Fabio Petito is Senior Associate Research Fellow in ISPI and Head of the "Religions and International Relations" Programme promoted by ISPI and the Freedom of Religion or Belief & Foreign Policy Initiative (FoRB&FPI), University of Sussex - UK. He is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sussex. He has taught at SOAS in London, the ESCP-EAP in Paris and at ‘L’Orientale’ in Naples.
Risultati della ricerca:
Africa’s development aspirations have always rested on the possibilities and policies inherent in achieving rapid industrialisation. Africans believe that key interventions in industrial policy would lay the foundation for sustained growth, business and job creation. In contemporary China, African policy makers seem to have found a development partner whose interests, experiences and capacities match these continental ambitions.
As the pandemic continues to constrain the fiscal space of African countries – given the slowdown in domestic economies and decline in commodity prices – and occurs in a context where 40% of the continent was already faced with unsustainable debt burdens, discussions around restructuring Africa’s debt have begun to gain traction.
African countries are scrambling to pull together the necessary resources to face the COVID-19 health crisis, cushion its fallout on the poor, support their economies, and stay current on debt obligations. Some are redirecting public spending, with Angola and Nigeria lowering the oil-price assumptions in their budgets to more realistic levels, at $33pb and $28pb respectively. Others have approved stimulus packages to contain the impact of the crisis on their economies and the poor.
From the moment he first declared his candidacy for the presidency of the United States on a strongly nationalist platform promising to “make America great again,” Donald Trump has been dogged by accusations that he is too cozy with explicitly racist, fringe-right figures and movements. Periodically, critics have seized on phrases or images in Trump’s communications that they argue send subtle messages of encouragement or solidarity to Nazis and white supremacists.
Even before the coronavirus pandemic, China was no stranger to the spotlight. The “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) had already raised the issue of the country’s global engagement. In compliance with the traditional concept of 面子(mianzi), China had in fact put its internationalreputation forward when relating to other countries.
“We will win this war”. In March of 2020, Donald Trump began referring to himself as a “wartime president”. After months of downplaying the threat of Covid-19 in the United States, he declared war against an invisible enemy: a so-called “China virus”.
For centuries, Latin American states have sought to leverage extra-hemispheric powers, Spain, France or the Soviet Union, to gain a modicum of autonomy and power relative to the hegemon to the north, the United States. China today is no different from those other extra-hemispheric crutches, but Beijing’s long-term vision and the global balance are markedly different from the past.
As COVID-19 cases continue to climb in the Western Hemisphere, Central American countries’ chronically weak governing institutions, economies and public health systems must cope with this additional strain. The pandemic has aggravated political polarisation in some capitals and caused economic contraction in countries already wracked by poverty. In some places, officials may be exploiting the crisis for corrupt purposes. At the same time, criminal gangs have resumed predatory activities they had suspended at the start of the outbreak.
The COVID-19 pandemic is acting as an accelerator for food insecurity in conflict zones, impacting food availability, access, and humanitarian assistance, as well as potentially giving rise to new social tensions as a result of the economic consequences of the lockdown.