Notwithstanding the rhetoric about collaboration, international players' national interests have often prevailed in the approach to Libya. Such interferences, determined by diverse and conflicting agendas, contributed to further dividing the country and have made it more difficult to undertake a true process of national reconciliation. The EU stresses Libyan ownership of the political process and the importance of inclusiveness, yet such conditions seem impossible without the definition of a clear political strategy among its members, especially those who have the greatest interests in Libya. However, as seen before, the double-crossing of some EU members undermined the Union's initiatives, and this could complicate every future pacification effort.
The conference organized by France on 29 May does not seem to escape this flaw. Although the 13 points proposed by the Macron administration are largely shareable , what does not work is the method. The French initiative appears as yet another attempt at hegemonic leadership of the negotiations related to the Libyan crisis, which ends up weakening rather than strengthening the UN negotiation process. Even the UN Special Envoy Ghassem Salamè will probably be forced to abandon the agenda he was pursuing, aimed at creating consensus in Libya towards a shared political path, and instead follow the French agenda. Not only have Italy, Great Britain and the United States not been involved in conceiving the initiative, but neither is there sufficient involvement of Libya's internal actors. In short, the initiative appears once again like a shortcut to a more difficult and complex diplomatic solution. It would have been useful to reach a common agreement before organizing this conference, between the European actors and the United States at least, to be extended to Middle Eastern powers.
It would be crucial to bring back together the states that can influence the stabilization process. These states have to work jointly – and together with Libyan parties – to define the fundamental points of a real "state-building" process. In this context, Europe certainly has to do more. First and foremost, for the initiative to succeed, it would have been crucial to have all representatives of the different Libyan groups at the negotiating table. Indeed, in the post-Qaddafi era, any negotiating attempt has failed namely for lack of complete representation. Certainly, such failure was due to the complex and multifaceted Libyan identity (regionalism, localism and tribalism) and the progressive political polarization that has followed the Arab Spring but also, and especially, to the disruptive role of international actors (Europeans included). Every player, in fact, has tried to support the actors most consistent with its interests to gain influence in the country. In order to circumvent these problems of representation, the stakeholders involved in the negotiating process decided to create a table composed only of those willing to participate. However, this negotiating track led to the agreement signed in Skhirat, which is, de facto, impossible to implement. One of the biggest problems was that that policy-makers and politicians at the negotiating table had no real representativeness. The militias, which have the real power on the ground, were only marginally involved in the UN peace process. The experience of past years clearly shows that in order to reach a durable and effective compromise, it is fundamental to include the militias in the negotiation. The Presidential Council should be encouraged to adopt a policy to selectively allocate funding to the militias, in an attempt to establish a closer connection between financial support and the internal reintegration of the new national powers. Obviously, even though many international actors played a double game behind its action in Libya, United Nations involvement will also be necessary.
Seven years from the start of the uprising, Libya needs, today more than ever, a phase of real state-building. However, the possibility of holding elections in 2018 might be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, elections could indeed be a way to reduce the multiple legitimacies of the country to one; on the other – as happened in all previous elections – they could lead to a new phase of political polarization, in which the winner does not recognize the defeated as a legitimate actor, and vice versa. Hence, the process of "reductio ad unum" of Libyan political legitimacy is something more complex than an electoral transition. What "ingredients" could help rebuild a real and new legitimacy? In order to understand that, one should start from the very basic needs of Libyan citizens. Today more than ever, what is needed is a state with minimum functions that is able to guarantee security, which knows how to use the potential of the rentier state more effectively. It is crucial to restart from the economic sector and the reconstruction of institutions. The EU should no longer focus solely on immigration control and the fight against illicit trafficking and criminal and/or terrorist organizations. Good governance is needed in Libya, and this is a domain where Europe can be important again.
 The final document that was circulated in Tripoli includes a crucial measure, which could potentially boost Libyan economy and foresees the unification of the Libyan Central Bank and the dismantling of all parallel institutions (Point 1).