During the last four decades, China experienced impressive economic growth, becoming one of the leading powers of the global economy. After a century of humiliation imposed by Western and Japanese colonial powers, today the country is demonstrating a strong desire to achieve its national rejuvenation (guojia fuxing). Indeed, under the iconic leadership of President Xi Jinping, China is adopting an increasingly assertive international behavior, balancing the need to protect its sovereignty and strategic interests related to economic and security issues, and the ambition to restore its role of a great power^[1]. In this context, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) - a massive infrastructure project to improve connectivity between the East and the West, increase regional cooperation and facilitate trade and investments - has been described as China’s grand strategy championing its global governance ambitions^[2]. Indeed, BRI-participating economies represent more than one-third of global GDP, and over half of the world’s population (OECD 2017).  

From the perspective of the Western world, the BRI has been the most highly debated, heavily criticized and poorly understood policy framework of the 21st century. Considering that the European market is the key strategic destination for the BRI, the Chinese project and a new manifestation of China’s soft power have been perceived as a threat to a global order shaped by the US’ hegemony. In the past two decades, China and the European Union, two of the three largest economies in the world and major trading partners, increasingly tightened their economic and political relations^[3]. However, promising potential for cooperation is repeatedly undermined by major political differences (Farnell & Crookes 2016), and EU member states failed to adopt a common response to the Chinese initiative.

Indeed, there are mixed feelings about the BRI in Europe (Brattberg & Soula 2018). Several member states, like Italy and Greece, are already partnering with China through bilateral Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) or other bilateral and multilateral initiatives, while other EU countries such as France and Germany remain mainly skeptical^[4]. The lack of a common EU strategy partially explains China’s unclear and fragmented diplomatic approach in dealing with EU member states, especially with the fragile economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), diminishing the authority of EU institutions. This strategy also reinforced the EU’s perception of China’s multifaceted role. At the same time, China is considered “a cooperation partner with whom the EU has closely aligned objectives, a negotiating partner with whom the EU needs to find a balance of interests, an economic competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance” (European Commission 2019, a). Indeed, despite the fact that the Chinese project proposes to establish win-win relationships based on friendship and mutual trust, some EU countries are increasingly concerned about the environment and human rights standards, transparency, open procurement and debt sustainability, especially when involving strategic national infrastructure.

The absence of a common response to China’s BRI is mainly due to the internal fragility of the EU. Especially after the global financial crisis, which led to a sovereign debt crisis in the European market and the adoption of austerity measures to cut government fiscal stimulus spending, tensions within the EU increased due to unalignment of interests and lack of trust and solidarity between member states, showing the high vulnerability of the EU integration project^[5]. Despite the fact that numerous policies have been implemented in order to strengthen a common EU approach to its foreign policy and security^[6], diverging national interests are one of the main reasons hampering EU unity and its ability to formulate a common and coherent strategy. Indeed, the rise of populism, the migrant and refugee crisis, the future results of Brexit negotiations, and a decline in transatlantic cooperation are only some of today’s major challenges for the future of the EU’s foreign actions^[7].

How should China change its approach to promote its BRI and improve Europe’s response towards BRI-related investment to achieve a win-win and long-term partnership and ensure the success of its overarching national strategy?

 

 

Background: China’s Belt and Road Initiative

On 7 September 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping launched at Nazarbayev University in Astana (Kazakhstan) the idea of building a new “economic belt along the Silk Road”^[8] to connect China, the Middle East and Europe through economic and cultural corridors. Mainly framed as a policy to promote friendship and people-to-people exchanges and build a bright future by reinforcing multilateral collaboration and cultural relationships in the region^[9], the BRI is an ambitious and China-sponsored project of massive infrastructure investments and trade agreements aimed at improving connectivity along the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21^st Century Maritime Silk Road.

China designed the BRI to achieve important national economic and geopolitical objectives such as maintaining sustainable economic growth, expanding its export markets for hi-tech sectors developed under “Made in China 2025”, escaping the middle-income trap and boosting the economic development of its rural and internal regions. However, defining the BRI as a mere strategy to build infrastructures and improve trade connectivity would be absolutely reductive.

Thanks to its impressive economic growth, which started after its opening up in 1979, China is today one of leading powers reshaping the new 21st century world order and the dynamics of the global economy, shifting the balance of power from the West to the East. With the ambition to replace today’s global leadership vacuum, China designed the BRI as a vision to spread its benevolence around the world and build a community of common destiny. To build a diplomatic umbrella, China used images and ideas aligned with Chinese strategic thoughts and national narratives. Indeed, the country’s rhetoric is based on the idea of spreading unity and harmony and creating a new “all-under-Heaven” ^[10] where every country can achieve prosperity through win-win cooperation, trust and friendship.

Moreover, the ambitions behind the BRI cannot be fully explained without referring to the charismatic leadership of President Xi Jinping and his modern Chinese “philosophy” explained in a set of policies and ideas titled “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”. Since the beginning of his mandate, President Xi emerged as a paramount leader, striving to achieve China’s Dream through the consolidation of his power. His political reform agenda and its anti-corruption campaign reinforced the central role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and consolidated his power by reducing internal factional politics and critics. For instance, the constitutional reform, which abolished the two-term limit of the presidential mandate, clearly shows the desire to extend Xi’s mandate beyond 2023. As a chairman of the newly established National Security Commission and the Leading Small Group for the Comprehensive Deepening of Reform, he de facto controls strategic economic policies and decisions related to domestic and external security, and as a Commander-in-Chief of the People’s Liberation Army, his role is strongly legitimized by the Chinese military. It is not surprising that the BRI has been widely described as President Xi’s flagship policy to reaffirm the role of China as a great global power.

