In 2006 the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) – of which al-Shabaab was initially part before becoming the remaining ‘faction’ – introduced a new chapter of governance in Somalia based on its interpretation of the Shari’a (Islamic Law). Using Islam as its foundation and claiming to introduce a ‘purely’ Islamic government in Somalia, al-Shabaab brought a different perspective to the Somali governance that dominated since 1991 (end of the government of Siad Barre) creating a foothold for clan and sub-clan aligned warlords.
Thirty years ago, on May 18th, 1991, the Republic of Somaliland declared independence. This separation from Somalia, which had not been legally prepared and was not politically supported by any other state, certainly was a bold move back then. For over a decade it was impossible to predict what would really come out of the secession. But today it is clear: Somaliland is one of the most stable de facto states in the world: it has a clearly demarcated territory (at least on paper), a permanent population, and a legitimate government.
Over the past three decades, few states have experienced prolonged conflict or repeatedly failed at establishing effective government as Somalia has. Perhaps only matched by Afghanistan, Somalia’s capital Mogadishu is once again on the brink of cataclysm caused by recent violent clashes between security forces —loyal to the incumbent President Mohammed Abdullahi ‘Farmaajo’— and forces loyal to the opposition since the Lower House of Parliament’s decision to extend the president’s term by two years on April 12th, 2021.
In a statement released on April, 13th 2021, EU Commission Vice-President Josep Borrell Fontelles expressed deep concern about the ongoing political and constitutional crisis in Somalia. In his words, the European Union “could under no circumstances accept an extension of the government mandate” without the parties agreeing to their previous electoral deal.
The deteriorating relationship between Kenya and Somalia amidst the global pandemic and internal and regional political dynamics has raised a red flag. There are concerns for the dispute to spark an armed confrontation if it proceeds with the current trajectory.
Over the last decades, experts and practitioners have frequently described Somalia as the quintessential collapsed state: because of state fragility, Somalia is seen as a reign of anarchy nurturing terrorism. According to this narrative, externally assisted forms of counter-terrorism, peace- and state-building are the most preferable and feasible solution to address state fragility.
In Somalia’s long and turbulent road towards rebuilding state-wide institutions and granting its citizens acceptable living conditions, for every two steps forward the country seems to take a step backwards. A new crisis has been unfolding in Mogadishu, this time around a primarily political one.
Il figlio Mahamat subentra al padre Idriss, presidente del Ciad da trent’anni, ucciso ieri durante uno scontro con i ribelli. Ma la scomparsa di un alleato chiave di Parigi nel Sahel riapre interrogativi sulla stabilità del paese e di una regione in crisi perenne.
Con un comunicato diffuso dalla tv di stato martedì 20 aprile, i generali dell’esercito del Ciad hanno reso pubblica la notizia della morte di Idriss Déby Itno, a poche ore dalla pubblicazione dei risultati delle elezioni presidenziali.
Lavorare per le Nazioni Unite (ONU) è il sogno di molti, ma poco si parla di quali siano i rischi per chi si impegna in prima persona nel mantenimento della pace in paesi martoriati da guerra ed instabilità politica. Giusto pochi giorni fa, l’ennesimo attacco di matrice jihadista nel Mali settentrionale è costato la vita a quattro membri del contingente ciadiano ed il ferimento di ulteriori trentaquattro caschi blu.
To hear many actors and observers tell it, the Sahel’s root problem is a “crisis of governance”. In fact, there appears to be near-consensus on this question – Sahelian governments, Western governments, think tanks, NGOs and citizens’ movements, journalists, and academics are all quick to identify “good governance” as the ultimate solution to the region’s multi-layered conflicts and waves of instability.
COVID-19 has further exacerbated the debt situation in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Prior to the pandemic about half of low-income countries (LICs) were at high risk of debt distress or in debt distress, including a large number of LICs in SSA. A shift in the composition of debt from concessional to non-concessional financing needed to finance infrastructure and human capital development contributed to higher debt levels.