- Since 2011, Tunisia and Libya have experienced different trajectories in terms of armed forces’ defence reform and parliamentary oversight;
- The efforts of Tunisia to strengthen the legal framework in support of parliamentary oversight on the security sector offers a roadmap for other countries; however, much still needs to be done to improve, for instance, the technical expertise of legislators in Security Sector Reform (SSR);
- Libya’s path towards defence sector governance and parliamentary oversight provides useful insights for other conflict-affected arenas: it highlights the need for holistic and innovative reform approaches and the urgency of laying legal foundations for long-term SSR processes;
Although they are neighbours, Tunisia and Libya have experienced different trajectories following the Arab Spring in terms of armed forces’ defence reform and parliamentary oversight. While the MENA region has struggled in the past decades to institutionalise civilian leadership and oversight over the defence sector, Tunisia’s path to defence reform and parliamentary oversight of the security sector is singular: improvements have indeed been made on both fronts since 2011. Since the revolution, the Tunisian Army has had to take on increased roles and responsibilities, due to concrete challenges oftentimes emerging as a result of the Libyan conflict. While the conduct of parliamentary oversight still lacks competencies and enforcement, progress made can provide important avenues for cross-country learning and influencing, towards a wider adoption of good practices for governance and accountability.
Libya, on the other hand, followed a much different trajectory in the aftermath of its revolution: conflict erupted when the military was deployed against protesters by the Gaddafi regime. Built to serve the latter’s interests, the Libyan military suffered from decades of chronic hybridization[i] and lack of oversight – beyond that of Muammar al-Gaddafi himself. Moreover, the country’s institutional divide since 2014 prevented the development of functioning oversight mechanisms on a nationwide scale. Divided governance structures at all levels of authority – including legislative, executive and the military structures – coupled with the spread of armed groups and their gradual infiltration of security sector institutions on both sides of the country[ii] paved the way for a return to a decentralized, localised locus of governance. This means that any defence reform plan will have to reckon with two factors: the immediate need to re-establish parliamentary and governmental legitimacy and the long-term implications of hybridity on institutional weakening.
Previously relegated to a secondary role, Tunisia’s military benefited from the political transition generated by the 2011 revolution: the army was able to strengthen its role within Tunisian society, in turn improving civil-military relations. Such changes were both a post-2011 reaction to the structure of the authoritarian rule imposed by Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, which had its centre in the Ministry of Interior and the police forces, and it was a result of the political process which led to the 2014 Constitution.[iii]
In political terms, the efforts of Tunisia’s new leaders to move away from Ben Ali’s police control system brought a gradual rebalancing between the military and the internal security forces. This has translated primarily into increased defence budgets (almost doubling since 2011), but also in efforts to make the military more effective and professional than before. The lean size of the Tunisian armed forces (35’800[iv]), as well as its composition, history, and conscript nature are in many ways guarantees of its allegiance to the people and the values of the democratic state. Moreover, the positive role that retired military officers have played since 2011, engaging in both the constitutional process and the vibrant Tunisian civil society, heralded an improvement in civil-military relations which seems rather unique among Arab countries.[v]
Several external factors have also contributed to the changes in the Tunisian armed forces. The challenges related to terrorism, as well as the inherent regional instability, have shaped their role and development: for economic and security reasons, Libya has become a major national concern for Tunis. Whilst Tunisia’s friends, primarily in the West, have tried to support the modernization and strengthening of the armed forces, Libya’s challenges have nonetheless “exposed deficiencies at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of Tunisia’s defence capabilities.”[vi] Yet, during the recent Covid-19 crisis, the military’s role in supporting the enforcement of health directives has been judged rather positively, primarily owing to their efforts in sustaining citizens’ welfare, and thanks to the trust they enjoy. Nevertheless, the Tunisian military would benefit from more coherent policies and focused planning to maximize its resources and boost capacities and effectiveness,[vii] as the pandemic imposed tightened state expenditures.
