Lebanon

Foreign analysts often call it "magic". The remarkable capability of the Lebanese economic system to remain afloat despite domestic instability, regional turmoil, and deep structural imbalances astonishes journalists and investors. Sometimes they "lose faith" and predict its "inevitable" collapse. So far, however, only to be proven wrong.

Not if, but when. Since the second Lebanon war in July-August 2006, a sense of inevitability seems to apply to the Israel-Hezbollah tensions, leading pundits to forecast initiation of a third confrontation. The crystallisation of the Syrian crisis, the gradual involvement of Hezbollah on Assad’s side, as well as the growing approach to the Israeli-Syrian border of militias supported by Iran, are all elements which seem to convey the possibility that the war theatre will not be limited to the Israeli-Lebanese border, but will probably extend to Syria.

The upcoming parliamentary election in Lebanon – the first since 2009 – is unlikely to unsettle Hezbollah’s grip over its traditional constituencies. Yet, the polls will be a test for the "Party of God". This is mainly because this election comes at a moment of extreme regional uncertainty, and because of an ongoing reshuffling of the domestic balance of power that is putting traditional alliances under stress.

As Lebanon seems inexorably dragged into the regional cold war between Saudi Arabia and Iran – the bizarre saga of Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s resignation being the latest illustration – it is worth looking at the current state of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and questioning its ability to prevent any type of conflict escalation. Discussions on the LAF generally oppose two competing views.

Abstract

Sectarian tendencies and antagonisms grew into levels unknown before in the modern Middle East. They were exacerbated by conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Bahrain and Lebanon, and by the social and political uprisings following the “Arab spring”.