Following a Constitutional Court decision in December 2016 and the EU's failure to turn the technical measures it tried to propose as part of an ambitious "Reform Agenda" into a comprehensive political strategy, Bosnia and Herzegovina is facing possibly its biggest political crisis after general elections will be held in October 2018 [1]. Three issues loom large on the Bosnian horizon: the complete failure of the EU's policy, a bogus need for electoral reform and increasing, malign Russian influence. Indeed, following a reduction in the role of the US and EU after the US withdrew its forces in 2004, and the failure of the encompassing constitutional reform package in April 2006, the existing vacuum has been incrementally filled by Russia in the Balkans and especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina [2].

As a result, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is likely to be pushed into institutional gridlock. There is a probability that hardline nationalists might resort to violence, primarily HDZ’s (Croatian Democratic Union) Dragan Čović – presently serving as a member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina – and SNSD's (Alliance of Independent Social-democrats) Milorad Dodik – the President of Bosnia and Herzegovina's Republika Srpska entity – to pursue their agenda of either revising the Dayton Peace Agreement and/or dividing the country into three ethnic enclaves. In other words, pursuing war-time goals by peaceful means is still salient on the nationalist agenda in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The joint German-UK policy initiative in November 2014, dubbed "Reform Agenda" in response to violent social protests in February 2014, initially seemed to show potential for some, if not substantial change. The focus of the policy was "structural socio-economic reform", resulting – less than two years after its launch in September 2016 – in a referral of the EU General Affairs Council to the EU Commission of Opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina's application for membership [3]. Fulfillment of the EU's conditionality – which included publishing the results of the 2013 census; adapting the Interim Trade Agreement of the country's Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) to Croatia's EU entry; and agreeing to a Coordination Mechanism for BiH - resulted in the Commission's handing over the so-called Questionnaire to the BiH authorities in December 2016 [4]. The Questionnaire is a an accession instrument used to assess the ability of applicant countries to meet EU criteria: it contains 3242 questions, 516 of which relate to political criteria, 74 to economic criteria and 2652 to the acquis, grouped into 33 chapters [5].

However, it was the adoption of the Coordination Mechanism – intended as a body allowing Bosnia and Herzegovina "to speak with one voice" with the EU – that showed both the EU’s willingness to compromise its own conditionality as well as resort to bottom-line negotiation with the Bosnian political elites. In addition to having been negotiated behind closed doors – once between Bakir Izetbegović, the president of the leading Bosniak ethnic party SDA (Party of Democratic Action) and Milorad Dodik and the second time between Izetbegović and Čović [6] – the Coordination Mechanism resulted in a de facto amendment of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Whereas the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina clearly defines foreign policy formulation as one of the core competencies of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina [7] – and relations with the EU certainly fall within the ambit of foreign policy – the final version of the Decision concerning coordination of the EU Integration Process in Bosnia and Herzegovina provides cantons with the right of veto on any and all decisions regarding the EU integration process [8].

Following that, in December 2016 the Constitutional Court of BiH ruled partially in favor of a complaint lodged by former HDZ politician Božo Ljubić, essentially arguing that Croats from Sarajevo, Tuzla and Bihać should be legally banned from becoming members of the House of Peoples of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even though the Court agreed with Ljubić only partially and ordered some of the provisions of the Election Law struck down, the decision allowed HDZ to hijack the political process in the country and threaten total collapse following the general elections to be held in October 2018 [9]. The fact remains, however, that the HDZ argument is political rather than legal. Elections can be held based on the FBiH constitution and the government formation process can also be completed. In the meantime, Croatia’s political class, led by President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović and Prime-minister Andrej Plenković has intensified its campaign of dangerous meddling in the political process in BiH, using its membership in the EU and NATO as leverage to push amendments to the Election Law [10].

One of the most interesting aspects of the aggressive Croat nationalist agenda in Bosnia and Herzegovina is Russian support for its revisionist, probably separatist, agenda. In addition to supporting the openly separatist agenda of its  partner Milorad Dodik, Moscow evidently sees HDZ as an ally in its attempts to undermine Bosnia and Herzegovina's NATO (and to a lesser extent EU) membership prospects. Moscow seems to have complemented its political, police and paramilitary links with Dodik with a heavy economic footprint in the areas of BiH ruled by HDZ; with the exception of Croatian government officials, Russia remains the sole foreign actor to fully endorse HDZ demands [11].