 

Comparing EU-China diplomatic and economic relations before and after the BRI

Starting from the 1970s, EU-China relations have been characterized by a series of continuous ups and downs. After its opening up in 1979, China restored its relations with most of today’s EU member states, while the 1989 Tiananmen crisis and the arms embargo led to a few years of frictions, followed by a new phase of expanded relations throughout the 1990s^[11].

At the beginning of the 21^st century, China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) created positive expectations. Indeed, increased market access and decreased tariff and non-tariff barriers were welcomed with great enthusiasm by the EU as a win-win scenario for both EU and Chinese investors and exporters^[12]. In 2003, China and the EU launched a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” in order to deepen their relations and increase their cooperation and economic interdependency. However, a real strategic partnership failed to materialize because of clashing political values, geopolitical interests and priorities, and conceptions of the world order (Maher 2016).  

The 2008 global financial crisis created momentum for EU relations with China (Holslag 2015). After the highly interconnected financial systems of the US and the EU collapsed, leading to catastrophic consequences for the real economy and creating a sentiment of high uncertainty among financial institutions, companies and investors, China represented a great opportunity, providing a big domestic market for European exporters, investors and buyers of government bonds from highly indebted EU states^[13]. Indeed, especially in the aftermath of the financial crisis, China concluded advantageous deals with cash-strapped governments that had to privatize national assets, including critical infrastructure (Brattberg & Soula 2018). The privatization of the Piraeus port in Greece, which later became a fundamental regional logistic hub for the BRI, is just one example.

However, especially between 2008 and 2012, it became clear that the EU was inconsistent in dealing with China (Holslag 2015). After the initial enthusiasm following China’s accession to the WTO, EU investors still faced barriers in accessing the Chinese market. EU institutions, whose concerns were mainly related to market access, transparency and sustainability, increasingly pushed China to decrease restrictions on foreign direct investments, strengthen its industrial and intellectual property rights regulations, take actions against cybercrime, reform the government’s procurement policies, stop currency manipulation and forced technology transfers, and reduce subsidies to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In other words, the EU urged China to accelerate its transformation into a fair and open market economy in order to eliminate the obstacles faced by European companies in accessing China’s market, perceived as having disproportionately restrictive rules^[14]. However, despite the lack of a level playing field, EU member states kept dealing bilaterally with Chinese companies and investors, demonstrating the lack of a unitary approach towards China. Indeed, despite giving the impression that most of the hard bargaining was outsourced to bureaucrats in Brussels, most member states also used bilateral meetings to urge China to reform its market (Holslag 2015).  

Today, the European Union, as the final destination of the BRI and a key targeted export market for Chinese products, has critical strategic importance for the success of this ambitious Chinese project. Although the ports of Piraeus in Greece and Venice in Italy have been indicated in the official maps as the main end points of the BRI, it still remains unclear whether Chinese interests could be further expanded into other routes and whether other terminals will be targeted as entry points in the EU and the Mediterranean^[15].   

In 2015, Hungary was the first European country to sign a MoU with China under the BRI and, by 2019, another 22 European countries had signed BRI co-operation agreements, with the latest being Luxembourg and Italy^[16]. However, leaders of countries like France and Germany, which refused to officially participate in the BRI, adopted a more cautious approach and expressed their concerns about the Chinese-sponsored project. In particular, they advocated for more balanced rules to avoid a “one-way trade road” and the increase of China’s influence in the Balkans^[17].

In 2013, the same year the BRI was launched, the EU and China adopted the “EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation”, calling for increased cooperation to promote peace, prosperity, sustainable development and people-to-people exchanges^[18]. Nonetheless, in 2015 the EU launched the “EU-China Connectivity Platform”, the European Commission’s first significant response to the BRI (Kuo 2019). Established by the European Commission and the National Development and Reform Commission of China, this bilateral platform was aimed at improving transparency, reciprocity in market access and a level playing field for businesses in the area of transport infrastructure, as well as enhancing synergies between the EU’s connectivity projects, including the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T)^[19] and China’s Belt and Road Initiative^[20]. The main tangible result of this platform relates to the organization of annual high-level meetings bringing together chairpersons and expert groups from both sides to foster their collaboration on transport infrastructure projects. However, although the connectivity platform continues to function, it does not appear to have resulted in any major practical instances of European engagement with or involvement in the BRI (Kuo 2019).

Despite these efforts in defining a common approach to deal with China, the EU response to the BRI mainly reflected its skepticism. As part of the EU’s preparation for an EU-China summit in July 2018, EU ambassadors to Beijing compiled a report, signed by 27 member states (except for Hungary’s ambassador) that sharply criticized China’s BRI as it “runs counter to the EU agenda for liberalizing trade and pushes the balance of power in favor of subsidized Chinese companies”(Handelsblatt 2018). So far, the EU’s involvement in the BRI could be explained only by looking at fragmented results of one-to-one negotiations between different member states and China. This clearly emerged after the launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015, when several EU countries remained on the sidelines, while others, led by Luxembourg and the United Kingdom, rushed to join the bank to ingratiate themselves with the world’s second-largest economy (Brattberg & Soula 2018).

