In Lebanon, the economy and security have gone hand in hand. Like the rest of the public sector, the security agencies have suffered from the economic breakdown since late 2019 on both an institutional and personnel level. They are likely to continue to be affected as the crisis persists over the next few years.
Lebanon security agencies
Lebanon has three main[1] security agencies: the ISF, the General Security (GS) and the General Directorate of State Security (GDSS). These agencies have different yet sometimes overlapping roles. The ISF is the largest security force. It is responsible for maintaining internal security and stability, including protecting property and individuals, and enforcing laws and regulations. The GS’s role includes border and passport control, protecting national security by gathering and investigating sensitive information, and censorship. The GDSS is the smallest security agency. Similar to the other security agencies, its role includes gathering information on potentially illegal activity by entities in the country and reporting them to the relevant authority.
Before the crisis
Lebanon's security agencies – like other public institutions – have been prone to political influence. Leaders have used them to strengthen their clientelist network with little will to invest in improving the security sector’s capabilities.[2] On the other hand, foreign donors’ interest in providing assistance and aid to the weak and underequipped security agencies grew over the years.[3] They drove assistance to these agencies which were regarded as vital for Lebanon stability.
Prior to the economic crisis, major donor countries and organisations led assistance focusing on organisational reform and the development of the security agencies’ capabilities, but mostly on an ad-hoc basis. They provided them with training and equipment while also working with them under the framework of Security Sector Reform (SSR).[4] Foreign institutions’ work with the security agencies included developing their analytical skills and enhancing their capability and performance to improve their interaction with their communities.
For example, in a primarily UK-sponsored initiative in 2014 conducted along with other international donors, a ‘Pilot Policing Programme’ was adopted for the police station in Ras Beirut (locally known as Hobeich Police Station) using a Community Policing Model. The pilot policing project was later replicated to other police stations in Beirut such as Raouche and Ramlet al-Bayda.[5] Between 2015 and 2018, the EU collaborated with the Restart Centre for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence and Torture to improve Lebanon’s prison management. It also established a protocol to handle prisons which was integrated in the ISF curricula and guided all associated law enforcement agencies.[6] In 2017, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) worked with the academy of the ISF to set up a curriculum for the municipal police. The curriculum included conflict management and improving the municipal police’s communications with its community.[7] From 2018 to 2022, DCAF worked with the ISF on strengthening human rights and supporting the implementation of the anti-torture law. This project, funded by Norway, led among other things to the adoption of new standard operating procedures by security agencies (ISF, GS and DGSS) in matters of investigations, detention, transfer of prisoners, and more.[8]
Through the struggles
Prior to the nationwide protests that broke out in October 2019[9], multifaceted political stalemates and economic problems had driven a progressive decline in socioeconomic conditions. The series of issues had led to government legislation to offset the worsening of the economic crisis. For example, on 31 July 2019 the government passed Budget Law No. 144, which among other austerity measures halted recruitment for the military and security institutions.[10]
Alongside government legislations, the security agencies were also hit by other aspects of the worsening economic crisis. Over the past two years, the local currency, the Lebanese pound (LBP), has lost more than 90% of its value against the US dollar (USD). The currency was originally pegged to the dollar at a value of LBP 1,507 to USD 1. However, the currency has depreciated sharply since late 2019, reaching more than LBP 30,000 to USD 1 on the parallel market at some points in the first six months of 2022.[11] Given that security personnel are paid in local currency, their purchasing power and the value of their salaries have significantly dropped. For instance, a junior officer’s monthly salary, worth around USD 800 or more prior to the crisis, is now below USD 100 per month.[12] The currency crash has reduced the personnel’s morale and negatively affected their ability to meet the cost of living.
All of these issues have impacted the security services’ ability to operate. Morale has reportedly fallen as a result of the crisis, with hundreds of officers reportedly deserting the force.[13] The ISF command has complained about, among other things, low salaries, and a lack of maintenance of the agencies’ equipment. It also expressed the inability of some personnel to reach their duty stations due to fuel shortages and the rise in transportation cost. As a result, the ISF command has had to adjust its service measures. For example, it unofficially allowed soldiers to serve around two to three days in their duty station and take another job to make a better living.[14] Yet, this measure has reduced the forces’ ability to effectively cover and respond to the country’s domestic security needs.
Since the crisis began, donor assistance has shifted from focusing on reform to supporting the internal security agencies’ resistance to the socio-economic issues. The shift aimed to sustain the agencies’ ability to continue performing their basic roles and maintain domestic security. Foreign donor assistance to the agencies since late 2019 has increasingly included material assistance such as spare parts for equipment and essential goods donations such as food packages. [15] The trend in assistance is unlikely to significantly change over the coming few years given the continued challenges faced by the security agencies in securing sufficient funds to sustain their forces. For instance, the security agencies’ budget is in local currency and will likely contain an exchange rate for operating expenses that does not reflect the rate in the parallel market.[16] On January 2022, Reuters reported the discussed draft budget for 2022 had a 15,000 and 20,000 LBP exchange rates for operational expenses when the exchange rate in the parallel market was about 23,000. [17] Thus, the agencies’ budget will continue to be scant, making them incapably to effectively fund their forces and institution. They will remain unable to independently train, maintain, develop, and provide their personnel with most of their basic needs such as access to medical care.
