The war was predictable, its course is not. The US intelligence was able to identify with remarkable accuracy the concentration of Russian troops and the directions of their initial attacks, but many factors of uncertainty will impact the progress of the invasion. Putin’s decision-making on launching the offensive operations from every strategic azimuth was based on ideological rather than pragmatic assumptions that could be proven wrong in a matter of a few days.
The consequences of the failure to gain a crushing and fast victory at a low cost may be dangerous for the whole Europe.
The first of Putin’s miscalculations pertains to the strength of Ukrainian capacity for resisting ground attacks. Russia has the advantage of superiority in the air augmented by long-range missile strikes, but this is not a sufficient condition for a blitzkrieg. Battalion tactical groups can advance through open terrain, muddy as it is, but they are inevitably stuck in the suburbs of such major cities as Kharkiv and cannot deliver a decisive breakthrough to Kyiv. The key parameters in the ever-changing equation of combat encounters are the fighting spirit of the seasoned Ukrainian army and the readiness of its people to take up arms against the occupants. Putin’s war planners assigned minimal value to both, but the main guideline underpinning these assumptions is that Ukraine is not a real state, but an artificial construct, which is a figment of wishful pseudo-historical thinking of their boss.
The second miscalculation is about the superior capabilities of Russian armed forces, and here the US intelligence might also be at fault in exaggerating their real strength. A lot of resources have been invested in the modernization of key weapon systems in the last decade, and on the parades the Armata tanks and armored vehicles look picture-perfect, but they have actually been produced in very limited series because of high costs. Maintenance and logistics have always been weak links in the Russian military, and the protracted deployment in wintertime has aggravated these problems. The troops have also been exhausted with the hardships of camping for many weeks, and their morale is hardly boosted with the start of real fighting. Elite units of paratroopers may be eager to prove their reputation, even if the helicopter assault on the Antonov airport near Kyiv was reportedly repulsed. Conscripts with only basic training, who constitute the bulk of regular battalions, expected discharge in March-April and are hardly eager to engage in hard battles.
The third miscalculation appears to be about the support for the war in Russian public opinion, which Putin, after the 2014 Crimea “triumph”, is inclined to take for granted. Independent sociologists argue that instead of enthusiasm and “rallying around-the-flag” effect, disbelief and shock are the prevalent feelings in the society, which was preoccupied with economic hardships and continuing epidemic. Until the very last days prior to the invasion, Russian propaganda didn’t try to beat the drums of “patriotic mobilization”, and many experts were inclined to see that as evidence of a lack of real preparations for the over-predicted war. Western sanctions are certain to make an instant impact on Russian businesses, big and small, and the drop in the already depleted incomes cannot motivate the anxious populace to accept the costs of war. Public disapproval may quickly translate into discontent in many elite groups, even if the top officials were forced to show loyalty to the boss at the awkwardly orchestrated meeting of the Security Council.
Every setback that Putin’s plans are set to meet, he will be inclined to blame on hostile Western interference, and here comes his most obvious miscalculation – the one of the unity of such institutions as the EU and NATO. The autocrat in the Kremlin is inclined to see the EU as deeply divided over the distribution of economic consequences of the war and irrelevant in the anticipated grand bargain on the European security architecture. President Emmanuel Macron went a long extra mile trying to sustain dialogue with Putin, but was repeatedly snubbed and told point blank that serious talks were to be held only with the USA. The US leadership, while believed to be absolutely dominant in NATO, is also perceived as feeble and preoccupied with domestic troubles.
Putin has never been able to admit mistakes, and in the war situation, his propensity to double the stakes in order to overcome setbacks may pose a difficult dilemma for the West. The need to deliver a resolute response to the blatant violation of international law is clear and urgent, but the risk of Putin’s desperate attempts to hit back cannot be ignored. The first counter-strike against the US and EU sanctions could be curtailing and even complete stop to Russian gas export to Europe, where energy markets are already stressed. What might come next is an attempt to brandish nuclear weapons, which are Putin’s instrument of choice for strategic blackmail. He may cancel the old Presidential Nuclear Initiative (1991), which locked all non-strategic nuclear warheads in centralized storages, and ordered forward deployment of these weapons to Crimea, Kaliningrad and combat ships of the Northern Fleet.
Western leaders are used to communicate with Putin as a calculating and manipulative autocrat, vain to assert his status but fearful for his power. Now he needs to be treated as an extremely dangerous war criminal.
