Looking at the ongoing militarization of the Internet, one could rephrase Rousseau’s famous incipit to The Social Contract: “Internet was born free and everywhere it is in chains”. In fact, the Internet is increasingly militarizing, and cyberspace has become the domain of choice for destabilising campaigns and hostile activities that would be unsustainable in the conventional domain.
The good old days of cold war disinformatia are gone. Social media are increasingly relevant in shaping the public opinion, but they are just “eco chambers”.
As governments become increasingly involved in cyberspace for military purposes, they tend to consider the cyber domain as critical part of their security strategies. This growing reliance on cyber assets calls for deeper investigation on the features of cyberspace as well as their impact on state rivalry. The paper draws from the insights of Offence/Defense Balance (ODB) theory to discuss whether competition in cyberspace may become an incentive to the use of force. In particular, ODB theory postulates that whenever defense is (or is held to be) more expensive relative do offense, states will have an incentive to act aggressively. Unfortunately, three features of cyberspace give offense an advantage over defense: the central place of vulnerabilities, the different pace of improvements for defense and offense technologies, the difficulty in attribution. The main conclusion of this argument is that the cyber-attacks in the future are likely to become more and more common.
Deep throat Edward Snowden’s revelations about the e-spying carried out by the United States set off a political storm in Washington and the capitals of its allies and is spurring President Barack Obama to speed up the timing for reforming the National Security Agency, reforms that should create a new equilibrium between the nation’s security and individual freedoms.
Abstract
This article discusses a practical mechanism to guard against cyber attacks by reducing the applica-tion's exposure to hostile intentions. The article provides the underlying assumptions and theory of attack surface reduction. It then relates practical steps that the user can take to that theory. The outcome of those steps will be a more robust and secure application environment that will increase the effectiveness of defensive measures
The critical information infrastructure (CII) represents the indispensable "nerves and blood" that allow modern societies to work and live. In fact, without it, there would be no distribution of energy, no services like banking or finance, no air traffic control and so on. The CII allows remote control and management of commodities and services, thus reducing costs, to utility companies and consumers alike, and improving efficiency. But the CII was born and developed with an intrinsic, and potentially disastrous, defect: security was never considered a top priority. Today, organized crime, rogue groups or even states may plan to disrupt or destroy portion of the CII or essential services, thus putting in serious dangers governments and economies around the world. This paper outlines the major elements of the CII and the risks to which it might be subject today and tomorrow.
The July 10-11, 2013 US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) made major strides in stabilizing and moving forward US-China relations, building upon the momentum spurred by the June presidential summit between US President, Barack Obama, and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, in Sunnylands, California. The US and China have hosted the annual S&ED since 2009, and before then as a separate Strategic Dialogue and Strategic Economic Dialogue, which were initiated in 2005 and 2006 respectively.
While US-China bilateral relations are currently strained across multiple issues –North Korea’s increased nuclear testing; emissions curbing of “super GHGs”, human rights; and China’s increasingly assertive territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea – it is the cyber war debate that has been claiming recent news headlines, and much more so within the US than in China.