Besides sustaining security personnel, some donors stressed the importance of the agencies, particularly the ISF, public order role and human rights commitment.[18] After the October 2019 wave of anti-government demonstrations, law enforcement personnel’s image further declined after physically clashing with the protesters.[19]
Through the adjustment in assistance, donors have tried to alleviate the impact of the economic crisis on the security agencies. Some of them have also raised their emphasis on human rights.[20] Nevertheless, this remains insufficient. One of the primary issues for the agencies will continue to be the lack of funds and resources to support their personnel who are incapable of making ends meet or have access to basic services. For example, security personnel have struggled to access to medical care following the economic crisis. Hospitals have avoided taking in security personnel due to the interior ministry’s non-payment of its dues.[21]
Conclusion
In the absence of government reforms to alleviate the economic woes, the impact of foreign aid to the security services will be short-lived and have limited benefits. For example, providing equipment such as CCTV (closed circuit television) for the ISF to improve their monitoring capability to combat crime will have bear fruit if this requires power, which is inconsistent. Supplying the internal security agencies with transportation vehicles will be idle if frequent fuel shortages continue.
Foreign assistance to the security agencies is likely to continue over the coming years. Donors are likely to remain focused on supporting the forces’ resilience against the worsening living conditions but on ad-hoc basis. However, the longer the economic crisis continues, the harder it will be to sustain the security agencies. Morale and willingness to serve will continue to deteriorate, along with personnel’s performance and capability to secure the country. This will also affect security personnel’s interaction with the protesters. Personnel are likely to continue clashing with demonstrators due to the continued social outburst over the coming years triggered by the government’s inadequate action to alleviate the deteriorating socio-economic situation.
As a result, donors will have to prioritize ways to provide monetary assistance to the security agencies. They will also need to consider donated equipment’s maintenance and spare parts over the coming few years. Furthermore, the international community will also need to support agencies’ facilities such as hospitalisation to ease the personnel access to basic services. Lastly, assistance should not come at a cost of developing the internal security institutions. The international community needs to continue to invest in junior and mid-level officers: this is essential for the future leadership across all agencies.
[1] This paper voluntarily focuses on security agencies, and not the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).
[2] Guillem Farrés-Fernández; Security Sector Reform and the Competition for Power in Lebanon. Contemporary Arab Affairs 1 March 2019; 12 (1): 39–54. doi.
[4] See “Security Sector Reform: Applying the principles of good governance to the security sector,” DCAF, 2015.
[5] “Two new police stations for Raouche and Ramlet El Bayda formally opened,” The Bulletin by Executive, 7 December 2018; Slachmuijlder, Lena, “Lebanon: Building Trust Between Police and Local communities,” pp. 68-69, in Schirch, Lisa, with Deborah Mancini-Griffoli. Local Ownership in Security: Case Studies of Peacebuilding Approaches. The Hague: Alliance for Peacebuilding, GPPAC, Kroc Institute, 2015; “Support to the internal security forces in Lebanon,” Siren Associates; Alan Maccrum, 30 July 2015, “Lebanon’s Sensible Pilot Projects,” Sada, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Interview with a security analyst 2 on 2 August 2022; Alex Walsh, 23 January 2019, “Security sector reform and the Internal Security Forces in Lebanon,” Middle East Institute.
[6] “Support to a Comprehensive Prison Reform in Lebanon (RESTART),” Delegation of the European Union to Lebanon, 5 March 2020.
[7] “Enhancing Community Security and Access to Justice in Lebanon Host Communities,” UNDP.
[8] “2020 Annual Report,” DCAF.
[9] On 17 October 2019, the government announced a proposed bill to impose additional taxes on voice call apps such as WhatsApp, prompting nationwide protests. See “Lebanon scraps WhatsApp tax as protests rage,” 18 October 2019, BBC.
[10] Sami Atallah, Georgia Dagher, Mounir Mahmalat, “The Government Monitor No. 6: Draft to Law: Minimal Change to the 2019 Budget,” The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS), September 2019.
[11] “Lebanese pound drops again to 30,000,” Naharnet Newsdesk, 14 June 2022.
[12] “The Lebanese security services are threatened with the loss of their members... and legal attempts to "curb the demobilization",” al-Hurra, 3 December 2021 (Arabic).
[13] Nahla Nasser el-Din, “Desertion…Elements of the Internal Security Forces are victims of poverty in Lebanon,” al-Araby, 29 November 2021 (Arabic); Interview with security analyst 2 on 2 July 2022.
[14] Interview with security analyst 1 on 29 June 2022.
[15] In March 2022, Turkey donated more than 500 tons of food aid to be distributed among ISF, GS and DGSS personnel. See Karine Keuchkerian, “Lebanon Just Received 524 Tonnes of Food Aid From Turkey,” the961, 21 March 2022; Another example of assistance is present through the help of UK-based non-profit organisation Siren Associates, the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities in July 2021 created the ‘Analysis, Planning and Coordination Unit and the Donor Coordination Platform’, to improve coordination of donor support for the security forces. See "Creating resources for donor coordination and aid programme analysis,” Siren Associates; The UK embassy also helped to provide a new centre for the ISF in December 2021 to improve its ability to combat crime. See “UK support to Lebanon's Police Force continues,” British Embassy Beirut, 13 December 2022; According to an interview with security analyst 2 on 2 July 2022, other foreign organisation has provided solar panels for a number of ISF stations to improve electricity supply.
[16] Timour Azhari and Maya Gebeily, “Lebanon recovery plan held up by changes from PM - top finance lawmaker,” Reuters, 4 July 2022.
[17] Laila Bassam and Nayera Abdallah, “Lebanon draft budget applies range of FX rates, official source says,” Reuters, 21 January 2022.
[18] Interview with security analyst 2 on 20 July 2022.
[19] “Lebanon: Military and security forces attack unarmed protesters following explosions – new testimony,” Amnesty International, 11 August 2020.
[20] Interview with security analyst 2 on 19 July 2022.
[21] “An appeal from the Hospital Syndicate: The treatment of the security forces faces risks,” Aliwaa, 9 January 2022.
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