Few concrete actions have been centrally implemented to support the implementation of BRI-related projects and ease investments in infrastructures and connectivity channels. Although in 2017 a China-EU Co-Investment Fund was established, jointly backed by the European Investment Fund and the Silk Road Fund^[21], no clear indications were provided to these organizations to state whether the fund was ready to take off, reflecting a strong reticence from the EU side^[22]. In addition, from the EU perspective, the fund was established to create synergies between China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the Investment Plan for Europe (the so-called Juncker Plan), showing its willingness to rebalance a narrative mainly centered on the Chinese “invasion” of the EU market through a fast-growing acquisition of oversea assets (Yu 2018).

In September 2018, the European Commission published a “Connecting Europe and Asia Strategy” plan to improve trade and economic and political ties between Europe and Asia. This constituted a major shift in its approach to the BRI and it was primarily a strategic response to the project, aimed at promoting a European alternative to the Chinese approach (Kuo 2019). Indeed, the EU strategy clearly differs from the principles of China’s BRI as it strongly emphasizes the importance of aligned rules, environmental and social standards, improved market access and the fiscal and financial sustainability of investments to avoid the risk of debt distress^[23]. In other words, in contrast to the BRI, the EU initiative wants to establish a rule-based international system for connectivity projects based on commonly agreed upon international standards and debt sustainability. Thus, while China is accused of conducting “debt-trap diplomacy” through stringent loan-repayment conditions, Brussels promotes multilateral arrangements that take debt sustainability into account, and resorts to both public and private funding mechanisms (Brattberg & Soula 2018).

In response to the EU’s strategy, in December 2018 China published its latest policy paper on the EU. In the document, China calls for strengthening its relations with the EU by exploiting the existing synergies between its EU-Asia Connectivity Strategy and the BRI^[24]. After four years of silence, with the most recent policy paper on the EU published in 2014, China’s document was necessary in order to reaffirm its interest in the EU market in a moment of diplomatic deadlock and a general lack of enthusiasm in the EU regarding the BRI^[25]. Indeed, no trade deals were signed between China and the EU after the 2018 EU-China Summit, where the EU preferred to sign an Economic Partnership Agreement with Japan. By asking the EU to “avoid politicizing economic and trade issues, and ensure the sustained, steady and win-win progress of China-EU economic and trade relations”, the policy paper clearly shows China’s pragmatism in dealing with its economic development rather than political issues and conflicting values. Despite expressing its support for “a united, stable, open and prosperous Europe and for the European integration process”, the paper clearly states that China had a more successful win-win cooperation with CEE countries, despite the series of political problems hampering the success of BRI-related projects in this region^[26], relegating the EU’s central institutions to a marginal and secondary role in dealing with China to negotiate BRI-related projects.

 

Main reasons behind the EU’s skepticism about China’s BRI

The reasons explaining the weak engagement and scarce enthusiasm of the EU towards the Chinese BRI are related to the lack of mutual trust and a general sentiment of skepticism about China’s increased assertiveness, mainly justified by the huge divide in terms of values, ideologies and political systems. The BRI has been presented as a strategic “bag” or “container” into which virtually everything can be thrown (Yu 2018). Although the media and official papers linked several projects to the BRI, like German and Polish railway connections or the Piraeus port in Greece as the 21^th century Maritime Silk Road’s access to the European Market^[27], the links of the BRI to Europe have not been clearly defined by China, resulting in an unclear understanding by the EU of the role and the ambition of the Chinese projects. Internally, the BRI is suffering from a lack of policy and bureaucratic coordination (Yu 2018), reinforcing this lack of clarity in the eyes of foreign investors and partners. Indeed, no clear responsibilities have been assigned among central committees, local government bodies, SOEs and so forth, and no clear framework or guidelines have been designed to categorize BRI investments, creating bureaucratic opaqueness and scarce transparency on how and who makes decisions about BRI-related investments^[28].

Also considering the EU’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its historical transatlantic partnership with the US, the EU-China relationship and the EU approach to the BRI also have important geopolitical implications in the balance of powers and policy-making of these great powers. In today’s global order, where new rising powers like China are gradually weakening the US’ hegemony and creating an increasingly multilateral system, the EU’s economy and security are still very much dependent on the US. However, considering also that the impact of the BRI on Sino-European economic relations remains limited, the main significance of the BRI for transatlantic relations is symbolic (Kuo 2019). In other words, the need to show a single and strong voice to respond to Chinese assertiveness and protect EU values and standards is aimed at avoiding potential transatlantic frictions, even in the present historic moment where the EU and the US have increasingly divergent interests and the EU is likely to diminish its economic and financial dependence on the US in this new multilateral global order^[29].

However, what is mainly affecting the EU’s negative perception of China’s BRI is the country’s fragmented approach in dealing with EU member states. Indeed, so far China  has conducted parallel negotiations with regions, cities, private companies, EU institutions, EU member states and geographical groupings (EPSC 2016), potentially generating competition to attract Chinese investments and threatening the unity of the EU. This is clearly exemplified by the 17+1 framework.

 

The “17+1” Framework

By strengthening its economic, diplomatic and cultural relationships with Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries through the 17+1 framework, China is clearly flexing its economic muscles and applying the well-practiced “divide and rule” strategy in its dealings with EU member states (Yu 2018). In 2012, a “16+1”^[30] Cooperation Framework was launched to increase trade, investments and transportation networks between China and 16 countries in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe through bilateral and multilateral initiatives. In 2019, during the 16+1 Dubrovnik summit, Greece was officially admitted into this China-centered elite, with Beijing being determinant in negotiating and deciding its acceptance^[31].

