It’s been just over a month since the first Iranian-made Shahed-136 drone (rebranded in Russian colours as the “Geran-2”) was intercepted by Ukrainian forces near Kupians, in the Kharkiv Oblast. This episode marked the first evidence of Russia’s rumoured wide-scale deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV’s, or “drones”), manufactured and supplied by Iran (still officially denied by Tehran) for its military effort in Ukraine. From that moment onwards, Iranian UAVs under Russian control have been recorded along the entire front line and over major Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructures.
It is still uncertain what impact these weapons may have upon the course of war; nonetheless, their ease of use, their ample lethality, and the increased deployment in the battlefield represents a growing threat to the Ukrainian Armed Forces and population. In addition, Tehran’s (alleged) delivery of its more sophisticated unmanned devices to Moscow indicates that the Islamic Republic has shifted towards an active military support role for Russia's war in Ukraine (a behaviour strongly opposed by Kyiv, Washington and Brussels) and that both counties are heading towards a more robust strategic relationship.
What the Islamic Republic has offered to Moscow
In July, White House National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan, revealed declassified intelligence on Moscow's intent of acquiring "several hundreds" of the Iranian manufactured UAVs (including weapons-capable models), and that Russian officials had visited the Islamic Republic for operational training on these devices. Satellite imagery released later also showed that a Russian military delegation visited the Shahid Karimi base (involved in Iranian drone operations within Syria) in August, examining both the Shahed-129, and Shahed-191 combat drones.
More than a month of operational activities of the UAVs within Ukraine by Russian forces reveals that Tehran has indeed met Moscow's requirements by providing (at least) two specific models of combat platforms: the Mohajer-6 and the delta-winged Shahed-136. The former is a mid-range intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) combat UAV, with a claimed operational range of 200 km and an effective payload of up to 150 kg of ordnance, including two hard points for up to four guided missiles or bombs. The latter is the Iranian Aircraft Industrial Company's (HESA) latest development, a loitering munition (or "suicide/kamikaze" drone) that officially entered service with the Iranian army in 2021. To date, the exact characteristics of the Shahed-136/Geran-2 are mostly unknown. In open sources, Iran claims it has a remarkable range of 2,500 km, a weight of 200 kg, a cruising speed of 185 km/h and with capabilities of carrying a powerful warhead of up to 40 kg. At best, however, these figures seem optimistic.
Both unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) are designed for offensive operations, although they possess different structures, armament capabilities, performances and operational models. The Shahed-136 is (in most of its intended uses) a single-use weapon that can be employed in rudimentary swarm tactics to directly strike precision targets from long distances. Instead, The Mohajer is mainly comparable to the Turkish-made TB2 drone (currently in Ukrainian inventories), as it can carry out both surveillance and attack functions with its own armament, and then return to base. Sources in Ukraine seem to indicate that the Mohajer-6 UAVs have generally been employed for advanced surveillance, directing the smaller Shaheds towards their targets.
Why Russia needs Iranian drones
Assessing the impact and efficacy of a single weapon system within a complex and fast-evolving environment, such as in Ukraine, is extremely difficult, and in this case, it may seem premature. Nevertheless, recent information emerging from the battlefield regarding Russia's early utilization of Iranian drones (and also the countermeasures implemented by the Ukrainian armed forces) offer some interesting insights into how the conflict is evolving.
Strategically, the arrival of Iranian drones helped fill a crucial gap in Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine. Despite previously seeking to become a significant drone power, Moscow has been sluggish to prioritise its UAVs development. As a result, it began the campaign fielding a large fleet of surveillance UAVs (such as the Eleron-3 and the Orlan-10 ), but with relatively few offensive drones to precisely strike targets deep inside the enemy territory. By contrast, Ukraine has extensively used Turkish-made combat UAVs to wreak havoc on Russian armour, logistic lines and artillery since the early phases of the conflict. Most Russian active models in Ukraine, such as the Zala KYB loitering munition, have a short range and very small warhead, making it inferior by nature to similar Iranian designs.
In eight months of active combat, the Russian UAVs fleet has been decimated by Ukrainian countermeasures, and its reserves of expensive long-range cruise missiles have declined sharply. The reconstruction of these arsenals will probably take years for Moscow to reach pre-war levels again, especially given the restrictions placed on Russian access to foreign-made, high-tech components necessary for this purpose. At this stage, Tehran's support represents an ideal interim solution for rapidly deploying relatively cheap UAVs until new supplies or a new generation of missiles and combat drones are available to the Kremlin.
A headache for Ukrainian air defences
From an operational perspective, Russia's deployment of Iranian drones has changed based on the rapid developments on the battlefield in the last weeks. During the Ukrainian counter-offensive in Kharkiv Oblast in late August, Iranian drones were predominately employed by tactically targeting long-range artillery batteries (including the valuable HIMARS missile launchers supplied by the US), troop positions, weapons depots and armoured vehicles near the front line. They then opted for a more strategic approach, by attempting to strike high-value infrastructure targets (such as electrical power stations, waterworks, and transmission lines) behind the frontline (especially in the South). Finally, on October 10, the Kremlin answered the explosion on the Kerch Bridge (that Moscow accredits to a Ukrainian special operation) by launching an indiscriminate aerial bombardment campaign against Ukraine’s major cities, including civilian targets deep inside Ukrainian territory. This was done extensively using Iranian-made loitering munitions, cruise missiles, and conventional bombs.
