Oggi, 21 giugno, si svolgerà in Etiopia la tornata elettorale per il rinnovo delle assemblee federali e regionali e delle principali municipalità. Lo scrutinio non coprirà l’intero territorio nazionale: nel Tigrai e in parte dell’Oromia, del Benishangul e nel sud l’esecutivo ha disposto il rinvio del voto a data da destinarsi, complice il perdurare dei conflitti e le difficoltà nell’assicurare la registrazione degli elettori.
At last, Ethiopia will have its federal and regional council elections on June 21st. Amid an ongoing conflict in Tigray, heightened international pressure, worsening economic situation due to the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, boiling tensions with Egypt and Sudan, and increased ethnic divisions within the country, this election takes place at a critical juncture in Ethiopia’s contemporary history.
The MED This Week newsletter provides expert analysis and informed insights on the most significant developments in the MENA region, bringing together unique opinions on the topic and reliable foresight on future scenarios. Today, we turn the spotlight on the Nile, where the dispute between Ethiopia and downstream countries over Addis Ababa’s plan to further fill his "Renaissance" dam is increasingly pressuring Arab states to mediate among quarrelling stakeholders.
Livello cinque, catastrofe
Le Nazioni Unite hanno dichiarato che in Tigray, regione del nord dell’Etiopia, 400.000 persone rischiano di morire di fame. Formalmente queste persone sono considerate “a livello cinque”,
Il governo etiope - guidato dal premio Nobel per la Pace Abiy Ahmed - ha invece sminuito la gravità della situazione, negato responsabilità nella carestia, e assicurato che permetterà l’accesso delle agenzie umanitarie nella regione.
Nell’ultimo decennio la presenza di organizzazioni armate di matrice salafita-jihadista in Africa subsahariana si è evoluta in funzione di una graduale proiezione continentale dello Stato Islamico (IS), accanto a una ben radicata presenza di gruppi affiliati ad al-Qa’ida.
Il nuovo colpo di mano dei generali in Mali ha aggravato l'instabilità in uno stato alle prese con una difficile transizione politica dopo il golpe di agosto 2020. Il paese è epicentro di una profonda crisi, tra le insorgenze jihadiste nella regione di confine con Niger e Burkina Faso, l'attivismo di milizie etniche di autodifesa, e gli abusi diffusi da parte delle forze di sicurezza. Quali prospettive attendono il Mali? Quale il ruolo della comunità internazionale e dell'Italia?
Seventeen elements in the periodic table – the so-called “rare earths” – play a major role in the calculations and strategies of various nations. In many ways, rare earths are the vitamins of industrial society in the 21st century: they are vital to key products from hi-tech items (smartphones and monitors) to energy conversion systems (wind turbines, photovoltaic panels and electrical machinery) and even military equipment (lasers and radar). The difficulties involved in replacing them with alternative materials make rare earths uniquely strategic resources.
The Sahel region is the theatre for one of the most significant developments in Italian foreign policy in the last decade. As a consequence of the intersection between external shocks, domestic pressures, and internal reorganisations, Italy is testing new approaches, instruments, and strategies in the Sahel to further its national interest, which is understood as much in terms of national security as domestic stability and international status.
In November 2020, the Ethiopian federal government launched a military operation in the northern region of Tigray. Hostilities between the federal army and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) forces continued in the following months. Furthermore, the involvement of ethnic-based militias as well as Eritrean armed forces have contributed to further escalate the conflict, causing a humanitarian crisis. What role did external actors play so far? How can the international community help solve the Tigray crisis? How will the conflict impact Ethiopia’s future prospects?
Key findings:
The security challenges faced by the Arab forces in the 2011-2021 decade originate more from exogenous than indigenous factors, and these come to us from across the centuries: three lessons on counterinsurgency (COIN) can be identified.
First of all, every insurgency and counterinsurgency in the Arab states have seen a major role for foreign forces;
Key findings:
In the 2011-2021 decade, military education has not significantly changed in terms of approach, despite new challenges and rising strategic ambitions in many Arab states;
However, military education programs and entities across the region are multiplying to improve the tactical and strategic skills of Arab officers, with particular regard to the Gulf monarchies;
Key findings:
Since 2011, Tunisia and Libya have experienced different trajectories in terms of armed forces’ defence reform and parliamentary oversight;
The efforts of Tunisia to strengthen the legal framework in support of parliamentary oversight on the security sector offers a roadmap for other countries; however, much still needs to be done to improve, for instance, the technical expertise of legislators in Security Sector Reform (SSR);