Il 25 novembre 2018 si è consumato il primo scontro militare diretto tra le forze armate russe e quelle ucraine dall’inizio del conflitto. Fino a quel momento, la Russia ha sostenuto che il conflitto era sostanzialmente un conflitto interno all’Ucraina, pur avendo ammesso [1] alla fine del 2015 la presenza militare russa nei territori orientali del paese, controllati dai ribelli.
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At the end, Donald Trump had to capitulate and finally cancel his long-awaited meeting with Vladimir Putin at the G-20 of Buenos Aires. The US President had tried until the very last minute to avoid such an outcome, adopting an ambiguous position toward this new crisis between Russia and Ukraine and trying to somehow blame both sides for it. This position proved untenable and fell under the arrows of several members of the administration and of a broad bipartisan coalition in Congress.
Hybridity is a permanent dynamic of the Yemeni defence sector. However, due to the rise of new military actors, the intertwining of political, local and tribal loyalties has undergone a further deep reformulation since the complete breakdown of the transitional process in 2014 and the start of the Saudi and Emirati-led military intervention in 2015. The reconfiguration of power relations in Yemen has resulted in a hybridized military marked by three emerging features.
The most interesting evolution in Iraq’s security governance is currently represented by the peculiarity of the hybridization process characterizing the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and the vast array of non-state/quasi-state militias. Since 2014 on, hybridization in state authorities as well as in the security domain has enhanced, although representing a recurrent feature of the Iraqi system which started in the Eighties: the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU, al-Hashd al-Shaabi) embody a new phase of this trend.
Defence sectors in several Arab countries have undergone significant transformation as a result of the armed insurrections and civil wars, external interventions, and paralysis of political systems that have incapacitated their central states.
The twentieth summit between the European Union and China, which ended on 16 July 2018 in Beijing, reinforces the collaboration between the two actors both at the economic-commercial and the geopolitical levels.
After seven years, stability in Libya remains a chimera. The country’s regions, the west, east and south are more and more divided, while different groups of militias fight each other for predominance. It is the law of the jungle. But in spite of the chaos on the ground and the complete disorganization of the Libyan State, the most recent dilemma is whether or not elections should be held.
The second round of the Brazilian presidential election on the 28th of October 2018 is likely to be between Fernando Haddad of the Workers’ Party and Jair Bolsonaro of the Social Liberal Party. This is an unexpected result and not the choice that many Brazilians would have wished for.
Il paese attraversa una fase di crescente incertezza, dovuta principalmente alla decisione statunitense di uscire dall’accordo sul nucleare (Jcpoa, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action). Con le stime che parlano di una recessione nei periodi 2019/2020 e 2020/2021 a causa del crollo previsto della rendita petrolifera, conseguenza del ripristino delle sanzioni statunitensi, a pesare sembra essere soprattutto lo spettro di un nuovo isolamento economico.
FOCAC – the Forum on China-Africa cooperation – meets every three years and allows for a stock-taking of the agenda. By 2018, virtually all African countries (except for Swaziland) engage with Mainland China, which is Africa’s biggest trade partner, a large investor, and a donor with substantial importance for African development. It is, indeed, important to know where Chinese interests move.