Considering their geographic location, CEE countries are particularly important for the BRI. For instance, the flagship investment in the port of Piraeus guarantees a fundamental access of the Maritime Silk Road to the EU market through the Balkans. Thanks to the 17+1 framework, and although the major part of Chinese investments still goes to Northern and Western Europe, BRI-related activities in Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe, including the Western Balkans, increased during the last decade^[32]. Indeed, these countries represent a perfect target for Chinese investments as they offer a more accessible political and regulatory environment, suffer from more limited financing options and present higher needs in terms of infrastructures and connectivity^[33]. Indeed, the 17+1 framework shows that China has two different strategic approaches in dealing with EU member states: if the aim of dealing with Western EU countries is to invest in strategic assets, research and development networks, CEE countries are mainly targeted because of their strategic position to access the EU market, thus creating opportunities in terms of large-scale infrastructure projects and the privatization of strategic assets in order to reduce transportation costs and build production and logistics hubs closer to the EU market^[34].

By the EU’s central institutions, the 17+1 has been perceived as a threat posed by China’s increasing assertiveness and a way to destroy the EU’s fragile unity. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, trade and investments, which were conditional to conversion to democratic norms and reforms, strengthened economic and diplomatic relations between CEE countries and Western Europe^[35]. However, today some of these countries are openly criticizing European norms and bureaucracy, and their privileged relations with China within the 17+1 framework - which involves alternative models of governance and a less transparent use of finance - is openly challenging the EU^[36]. Indeed, the EU’s set of economic standards and benchmarks in terms of market economy, rule of law, democracy and liberty, generates tasks and burdens for the Eastern EU neighbors in terms of reforming their state administration and politics, while Chinese loans and investments do not have normative strings and conditionalities attached to them and seem to be more palatable on many occasions (Popescu& Brînză 2018).

As explained by Małgorzata Jakimów, although China’s soft power politics adopted a desecuritization strategy in order to change the pre-existing “China threat” perceptions in the European regional narrative and render China a non-security issue, this approach further reinforced certain pre-existing dynamics such as the historical East/West divide in the EU. Indeed, China’s approach in promoting BRI-related projects in CEE countries seems to be closer to what William Callahan describes as Chinese “negative soft power”, which usually combines the claims of China’s benevolence (compared with the West) and its non-interference in domestic affairs (compared with the Washington Consensus conditionality) (Jakimów 2019).

The 17+1 is also the result of rising nationalist and populist sentiments and an increasing intolerance of these EU-peripheral ex-communist states towards EU institutions. The weak economies of CEE are more interested in attracting Chinese investments to boost their economic development than in advocating for the respect of international norms and standards of transparency^[37]. The latter is especially true in the case of Hungary, an illiberal democracy under the authoritarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán^[38] and a big recipient of Chinese investments, which repeatedly blocked EU statements criticizing China’s rights, and Greece, which for the first time blocked an EU statement at the United Nations against China’s human rights record, accusing the EU of unconstructive criticism^[39].

The EU worries that some concerns usually arising from Chinese investments in non-European countries could negatively affect EU member states involved in the 17+1 framework. Chinese-backed projects usually employ few locals, burden governments with large debt obligations, lack transparency and public debate and public open procurement procedures (Zeneli 2017). For instance, projects like the Belgrade-Budapest railway, mainly financed by the China Export-Import Bank, and the Chinese-built Montenegro Highway, raised issues and concerns regarding their respect of EU laws for public tenders and their debt sustainability^[40]. In particular, the project in Montenegro, which caused the country’s debt to soar, highlighted the BRI’s opaque and unaccountable mode of operation when financing and investing in regional infrastructure projects, exposing vulnerable economies to potentially unsustainable debt levels and fiscal instability (Brattberg & Soula 2018).

 

Are China and the EU moving towards increased cooperation under the BRI?

The 17+1 framework pushed the EU Commission to reaffirm that neither the EU nor its member states can effectively achieve their aims with China without full unity (European Commission 2019, a). However, while Europe has taken its time to think about a common strategy, if any, China has not wasted time and has continued building strong bilateral relationships on the continent (Amighini 2019).

In March 2019, Italy signed an MoU with China, becoming the first founding member of the EU and the first member of the G7 to affirm its commitment to the Chinese project. Having access to Italian ports, like Trieste and Genoa, is critical for China to connect the Chinese Maritime Silk Road with the markets of Central and Northern Europe. Before the visit of President Xi Jinping in March, bilateral investments between China and Italy were regulated by a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), the so-called China-Italy BIT, signed in 1985. Thus, the new MoU created the conditions to reinforce the economic relations between the two countries and increase Chinese investments and co-operation agreements for jointly developed projects^[41]. The MoU with Italy represented a symbolic success for China and President Xi expressed great satisfaction for this new strategic partnership based on mutual trust and cooperation. China hoped that the MoU with Italy would pave the way to other partnerships in the EU, pushing EU member states to exert political pressures and relax EU scrutiny mechanisms towards Chinese investments.

In Italy the reactions to the signing of the MoU have been mixed. Italian President Sergio Mattarella emphasized that the new Silk Road must be a two-way street to share not only goods, but also skills, ideas, knowledge and solutions to face common issues and future projects^[42]. After reassuring their historic Western allies^[43], the Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte and then Minister for Economic Development Luigi Di Maio emphasized that the Italy-China MoU would boost exports of “Made in Italy” products, reducing Italy’s trade deficit with China, and attract FDIs from Chinese investors, helping the country to overcome its economic recession^[44]. Indeed, during President Xi’s visit to Italy, Italian firms signed deals with Chinese counterparts for a total amount of $2.8 billion, although Minister Di Maio stated that these contracts had a potential future value of $22.6 billion^[45]. Michele Geraci, the Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Economic Development responsible for trade and investment and one of the main promoters of the MoU^[46], argued that stronger relations with China would boost trade and exports to China, allowing Italy to catch up with other European peers^[47]. The Minister of the Interior Matteo Salvini, and the leaders of other right-wing parties adopted a more skeptical approach, warning that economic opportunities should not jeopardize national security^[48].  

