Russia’s lack of a major success in the war against Ukraine and the unexpected scale of Western sanctions have brought uncertainty to Sino-Russian relations. Their power asymmetry as well as Moscow’s dependence on Beijing’s imports is likely to have deepened. The limitations of the ‘alliance in all but name’ have come to the fore, too. While Beijing has continued its incessant political support, echoing and amplifying the Kremlin’s justifications for war, we have not witnessed any substantial economic or military assistance so far. The Chinese leadership seems to be uncertain as to how much support it should offer Moscow without risking a deterioration of its relations with the West, particularly the US.
Regardless of how much Xi Jinping knew before the outbreak of the war, Russia’s increasing military pressure on Ukraine did not bother the Chinese leadership at first. On the contrary, it offered such a useful distraction for the US that Beijing rewarded Moscow. The joint communication signed on the 4th of February during Vladimir Putin’s visit to China for the opening ceremony of the XXIV Olympic Winter Games emphasised the ideological convergence between them. Xi Jinping voiced his understanding for Russia’s security concerns in Europe, including NATO enlargement. Nonetheless, Chinese observers and policymakers may have been deceived by Russia’s previous successes in employing military force to achieve foreign policy aims, such as with the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the 2015 involvement in the Syrian civil war, which contributed to the success of Bashar Assad’s regime. The Chinese leadership most probably expected a repetition of such military prowess in Ukraine in 2022, even though Putin did not brief Xi about his invasion plans in advance. Such a disclosure would require enormous trust, one that is often difficult to find even among close allies. The limited scope of China’s practical assistance to Russia implies that Beijing was not familiar with Moscow’s intention to conduct a full-scale invasion.
Russia’s failure to overthrow the Ukrainian government has seriously undermined the myth of a successful military modernisation under Putin and dented Russia’s image as a great, efficient military power. As a result, Russia cannot hope for the war to diminish the asymmetry that has characterised Sino-Russian relations since the late 2000s. Regardless of specific steps taken by Beijing, the aggression against Ukraine has made Russia far more reliant on China than during the 2014 annexation of Crimea. This asymmetry can only be expected to deepen with the prolonging of the conflict and each subsequent round of Western sanctions. Before the 24th of February, China’s economic potential could not be matched by Russia; however, Moscow’s bold and efficient foreign policy actions diminished the scope of this asymmetry. Now, the war has turned such asymmetry into a de facto structural factor that will increasingly determine the dynamics of the relationship.
At this stage, a breakup of the Sino-Russian relationship remains the least plausible option: Moscow cannot afford to lose its main strategic, economic, and political partner, while China benefits from Washington’s preoccupation with the war in Europe. What remains uncertain, however, is what role Beijing envisions for Russia.
One possible scenario is that China may be tempted to capitalise on Russia’s weakness. Deprived of access to capital and advanced technologies, Moscow may be more open to Chinese partners than in the past. Russia’s vulnerability may enable Beijing to entrench its influence in the Russian energy sector, including ownership in Rosneft or Gazprom as well as the powerful oil and gas fields. Politically, Russia’s complete failure would embolden the West, particularly the US. Helping Moscow bypass Western sanctions, Beijing would turn Russia into its asset in the global rivalry against Washington. As such, Russia’s room for manoeuvre in international politics would certainly shrink in areas concerning China’s key interests. For instance, Moscow would be expected to limit its military, security, and energy cooperation with partners such as Vietnam or India. Ultimately, it would lead to an invigorated Sino-Russian alliance, albeit one with China playing the definite, leading role.
A second likely scenario is one whereby the Chinese leadership pursues the current position of supporting Moscow only rhetorically while shying away from any serious economic assistance. That way, China would not risk further deteriorating relations with the US and would still be able to court the European Union, praising its aspirations for ‘strategic autonomy’ (which Beijing understands as the EU’s independence from the US in the international arena). Russia’s limited utility in the Sino-American rivalry could push Beijing towards this option. Moscow does not have the capacity to bolster China in the most relevant sectors of Sino-American competition, including high-tech and China’s cut-off from the most advanced technologies and telecommunications, such as the 5G sectors, economy, and trade or investment opportunities. In this case, even deepening normative and political convergence would not transform the relationship into a fully-fledged alliance.
A third, 'wild card' scenario is one with a potential domestic change within Russia that would open up space for a new arrangement between Russia and China. While sceptical voices within the Kremlin have been largely silenced for the last decade, dissatisfaction with the ‘junior partner’ role and fear of Chinese nationalism remain present among the Russian elite. A domestic change would provide an opportunity for the Russian elite to reassess the results of to-date policy and return to the long-held idea of diversifying Moscow’s policy in Asia, going beyond the ‘pivot to China’.
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