As indicated, the Tunisian Constitution asserts the legislative and financial oversight powers of Parliament (Assemblée de Représentants du Peuple, “ARP”) over the security sector. The text makes no exceptions to the legislative power’s control, and the Assembly must adopt all texts related to the organization of the armed forces in organic laws.[viii] The Tunisian case brings with it several lessons learned, notably regarding the mandate of the ARP. In a political landscape characterized by fragmentation and infighting among different parties, the military does not enjoy particularly constructive relations with the two parliamentary committees charged with oversight of military affairs, the Standing Committee on Administrative Organization and the Affairs of the Armed Forces (COAAFA), and the Special Committee on Security and Defence (CSD).
A recent study of the ARP’s role revealed that, in addition to the lack of competencies in military affairs of the legislators (due to political rotation), their committee staff also lack technical expertise in security sector reform. This capability gap has an impact on budgetary control, which is the competence of the COAAFA. Yet, without a clear vision for Tunisian national security, it is nearly impossible to conduct valuable financial scrutiny of the sector’s spending. Thus, budgetary control is conducted according to the very general guidelines and goals laid out in the current national security strategy. Hence, it is essential that, to improve the ability of the ARP to initiate reforms and conduct oversight of the sector, sufficient resources are allotted to fulfil its constitutional roles effectively. These include institutional support, access to information, analytical and research capacity, specialized skills, and working relationships with security institutions and civil society. [ix]
Libya’s post-2011 trajectory varies greatly from that of its neighbour. Crippled from the onset by a hybridized defence sector designed to protect Gaddafi and his rule, Libya’s attempts to establish an efficient and overseen defence sector in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution were hampered by a hostile and largely transactional political and security situation. While parliamentary oversight bodies have existed on paper throughout the years (notably the General National Congress’s Defence Committee,[x] or the House of Representative’s Defence and National Security Committee)[xi], their efficiency was always curtailed by the general absence of political – and coherent – will for reform writ large. In this scenario, Libya’s consecutive and divided authorities face a core challenge: how can legislative oversight structures properly operate in a context that is hostile to their very existence?
The Libyan conflict bears similarities with others in the region: oversight institutions are side-lined from any form of relevance as the country’s security sector becomes progressively hybridized due to intensified conflict. The logical response to enhance parliamentary legitimacy, as well as security sector accountability, would be the creation of oversight institutions and mechanisms. However, this is not sufficient if complementary measures to ensure their full success are not taken. The mandate of oversight bodies remains a key issue, which is linked to what such mandates entail for existing power structures and armed groups wishing to avoid interference in their daily operations. A great deal of legal work has been done – in the forms of laws or decrees[xii] – in the aftermath of Libya’s revolution. However, the contradictory nature of decreesissued by successive authorities over the course of time, as well as their lack of enforcement on a nationwide scale given the absence of a unified parliamentary body, shows that a harmonized normative hierarchy is still missing.
The adoption of a constitution is seen by many as the first step towards addressing this gap. However, our experience reveals that restoring legislative coherence and establishing transparent and efficient oversight structures can’t stop at a constitutional text, even though it is a fundamental step. The accountability goal must be pursued as part of a holistic SSR process tailored to contextual realities. Foundations for future reform can be established despite an inconducive environment for wide-scale reform. For instance, supporting the legislative sector in establishing its core oversight function of the defence sector could entail the former assuming a legal-advisory role in restructuring the military’s chain of command in line with international humanitarian law. In parallel, the reformulation and operationalisation of rules of engagement in the defence sector to restore the rule of law across ranks could also be undertaken. These processes are lengthy and complex; however, they could serve as steppingstones for broader legal reforms around functional and institutional responsibilities, paving the road towards stabilisation.
