The drums of war being beaten by Egyptian President ʿAbdel Fattah al-Sisi in June 2020 ‒ in response to the Government of National Accord (GNA) forces’ advance on the Sirte-Jufra frontline towards Cyrenaica, Egypt’s declared red-line ‒ seem to have been set aside to favour a possible agreement between the parties, as a consequence of the ceasefire announced at the end of August by Libya’s UN-backed and internationally-recognised GNA.
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There is no compelling reason why the 21st century should become “China’s century.” It could however be defined by the “China question”, as large parts of the 19th and the 20th centuries were defined by “the German question” (and to some extent also by the Japanese one); we also know their outcome. Hopefully the China question can avoid their tragic fate, but if it does the center of the conflict will be in Asia, and it will involve both China and the United States.
In the past few years, Saudi Arabia has witnessed a flurry of top-down socio-economic reforms – typically referred to by the title of one main reform program, Vision 2030 – aimed at easing conservative restrictions on Saudi social life and diversifying an oil-reliant economy.
Under Vision 2030, a new sense of national pride has been growing among a majority of Saudis, accentuating the positive emotions related to Saudi pre-Islamic history. But there is a common misconception that Saudis have a problem with their pre-Islamic past, considering it antithetical to Islam. According to this misconception, this era should be ignored or at least not celebrated, and absolutely not incorporated into any formulation of what is Saudi Heritage.
In the course of his first official visit to the US in mid-August 2020, the Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi assured his American allies of his commitment to a mutually beneficial exchange.
African countries are scrambling to pull together the necessary resources to face the COVID-19 health crisis, cushion its fallout on the poor, support their economies, and stay current on debt obligations. Some are redirecting public spending, with Angola and Nigeria lowering the oil-price assumptions in their budgets to more realistic levels, at $33pb and $28pb respectively. Others have approved stimulus packages to contain the impact of the crisis on their economies and the poor.
Once marginal in shaping the geopolitics of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, Gulf power projection and competition have become a central driver of the politics of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria since the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings. The political turmoil that engulfed these states created both threats and opportunities for Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, the rich and ambitious states of the Arabian Peninsula.
After an uncertain political transition following the 2011 revolts, Egypt seems ready to reshape its geopolitical role in the Mediterranean area and fulfil its geostrategic goals, always maintaining their national security principle to be an essential objective of its domestic and foreign policy. The two main closely and interconnected scenarios, where the country’s strategic ambitions are projected, move from Libya to the contested waters of the Eastern Mediterranean.
The COVID-19 pandemic is not just a health emergency but a multi-dimensional crisis for Afghanistan, casting “a huge shadow” over daily lives, Deborah Lyons, newly appointed head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan told the Security Council on Thursday, June 25.
After 6-years of rapid development, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has entered a new era in terms of quality development. In this grand picture, cities acting as sub-state actors along the BRI, have gained new momentum for displaying geographic significance and economic attractiveness. This paper intends to define cities’ role in the joint promotion of BRI, exemplify how cities will prosper in the process and explore new opportunities of investment after the COVID-19 pandemic.