After the initial enthusiasm for the MoU, the relationship with China remained prudent and mainly fueled by economic opportunities. For instance, in September 2019, the Italian government announced the use of the so-called “Golden Power”, a special scrutiny process on investments in strategic sectors and critical infrastructures built by non-EU companies, to examine potential 5G deals between Italian telecommunication companies and Chinese ICT giants Huawei and ZTE. Moreover, the videoconference with Hong Kong protesters organized during a parliamentary hearing in November 2019, highly criticized by Chinese officials but defended as totally legitimate by all the Italian political parties^[49], was a clear sign that Italy and China are still mere economic partners rather than a strategic alliance.

However, the MoU between Italy and China caused immediate negative reactions in the EU and the US. The latter expressed severe criticism, warning that Italy will be exposed to security and financial risks, becoming a victim of China’s debt-trap diplomacy, whose main goal is taking control of strategic assets and infrastructures^[50]. French President Emmanuel Macron, who has been defending the importance of a common EU approach since his visit to China in January 2018, when he had emphasized that the trade routes of a new hegemonic power could turn EU countries into vassal states^[51], deeply criticized Italy’s singular move. After President Xi’s visit to Italy, he expressed the desire to strengthen EU-China relations, together with the German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker. However, both the French and German leaders confirmed that they will not deal bilaterally with China, but would rather cooperate with the BRI in concert with other EU member states^[52]. German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas also criticized Italy’s maneuver, underlining the importance for EU member states to strengthen their unity in a world dominated by global superpowers like China and the US, followed by Gunther Oettinger, the EU’s budget commissioner, who called for a mechanism to establish a veto right of the EU to approve foreign investments^[53].

At the 21^th EU-China Summit held in April 2019, the EU and China reaffirmed their interests in releasing the ambitious EU-China Comprehensive Investment Agreement in 2020. The agreement, whose negotiations have been ongoing since 2013, is aimed at ensuring a level playing field for both EU and Chinese companies and improving market access by eliminating discriminatory requirements and practices affecting foreign investors and establishing a balanced investment protection framework^[54]. However, the big delay in releasing the agreement clearly shows that China and the EU’s different perspectives related to non-discriminatory market access, fair competition and transparency are still one of the major obstacles to a potential strategic long-term partnership. However, a common EU strategy and the release of the EU-China Comprehensive Investment Agreement as a key cornerstone to facilitate trade and investments under the BRI are crucial for China’s success in the EU market. This will also reduce China’s diplomatic efforts, as many EU states do not intend to sign any MoU and still prefer to deal unilaterally with China on a project-by-project basis^[55].

 

Conclusions

To effectively promote the BRI and expand this connectivity project in the EU market, China must actively promote a unified narrative and a common approach in dealing with EU member states. Fragmented diplomatic efforts and one-to-one negotiations bypassing the role of the EU’s central institutions only reinforced the EU’s skepticism towards China’s soft power. As previously discussed, the BRI is perceived as a “Trojan horse” aimed at hampering EU cohesion and worsening the EU’s internal frictions. For this reason, EU leaders recently reaffirmed the need to defend one Europe, to promote unity and solidarity and to work for joint solutions based on shared principles of democracy and the rule of law (European Council 2019). This urges China to shift from its divide et impera strategy based on bilateral negotiations, which undermines EU cohesion.

The EU is somehow forced by the expansive Chinese economic impetus to deal with its own insecurities (Popescu & Brînză 2018) and unless EU member countries can agree on a common policy, the relationship between a weakened Europe and an increasingly assertive China risks becoming increasingly unbalanced (Le Corre 2016). This identity crisis and EU insecurity may be one of the reasons behind China’s fragmented approach: if economic considerations have been prioritized in one-to-one negotiations between China and single member states, non-economic issues, used by the EU as a protective barrier, have been the main obstacles when dealing centrally with EU institutions. Thus, it is of high priority for China to overcome the existing divide in terms of values, ideologies and worldviews, and agree on common principles to guide future cooperation frameworks and diplomatic agreements.

In this regard, a fundamental step would be to increase diplomatic efforts in the ongoing negotiations to design the EU-China Investment Agreement. This, replacing all the existing 26 trade agreements signed bilaterally by EU member states and China, including the previously mentioned China-Italy BIT, is fundamental to creating a new, jointly agreed upon framework to protect both EU and China investors and investments in their respective markets^[56]. This became particularly important after March 2019, when the EU Parliament and the EU Council  adopted a new EU Foreign Investment Screening Regulation^[57]. The new regulation grants significant power to EU bodies by allowing the “Commission to issue opinions when an investment poses a threat to the security or public order of more than one Member State” (European Commission 2019, b), potentially affecting Chinese investments^[58]. Thus, working on increasing its dialogue with Brussels would be strongly in China’s strategic interest and would give more strength to a bilateral policy cooperation framework, avoiding the EU’s potentially stepping up mechanisms in investment screening and protection, and increasing restrictions to entry to EU markets (Chan 2019).

