The nascent peace and reconciliation process underway in Afghanistan is often described as “Afghan-owned” and “Afghan-led.” But in reality, Afghanistan’s neighbours (and America and the EU too) have played a big part in it.
Unlike other peace processes – from Colombia to the Philippines –, there is no exclusive Afghan government delegation to the officially so-called intra-Afghan negotiations that started in Doha (Qatar) in September 2020. Instead, a construct called the “negotiating team of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan” (IRoA team) with 21 members is facing the Taliban.
The political leadership of the Taliban supported the ‘Khalilzad process’, because it was designed to offer the Taliban an attractive deal. In fact, Khalilzad framed the process largely on the basis of a Pakistani proposal.
When President-Elect Biden entered the Oval Office, only 100 days remained before May 1, 2021, which the Doha Agreement with the Taliban sets as the deadline for the U.S. to withdraw all troops from Afghanistan.
The terrible human toll exacted by the war in Afghanistan since 2001 has been documented by Afghan and international human rights organizations and the UN. Civilian casualties alone (killed or injured) have been around 10,000 per year for the past decade, many of them victims of unlawful killings and other violations of the law of armed conflict. Yet, for these actions, impunity has long reigned virtually supreme. Only last year were there some signs of serious commitments to investigating and prosecuting.
2021 marks the twentieth anniversary since the beginning of the US war in Afghanistan and a critical juncture for the country. After reaching some diplomatic achievements in 2020 – such as the “US-Taliban Agreement” – Trump’s accelerated withdrawal of US troops and the concession to sit bilaterally with the Taliban deeply wounded the Intra-Afghan peace process. Which challenges will Joe Biden be forced to navigate in the short-term? Will regional powers play an increasingly more relevant role in the future? Which future should the Afghan people expect?
La politica americana in Afghanistan è tracciata. Da Trump a Biden, per gli Usa la guerra è chiusa, ma modi e tempi del disimpegno avranno forti ripercussioni sulle istituzioni di Kabul e sul negoziato intra-afghano. Inaugurato il 12 settembre 2020 a Doha, figlio dell’accordo bilaterale tra Talebani e Usa del 29 febbraio, il negoziato, ancora in stallo, rischia di deragliare o di subire nuovi scossoni durante l’interregno tra Trump e Biden.
La cerimonia con cui il 12 settembre a Doha sono stati inaugurati i dialoghi intra-afghani segna l’inizio di un processo necessario ma accidentato e senza alcuna garanzia di successo.
Cominciato venerdì 31 luglio in occasione della festività islamica dell’Eid al-Adha, l’ultimo cessate il fuoco tra i Talebani e il governo di Kabul apre una finestra d’opportunità inedita sull’inizio del negoziato intra-afghano, ma mostra anche i limiti dell’accordo tra i Talebani e gli Stati Uniti firmato a Doha lo scorso febbraio e i tanti ostacoli lungo la strada verso la pace.
The COVID-19 pandemic is not just a health emergency but a multi-dimensional crisis for Afghanistan, casting “a huge shadow” over daily lives, Deborah Lyons, newly appointed head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan told the Security Council on Thursday, June 25.
La diffusione del virus COVID19 ha gravemente colpito l’alta dirigenza talebana, sia il Consiglio Supremo (shura) in Afghanistan e Pakistan, sia il gruppo politico di Doha in Qatar, rendendo di fatto il movimento privo dell’organo di guida e di quello negoziale.
On May 23rd, the Taliban announced a rare three-days ceasefire to mark the holiday of Eid al-Fitr that ends the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, and the Afghan government responded by announcing plans to release up to 2,000 insurgent prisoners, as “a gesture of goodwil