In conclusion, a combination of factors, including internal structural weakness and lack of coherent policy on the part of NATO and EU – most recently, NATO missed another opportunity by failing to activate a Membership Action Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina – does not augur well for the short term future of the country. The country seems destined for another crisis, possibly the biggest one since the end of the war and it will take coherence and consistency on the part of the West to prevent peace from collapsing. Unfortunately, coherence and consistency are the only two ingredients missing from the mix.

References:

[1] The EU’s Failing Policy Initiative for Bosnia and Herzegovina A Reform Agenda & Questionnaire Monitoring Report, Bodo Weber, Berlin-Sarajevo, April 2018,  http://www.democratizationpolicy.org/pdf/DPC_EU_BiH_Initiative_Failure_P...

[2] Bosnia on the Chopping Block: The Potential for Violence and Steps to Prevent it, Reuf Bajrović, Richard Kraemer, and Emir Suljagić, Foreign Policy Research Institute, March 2018, https://www.fpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/UPDATED-Bosnia-2018.pdf

[3] Substantial Change on the Horizon? A Monitoring Report on the EU’s New Bosnia and Herzegovina Initiative, Bodo Weber, Berlin-Sarajevo March 2017, http://www.democratizationpolicy.org/pdf/DPC_EU_BiH_Initiative_Monitorin...

[4] The EU’s Failing Policy Initiative for Bosnia and Herzegovina A Reform Agenda & Questionnaire Monitoring Report, Bodo Weber, Berlin-Sarajevo, April 2018,  http://www.democratizationpolicy.org/pdf/DPC_EU_BiH_Initiative_Failure_P...

[5] http://euinfo.ba/european-commissions-questionnaire-for-bih-available-in...

[6]„Sam sebe demantirao: Zvizdić obmanuo javnost BiH, mehanizam koordinacije ipak nije usaglašen!“, Patria News Agency, 16 March 2016, 15:48:45, http://www.nap.ba/new/vijest.php?id=22467; „Pročitajte šta donosi 'novi' Mehanizam koordinacije“, 28.09.2016. 20:58, N1 Television, http://ba.n1info.com/a114854/Vijesti/Vijesti/Procitajte-sta-donosi-novi-...

[7] Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Article III: Responsibilities of and Relations Between the Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Entities, 1. Responsibilities of the Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, http://www.ccbh.ba/public/down/USTAV_BOSNE_I_HERCEGOVINE_engl.pdf

[8] USAGLAŠEN SPORNI ČLAN: Kantoni i zvanično postaju država, 18 August 2016., 14:21h, Žurnal, http://www.zurnal.info/novost/19963/kantoni-i-zvanicno-postaju-drzava

[9] Bosnia’s teapot tempest, Daniel Serwer, May 2, 2018, https://www.peacefare.net/2018/05/02/bosnias-teapot-tempest/

[10] See Grabar-Kitarović u Mostaru pozvala na dogovor o novom izbornom zakonu BiH, 06 March, 2018, 17:47, https://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/clanak/grabar-kitarovic-u-mostaru-pozvala... Izborni zakon BiH od Turske do UN-a, 09 January 2018, 19:55:00, http://www.nap.ba/new/vijest.php?id=42026; Čović i Grabar-Kitarović razgovarali o hitnoj izmjeni Izbornog zakona BIH, 06 February 2018, 18:01 Bljesak.info, https://www.bljesak.info/vijesti/politika/covic-i-grabar-kitarovic-razgo... Čović i Plenković za izmjenu Izbornog zakona BiH, 10 April 2018, 12:55, https://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/covic-i-plenkovic-za-izmjenu-izbornog-za... Plenković: Hrvatska bi voljela promjenu Izbornog zakona BiH, Al Jazeera Balkans, 15 January 2018, http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/plenkovic-hrvatska-bi-voljela-promj...

[11]  Bosnia on the Chopping Block: The Potential for Violence and Steps to Prevent it, Reuf Bajrović, Richard Kraemer, and Emir Suljagić, Foreign Policy Research Institute, March 2018, https://www.fpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/UPDATED-Bosnia-2018.pdf; see also Russia’s Efforts to Destabilize Bosnia and Herzegovina, David Salvo, April 25, 2018, German Marshall Fund, http://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/publications/russias-efforts-destabil... Russia's Bosnia Gambit: Intrigue in the Balkans, Jasmin Mujanovic, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/bosnia-herzegovina/2017-09-06/ru...