With a common EU framework, China’s opportunities in the EU market will be expanded. For instance, German Economy Minister Peter Altmaier expressed willingness to participate in China’s BRI. However, he clearly stated that the country will never sign a bilateral agreement with China as an individual state, but will only engage with China as part of the European Economic Area^[59]. Moreover, by overcoming the impasse on the ongoing negotiations, which shows that issues like reciprocity and market access still need to be addressed, China would take the first step towards a closer relationship with the EU. For instance, in its 2018 policy paper on the EU, China expressed its desire to launch a joint feasibility study on a China-EU Free Trade Area, which today seems still far from achievable^[60].

Despite the Trump administration’s increasing protectionism and reluctance to engage in multilateral negotiations, China should demonstrate its willingness to exploit potential synergies existing between the BRI, the EU-China Connectivity Strategy and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy. The latter, formally launched in 2016 by Japan and led by the US, is aimed at containing China’s rise and providing an alternative to China-backed investments in the region, fostering a collaboration based on values of transparency, openness and the rule of law^[61]. By showing a true desire to expand the scope of the BRI, embrace other countries’ initiatives and contribute to defining a rule-based international order, China could definitely mitigate the EU’s skepticism and fear of weakening its transatlantic partnership. Indeed, all these countries benefit from economic interdependence with China, but they are concerned about China’s growing power and assertiveness in the security and economic realms that could potentially shift the regional balance of power in the direction of a Sino-centric order (Szechenyi & Hosoya 2019).

The year 2020 was expected to be a turning point in EU-China relations, positively affecting BRI-related negotiations. China could have exploited the gradual future weakening of the transatlantic alliance, leaving space for a more autonomous and coherent EU approach in designing its foreign policy and promoting its economic interests. According to Øystein Tunsjø, this new increasingly multipolar international order was gradually forcing the US to shift its political and diplomatic priorities towards Asia, moving towards a dramatic change in transatlantic relations and a gradual process of disengagement between the US and the EU^[62]. Indeed, threat perception and concerns over China’s rising power, the EU’s lack of cohesion in foreign policy, unequal hard and soft power capabilities and different ambitions in the international order explain why the US had adopted a push-back strategy to face China’s economic and military ascent, while the EU had mainly faced China with closer cooperation and adopted hedging strategies to avoid negative impacts on its internal security^[63]. Moreover, the ambitions of the EU to be a strong and independent player in the global economy were clearly expressed by the newly appointed president of the EU Commission Ursula von der Leyen and her desire to lead a “geopolitical Commission”^[64]. Thus, the reinforcement of the EU’s external actions in foreign and security policy could have created the momentum to strengthen China-EU ties and improve future cooperation under the BRI and EU-backed connectivity strategies.

However, the spread of the coronavirus, declared a global pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO) in March 2020, is generating disruptive effects in the global economy and is destined to create future unexpected and unimaginable scenarios affecting global trade routes and global value chains. For instance, to reduce the risks of future pandemics, companies mainly operating in or exporting to China will likely relocate their supply chains to other countries in order to improve the geographical diversification of their production and their final markets. The effectiveness of governments’ responses to the crisis will also affect countries’ politics and economic relations with their partners. For instance, the pandemic might overturn predictions about the results of the next American presidential elections  in November 2020. President Trump clearly underestimated the risks of the COVID-19 outbreak and aroused fierce criticism from many state governors for the lack of centralized and coordinated response to the emergency. Indeed, he had to reverse his initial plans to relax containment measures and re-open the US economy by Easter after realizing that polls were fiercely opposing his decision^[65]. Even if most recent polls show an increase in Trump's popularity,  he should be doing much better considering that other countries  particularly affected by the coronavirus show the same pattern, as people tend to rally around their leaders in times of emergency or crisis^[66]. If Trump’s re-election is not so obvious anymore, the results of the next election could drastically change all the previous reflections on the future of  US-EU relations. The coronavirus is also showing all the weaknesses of the EU, from the lack of common strategies to deal with the crisis to the lack of real solidarity between member states, threatening the future of European integration.

In this situation, the BRI is destined to take a back seat until the end of the emergency and its future appears unclear. When  COVID-19 started to spread outside the Hubei Province and China, where it originated, the political priorities and economic efforts of governments around the world shifted towards actions to face and contain the health and economic crisis. Moreover, China’s lockdown, gradually adopted by more and more countries, has momentarily disrupted Chinese manufacturing supply chains, the main providers of raw materials and workers to BRI projects. However, despite the slowdown of the Chinese initiative, the country is momentarily using a different approach to reinforce its relations and diplomatic ties by sending doctors and medical materials and equipment like masks, testing kits and ventilators to its economic partners. With the pandemic outbreak expected to register its peak between the end of April and the beginning of May 2020, the economic effects of the coronavirus on BRI participating countries and the future of this massive Chinese project still remain open questions.

 

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Horia Ciurtin. 2019. The “16+1” Becomes the “17+1”: Greece Joins China’s Dwindling Cooperation Framework in Central and Eastern Europe. The Jamestown Foundation. China Brief Volume: 19 Issue: 10. 

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Delegation of the European Union to China. EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation. 

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European Commission. 2019 (b). EU foreign investment screening regulation enters into force. Press Release. Brussels, 10 April 2019. 

European Commission. 2019 (c). Speech by President-elect Ursula von der Leyen at the 2019 Paris Peace Forum. 12 November 2019. 

European Commission. 2019 (d). The EU-China Connectivity Platform. 

European Commission. Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T). 

European Council. 2019. The Sibiu Declaration. Press Release. Sibiu, 9 May 2019. 