From a technological standpoint, Iranian attack drones cannot be as technologically sophisticated as US, Israeli, or Turkish-made drones. Russia's most-used Iranian UAV within Ukraine, the Shahed-136, is a rudimentary weapon system equipped with a Mado MD-550 piston engine (a Chinese license-build copy of the German Limbach L550) with a nominal power of 50 hp. Despite being economical in terms of fuel consumption, allowing the drone to travel long distances, this does limit its cruise speed to a mere 185 km/h. Due to its loud buzzing noise, the UAV can also be easily spotted mid-flight (for this reason, Ukrainian forces have nicknamed it "moped"). Similar not-so-fast, low-flying targets could become easy prey for organised air defences such as rapid-fire, anti-aircraft artillery (such as the ZSU-23-4 "Shilka" or the German Gepard) or portable light anti-aircraft systems such as the FIM-92 Stinger, Piorun or Starstreak (in some cases, even by automatic infantry weapons).
On October 6, the Ukrainian General Staff declared that, until that point, approximately 60% of the Shahed-136 UAVs deployed by Russian forces in Ukraine had been intercepted. Two weeks later, the Ukrainian Air Force Command claimed responsibility for the shooting down of 223 suicide drones between September 13 and October 19, confirming the increased use of these platforms in the latest retaliatory campaign waged by the Kremlin.
Apart from these figures (which are still difficult to confirm), it would be wrong to underestimate the significant advantage that low-cost, quickly deployable drone technology such as the Shahed-136/131 could provide on the battlefield. Despite their small size, weak engine, lack of sophisticated electronics and robust electronic warfare defences, these UAVs have proven quite problematic for Ukrainian defences. Together with its accuracy, the Shahed-136 is used in batches of 5-10 units, generally launched from a standard container holding five pieces, and can be used in a "swarming" multi-drone deployment to saturate ground defences. In addition, Iranian loitering munitions are quite small, have a composite structure and operate at low altitudes, making them difficult to detect by means of radar operating within broad areas such as the Ukraine. Finally, counteracting large groups of small, cheap drones (Ukrainian sources estimate a cost of 20,000$ per unit) can prove extremely costly for defenders in the long run, especially if primarily carried out with expensive anti-aircraft missiles or radar-guided guns (available only in limited numbers).
As Russia has already turned its long-range ammunition upon the Ukrainian civilian population in its campaign of terror, Ukrainian officials fear that Iranian UAVs will increasingly be used against civilian targets and critical infrastructures. The scale of the problem to the Ukrainians is made even more evident by the composition of arms demanded by Kyiv from the United States and other NATO members. As recently revealed by Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on October 11, Ukrainian defence intelligence believes that Russia is looking to procure 2,400 ‘Shaheds’ from Iran. To counter this threat, Kyiv authorities are progressively attempting to strengthen their air defence systems, starting with new demands on Washington and Western allies.
After attempting to procure long-range, high-precision artillery and ammunition for some months now, Ukraine is currently urging the United States to help accelerate the delivery of anti-aircraft defence systems, such as the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) and the Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS). From its side, Washington has already pledged to fulfil these requests to help Ukraine defend itself from the indiscriminate Russian strikes. Simultaneously, NATO allies are discussing bolstering Ukraine's air defences. Essentially, Russian UAV tactics have placed the Ukrainians on a more defensive footing, especially given the increased threat to their logistics, supply networks, communications, and infrastructures. This can be considered a good result for the Russian Armed Forces, at least in the short term, which should also be credited to the Iranian drones.
Nonetheless, it is premature to overestimate the actual consequences of Iranian-made drones for the conduct of the military campaign. In the eyes of Western officials, Russia’s attacks on Ukrainian cities and civilian targets are perceived as more a sign of weakness than anything else, mainly because President Vladimir Putin is rapidly running out of options in Ukraine. Together with having been unable to achieve air superiority, the Russian military's lack of a reliable, sustainable, and accurate operational-level strike capability is likely one of its most significant capability gaps in the war, combined with the growing shortage of manpower and heavy weapons. Quite simply, Iranian-made drones would not suffice to fill these ever-expanding gaps, in both terms of quality and quantity.
Even without available data on Iran’s domestic production capacity, Iranian ammunition appears to be sufficiently cheap and easy to produce, allowing for rapid mass production. At the same time, in recent years, Tehran has significantly increased its efforts to expand its UAVs arsenal, making it even more likely to meet Russian demands. Nevertheless, in terms of production, the main bottleneck for Iranian industrial production is the technological components (chips and optical system cameras) required for each drone, which Iran struggles to acquire due to long-term US and European sanctions in place. This is the primary variable in case the Russians want sufficient UAVs manufactured in Iran, possibly with infrared sensors or better GPS guidance. And all this obviously will come at a cost.