Key learning points can be identified from the different trajectories of Libya and Tunisia after 2011. On the one hand, Tunisia’s efforts to strengthen the legal frameworks supporting parliamentary oversight of the security sector could provide a roadmap for other countries wishing to inscribe defence oversight into a process of civilian control. On the other hand, Libya’s efforts towards institutionalising parliamentary oversight of the defence sector in a hostile context can provide useful insights for other conflict-affected arenas, as it exemplifies both the need for holistic and innovative reform approaches and the urgency of laying the legal foundations for long-term SSR processes.
For Tunisia and Libya, it is time to kick-off clear processes of identification of external security threats and institutional mechanisms to respond to them: the establishment of a national security strategy involving both civilian and military institutions is essential in this context, as it could also provide a space to adequately rebalance civil-military institutions.
Constitutional and normative drafting processes are crucial towards the democratisation of the defence sector: they set the stage for military forces serving democratically elected, civilian institutions and providing security to the population, rather than to the political/military leadership. While Tunisia has made significant progress on both fronts, the same has yet to happen in Libya – though some hope is vested in the political process that may lead to the upcoming December 2021 elections.
The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own and do not necessarily represent those of the institution they are affiliated to.
[i] Badi, E. “Devolution Of Informality: Legacies Of State Engineered Hybridity In Libya”, Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 27, Issue 1, 2020
[ii] Badi, E. “Exploring Armed Groups in Libya: Perspectives on Security Sector Reform in a Hybrid Environment”, DCAF, 2020
[iii] The Tunisian Constitution of 2014 inscribes the role of the armed forces within the “republican” state with the specific role of “defending the Nation, its independence and the integrity of its territory” (art.18). Furthermore, the document establishes the principles of accountability of the entire public administration, including the security sector, as well as its neutrality, integrity, and effectiveness within a framework of transparency. Although the armed forces are responding chiefly to the democratically elected President of the Republic and the Government (Ministry of Defence), the Parliament was assigned a central role in terms of oversight and accountability. For more on this, see La Constitution tunisienne du 27 janvier 2014 et la Gouvernance du Secteur de la Sécurité, DCAF, October 2015, https://www.dcaf.ch/security-sector-governance-tunisian-constitution-27-january-2014
[iv]The Military Balance 2020, IISS, Feb. 2020, p. 379
[v] Grewal, S. “A Quiet Revolution: The Tunisian Military After Ben Ali”, Carnegie, February 2018 & Shah, H. and Dalton, M. “The Evolution of Tunisia’s Military and the Role of Foreign Security Sector Assistance”, Carnegie, 2020
[vi] Wehrey, F. “Tunisia’s Wake-Up Call: How Security Challenges From Libya Are Shaping Defense Reforms”, Carnegie, 2020
[vii] Wehrey, F. “Tunisia’s Military and the Economic Fallout of Covid-19”, War on The Rocks, May 2020
[viii] Article 59 on the powers of standing and special committees provides that “all authorities must help them in the accomplishment of their tasks,” which represents an important element, despite it not clarifying the concrete mechanisms of implementation.
[ix] These paragraph’s findings are extracted from the still unpublished DCAF study, The Role of Parliaments in SSG. The Case of Tunisia, authored by Hamza Mighri and Maxime Poulin for DCAF’s Policy & Research Division
[x] The establishment of the General National Congress’s Defence Committee is referenced in Article 16 of Resolution No. (62) of 2013, available at: https://security-legislation.ly/node/32162. At the time, Decree No. (483) of 2013 was passed, outlining the roles and responsibilities of each branch of the Ministry of Defence. The decree is available at: https://security-legislation.ly/node/33652
[xi] The establishment of the House of Representative’s Defence and National Security Committee is referenced in Article 27 of Law No. (4) of 2014, available at: https://security-legislation.ly/node/100873
[xii] A total of 421 laws, decrees and resolutions related to the security sector were passed between 2012 and 2014. Detailed statistics are available at: https://security-legislation.ly/statistics