European Political Strategy Center (EPSC). 2016. Engaging China at a Time of Transition. Capitalising on a New Era of Chinese Global Investment and Foreign Policy Initiatives. EPSC Strategic Note. 15 July 2016. 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. Promote Friendship between Our People and Work Together to Build a Bright Future. Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping, President of the People's Republic of China at Nazarbayev University. 8 September 2013. 

 

NOTES

[1] Yong Wang. 2016. Offensive for defensive: the belt and road initiative and China's new grand strategy. The Pacific Review, 29:3, 455-463. Wang Jisi. China's Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 2 (March/April 2011), pp. 68-79. 

[2] Yong Wang. 2016. Offensive for defensive: the belt and road initiative and China's new grand strategy. The Pacific Review, 29:3, 455-463. 

[3] John Farnell; Paul Irwin Crookes. 2016. The Politics of EU-China Economic Relations. An uneasy partnership. Palgrave Macmillan.

[4] Erik Brattberg; Etienne Soula. 2018. Europe’s emerging approach to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

[5] Lorenzo Codogno. 2019. Euro and economic governance: national priorities and quest for stability. In Carlo Altomonte; Antonio Villafranca. 2019. Europe in Identity Crisis: The Future of the EU in the Age of Nationalism.

[6] For instance, the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy presented by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Council in 2016.

[7] Ioannis Galariotis; Fabrizio Tassinari. 2019. The EU and the world: tuning to be heard. In Carlo Altomonte; Antonio Villafranca. 2019. Europe in Identity Crisis: The Future of the EU in the Age of Nationalism.

[8] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. Promote Friendship between Our People and Work Together to Build a Bright Future. Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping, President of the People's Republic of China at Nazarbayev University, Astana. 8 September 2013. 

[9] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. Promote Friendship between Our People and Work Together to Build a Bright Future. Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping, President of the People's Republic of China at Nazarbayev University, Astana. 8 September 2013.  

[10] Tingyang Zhao. 2016. Rethinking Empire from a Chinese: Concept ‘All-under-Heaven’ (Tian-xia). Social Identities, Vol. 12, No. 1. January 2006. pp. 29-41. 

[11] Jonathan Holslag. 2015. Explaining Economic Frictions Between China and the European Union. Chapter 7, in V.K. Aggarwal, S.A. Newland (eds.), Responding to China’s Rise: US and EU Strategies, The Political Economy of the Asia Pacifi c 15.

[12] Jonathan Holslag. 2015. Explaining Economic Frictions Between China and the European Union. Chapter 7, in V.K. Aggarwal, S.A. Newland (eds.), Responding to China’s Rise: US and EU Strategies, The Political Economy of the Asia Pacifi c 15.

[13] Jonathan Holslag. 2015. Explaining Economic Frictions Between China and the European Union. Chapter 7, in V.K. Aggarwal, S.A. Newland (eds.), Responding to China’s Rise: US and EU Strategies, The Political Economy of the Asia Pacifi c 15.

[14] Philippe Le Corre. 2016. What China’s checkbook diplomacy means for Europe. Politico. 5 December 2016.

[15] European Council on Foreign Relations. 2017. China and the Mediterranean: open for business? ECFR/219. June 2017.

[16] Peter Hirst; Alejandro Garcia. 2019. China, Italy, the European Union and the “Belt and Road Initiative”. Lexology. July 22, 2019.

[17] Erik Brattberg; Etienne Soula. 2018. Europe’s emerging approach to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

[18] Delegation of the European Union to China. EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation.

[19] Based on the Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013, the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) is project launched in to develop a Europe-wide network of railway lines, roads, inland waterways, maritime shipping routes, ports, airports and railroad terminals. The aim is to improve connectivity between all the European Regions and strengthen social, economic and territorial cohesion in the EU.  

[20] European Commission. 2015. EU-China High Level Economic Dialogue, Beijing, 28/9/2015. “EU-China Investment cooperation”. & European Commission. Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T).

[21] Delegation of the European Union to China. EIB Group cooperation with China to be strengthened with new EUR 500 million Silk Road Fund equity investment initiative. Brussels, 03 June 2017.

[22] Jie Yu. 2018. The belt and road initiative: domestic interests, bureaucratic politics and the EU-China relations. Asia Eur Journal (2018) 16:223–236.

[23] European Commission. High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 2018. Joint communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank. Connecting Europe and Asia-Building blocks for an EU Strategy. Brussels, 19 September 2018.

[24] China's Policy Paper on the European Union. 2018.

[25] Julian Chan. 2019. What’s New About China’s Latest EU Policy Paper. The Diplomat.

[26] Julian Chan. 2019. What’s New About China’s Latest EU Policy Paper. The Diplomat.

[27] Jie Yu. 2018. The belt and road initiative: domestic interests, bureaucratic politics and the EU-China relations. Asia Eur Journal (2018) 16:223–236.

[28] Jie Yu. 2018. The belt and road initiative: domestic interests, bureaucratic politics and the EU-China relations. Asia Eur Journal (2018) 16:223–236.

[29] Mercy A. Kuo. 2019. Assessing the EU-China-US Triangle Insights from Frans-Paul van der Putten. The Diplomat. 05 November 2019.

[30] In particular, the 17 participants are: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Greece Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia. 12 of the 17 countries are EU members, while 5 are Balkan states.

[31] Horia Ciurtin. 2019. The “16+1” Becomes the “17+1”: Greece Joins China’s Dwindling Cooperation Framework in Central and Eastern Europe. The Jamestown Foundation. China Brief Volume: 19 Issue: 10.

