Cosa dobbiamo aspettarci per le strategie di sviluppo basate sulle catene del valore globali nel futuro “new normal”? – Figlio del Covid-19 certamente, ma anche di tutte le altre radicali trasformazioni in atto, di natura tecnologica, politica e ambientale.
La crisi provocata dal Covid-19 ha colpito il commercio mondiale, già indebolito nel 2019 a causa delle tensioni tra Cina e Stati Uniti, delle incertezze sulla Brexit, di dispute commerciali e dell'ascesa di molte politiche protezionistiche rafforzate dalla pandemia che ha accelerato questa tendenza.
Sono tempi duri per tutti e ancora di più per i ministri delle Finanze dell’intero globo, stretti fra la necessità di “salvare il salvabile” quanto ai saldi di finanza pubblica e continuamente tirati per la giacca da una miriade di stakeholders per aumentare le spese e allentare il più possibile la morsa fiscale.
Covid-19 is rapidly turning Latin America irrelevant to Global Value Chains. First, because the region -with the notable exception of Mexico- did not enter into the productivity and technology competition vis-à-vis Asian economies early on. Second, structural limitations in infrastructure, institutional enabling conditions and human capital lingering since the early 1990s have worsened under the pandemic. Simply put, Latin American participation in GVCs is uneven and domestic creation of value added for this GVCs are meagre to say the least.
On July the 8th, the Mexican president Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) flew to Washington to celebrate the official July 1 enactment of the revised North American Free Trade Agreement with the US President Donald Trump. The summit was a public relations event in which the two leaders showcased an unusual moderate narrative, and celebrated their good neighbour relations in an attempt to sweep below the carpet their record of political and economic failures
The calm before the storm, the flat calm that preludes to the earthquake, the long quarantine in which anger and frustration mount: this is Latin America swept by Covid. The continent saw the outbreak spreading in Europe and had time to prepare for the impact. However, the pandemic has overcome every barrier and has spread everywhere. Not only for countries who exposed themselves to disaster with their governments not taking any actions towards interventions and mitigation, like Brazil and Mexico: they are now paying dearly for it.
The future is always uncertain but it seems particularly true for Argentina. As elsewhere, it is unclear how the COVID-19 epidemic will pan out, but Argentina’s proximity to Brazil, a country of 210 million people where contagions seem out of control, poses risks that few other countries have to face.
The Covid-19 pandemic, economic crisis, and political turbulence have created a “perfect storm” for Brazil, causing a panorama of strong uncertainties for the future of South America’s largest country. Already in April, the Johns Hopkins University predicted today's dramatic scenario.
For centuries, Latin American states have sought to leverage extra-hemispheric powers, Spain, France or the Soviet Union, to gain a modicum of autonomy and power relative to the hegemon to the north, the United States. China today is no different from those other extra-hemispheric crutches, but Beijing’s long-term vision and the global balance are markedly different from the past.
With the United States, Latin America has become an epicenter of the COVID-19 pandemic. This situation is endangering already fragile political and economic structures, with an increasing risk of social unrest and democratic derailment. How are major countries in the region reacting to the crisis? How will the pandemic impact the region in the long run? And how is Latin America’s role in the US-China confrontation going to change after the pandemic is over?
