prerogatives at bay. In fact, the involvement of the military leadership in the “Clean Hands Operation” against corruption since 2019 suggests that financial and economic audit will remain a prerogative of its security branches without significant civilian scrutiny beyond the President’s oversight — and he is not likely to touch the military’s financial prerogatives. Furthermore, the 2019 law that granted investigative prerogatives on financial corruption to the intelligence apparatus makes the military immune to it. Crucially, it also means that the military can level such corruption charges against any opponents given the mandate and the lack of accountability around the institution.
In the long term, however, these powerful tools and the lack of transparency and accountability could jeopardize the armed forces’ domestic reputation.
Geopolitical Opportunities and Pressures
The military leadership, compelled and informed by its traditionalist outlook, is seeking to balance out a few overriding and at times contradictory concerns. First, the armed forces’ doctrine is to maintain a certain neutrality. This principle, however, has proved rather difficult to uphold for various reasons. First, the Algerian military’s partnership with Russia. Although Algeria has not allowed its Russian counterparts to use it in any meaningful way to leverage its geopolitical struggle, the partnership itself indicates a sort of alignment that is difficult to portray as neutral.
The doctrine’s second principle is to protect against a hostile neighbor, which has shaped Algeria’s posture vis-à-vis Morocco and the conflict in the Western Sahara. Since August 2021, tensions between Rabat and Algiers have increased, with the Algerian leadership declining all mediation efforts.[i] Underpinning this tension is Morocco’s recent recognition of its claims over the contested territory by the US. At the same time, active conflict between Morocco and the Polisario resumed in November 2020, which has led to mutual attacks and casualties. The violence has also spilled over onto Algerian citizens; further antagonizing the Algerian military among the public. A concomitant development can be found in the normalization in Moroccan-Israeli relations and their growing defense partnership, which includes joint military exercises, an agreement to purchase $500 million in air missile defense systems, and intelligence cooperation.
Another notable element in the Algerian military’s regional posture is its relationship with Russia. Moscow is Algiers’ top arms supplier, with 4.2 billion dollars’ worth of arms trade between 2016 and 2020, building on an estimated two billion dollars’ budget for annual military purchases over the past two decades. This cooperation included the delivery of developed systems such as S-350 Russian missiles. This enduring relationship has proven difficult for the military elite to abandon or even lessen. Though the Algerian military leadership might understand the gravity of Russia’s new circumstances, it is stuck in its own ways. Perhaps due to institutional and psychological reasons, the leadership does not seem willing to think outside of their traditional approach. The way the institution is set up gives greater credence to older leaders, with their vision ultimately winning out. As such, a realistic or viable way to change the Algerian military’s stance on Russia seems unlikely.
Conclusion
Throughout the country’s tumultuous history, the National Popular Army has assumed the role of the “Republic’s Guardian” in the face of foreign and domestic aggression. The armed forces have sought to preserve sociopolitical stability as well as avoid economic hardships and extremism. The military’s paternalistic role has come at the expense of all other actors and credible political alternatives. The 2019 Hirak, geostrategic shifts, and generational gaps further foster the military’s hold onto its domestic supremacy, the push against regional competition, and a revolutionary view of the global order. Nevertheless, this paternalistic and outdated vision could gradually chip away at the military’s popularity. While many Algerians still value — some even idolize — the armed forces, younger generations are likely to assess the institution’s supremacy, control, and immunity more pragmatically. This re-evaluation will also consider global developments as Algiers seeks to solidify its security sector and assert independence from external actors. However, until then, the Algerian armed forces will retain their political influence and consolidate their financial advantages to boost military industrial and technical leverage.
|
Year |
2000 |
2001 |
2002 |
2003 |
2004 |
2005 |
2006 |
2007 |
2008 |
2009 |
2010 |
2011 |
2012 |
2013 |
2014 |
2015 |
2016 |
2017 |
2018 |
2019 |
2020 |
2021 |
|
Defense Spending (in billion USD) |
1.881 |
2.091 |
2.1 |
2.206 |
2.802 |
2.925 |
3.093 |
3.946 |
5.172 |
5.281 |
5.671 |
8.652 |
9.326 |
10.162 |
9.724 |
10.412 |
10.217 |
10.073 |
9.584 |
10.304 |
9.708 |
9.116 |
|
Share of GDP (percent) |
3.4 |
3.8 |
3.7 |
3.3 |
3.3 |
2.8 |
2.6 |
2.9 |
3.0 |
3.8 |
3.5 |
4.3 |
4.5 |
4.8 |
5.5 |
6.3 |
6.4 |
5.9 |
5.5 |
6.0 |
6.7 |
5.6 |
|
Share of government’s spending (percent) |
12.2 |
10.8 |
10.1 |
10.7 |
10.5 |
9.2 |
8.8 |
8.0 |
9.0 |
9.4 |
10.8 |
10.2 |
13.4 |
13.7 |
13.7 |
15.3 |
15.4 |
14.5 |
15.9 |
17.4 |
15.2 |
N/A |
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