[32] Erik Brattberg; Etienne Soula. 2018. Europe’s emerging approach to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

[33] Erik Brattberg; Etienne Soula. 2018. Europe’s emerging approach to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

[34] Liliana Popescu; Andreea Brînză. 2018. Romania-China Relations. Political and Economic Challenges in the BRI Era. Romanian Journal of European Affairs. Vol. 18, No. 2. December 2018.

[35] Bogdan Lucian Cumpănaşu. China’s linkages and leverages in Central and Eastern Europe – a new challenge for EU. CES Working Papers – Volume XI, Issue 3.

[36] Bogdan Lucian Cumpănaşu. China’s linkages and leverages in Central and Eastern Europe – a new challenge for EU. CES Working Papers – Volume XI, Issue 3.

[37] Bogdan Lucian Cumpănaşu. China’s linkages and leverages in Central and Eastern Europe – a new challenge for EU. CES Working Papers – Volume XI, Issue 3.

[38] Balázs Jarábik; Dániel Bartha. 2019. Orbán Lost in the European Wilderness. Carnegie. Endowment for International Peace.

[39] Robin Emmott; Angeliki Koutantou. 2017. Greece blocks EU statement on China human rights at U.N. Reuters. June 18, 2017.

[40] Valbona Zeneli. 2017. What Has China Accomplished in Central and Eastern Europe? The Diplomat. 25 November 2017.

[41] Peter Hirst; Alejandro Garcia. 2019. China, Italy, the European Union and the “Belt and Road Initiative”. Lexology. July 22, 2019.

[42] Angela Giuffrida. 2019. Italy pulls out red carpet for Xi Jinping in trade charm offensive. The Guardian. 22 March 2019.

[43] Jason Horowitz. 2019. Italy’s Deal with China Signals a Shift as U.S. Influence Recedes. The New York Times. 20 March 2019. & Natasha Turak. 2019. Italy's Di Maio tries to reassure Washington after becoming first G-7 country to join China’s massive Belt and Road initiative. CNBC. 24 March 2019.

[44] Miles Johnson. 2019. Why would Italy endorse China’s Belt and Road Initiative? Financial Times. 21 March 2019.

[45] Reuters. 2019. Italy signs deals worth 2.5 billion euros with China. 24 March 2019.

[46] Philippe Le Corre; Carlotta Alfonsi. 2019. Italy’s Risky China Gamble. Carnegie. Endowment for International Peace. 14 March 2019.

[47] Crispian Balmer. 2019. Italy's drive to join China's Belt and Road hits potholes. Reuters. 15 March 2019.

[48] Miles Johnson. 2019. Why would Italy endorse China’s Belt and Road Initiative? Financial Times. 21 March 2019.

[49] ANSA. Italian MPs 'irresponsible' with Wong - China embassy. 29 November 2019. 

[50] Daniel Jativa. 2019. US issues warning to Italy on China economic initiative. Washington Examiner. 09 March 2019. & Crispian Balmer. 2019. Italy's drive to join China's Belt and Road hits potholes. Reuters. 15 March 2019.

[51] Michel Rose. 2018. China's new 'Silk Road' cannot be one-way, France's Macron says. Reuters. 8 January 2018.

[52] Kim Willsher. 2019. Macron meets Xi Jinping to strengthen EU-China relationship. The Guardian. 26 March 2019.

[53] Euronews. 2019. EU Commissioner Oettinger asks bloc to consider a veto against Italy-China deal.

[54] Delegation of the European Union to China. 2019. Joint statement of the 21st EU-China summit. Bruxelles, 10 April 2019.

[55] Françoise Nicolas. 2019. France and China's Belt and Road Initiative. ISPI. 08 April 2019.

[56] Peter Hirst; Alejandro Garcia. 2019. China, Italy, the European Union and the “Belt and Road Initiative”. Lexology. July 22, 2019.

[57] European Commission. 2019. EU foreign investment screening regulation enters into force. Press Release. Brussels, 10 April 2019.

[58] Peter Hirst; Alejandro Garcia. 2019. China, Italy, the European Union and the “Belt and Road Initiative”. Lexology. 22 July 2019.

[59] Tom Daly. 2019. Europe wants to deal with China as a group: German minister. Reuters. April 26, 2019. 

[60] Julian Chan. 2019. What’s New About China’s Latest EU Policy Paper. The Diplomat.

[61] Nicholas Szechenyi; Yuichi Hosoya. 2019. Working Toward a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

[62] Øystein Tunsjø. 2015. China’s Rise: Towards a Division of Labor in Transatlantic Relations. In V.K. Aggarwal, S.A. Newland (eds.). Responding to China’s Rise: US and EU Strategies. The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific 15. Springer International Publishing Switzerland

[63] Øystein Tunsjø. 2015. China’s Rise: Towards a Division of Labor in Transatlantic Relations. In V.K. Aggarwal, S.A. Newland (eds.). Responding to China’s Rise: US and EU Strategies. The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific 15. Springer International Publishing Switzerland

[64] European Commission. Speech by President-elect Ursula von der Leyen at the 2019 Paris Peace Forum. 12 November 2019.

[65] Peter Baker; Maggie Haberman. 2020. Behind Trump’s Reversal on Reopening the Country: 2 Sets of Numbers. The New York Times. 20 March 2020.

[66] Simon Tisdall. 2020. The pandemic has led to a 'Trump bump' in the polls – but don't assume it will last. The Guardian. 1 April 2020.