In the past few years, the MENA region witnessed a rise in jihadist extremism and radicalization, as countries in the area were rocked by a series of deadly terrorist attacks. As authorities responded to the threat, it became clear that in order to effectively counter the phenomenon, traditional repressive measures had to now be accompanied by alternative methods of prevention, rehabilitation and dissuasion.
In a financially fragile country, it may happen that the government does not share the logic of the financial markets, or the need to have an independent central bank. However, a government cannot afford to act against this logic. Otherwise, it would run the risk of suffering from currency turbulences, as it was the case of the Turkish lira last May.
Nei primi sei mesi del 2018, in Afghanistan si sono registrate due tendenze rilevanti, in contraddizione tra loro. La prima è un lieve aumento delle vittime civili, testimoniato dall’ultimo rapporto di Unama, la missione delle Nazioni Unite a Kabul. La seconda è l’apertura di una finestra di dialogo diplomatico che potrebbe ridurre progressivamente la conflittualità e condurre a un negoziato vero e proprio.
I capi di stato e di governo si sono incontrati a Bruxelles l’11-12 luglio in occasione del 29.° Summit della NATO, a cui hanno preso parte i 29 paesi membri – per l’Italia il presidente del Consiglio Giuseppe Conte, accompagnato dai ministri Elisabetta Trenta (Difesa) ed Enzo Moavero Milanesi (Affari Esteri) –, 20 paesi partner e i rappresentanti delle Nazioni Unite, dell’Unione Europea, della banca mondiale e la rappresentanza parlamentare dei paesi NATO.
Turkey represents NATO's most credible war-fighting force at the Southern Flank. The manpower advantages and high combat-readiness of the Turkish military makes it a reliable actor in the Alliance’s rapid response plans, which are expected to receive a boost in the July 2018 Summit. In recent years, Ankara has weathered very serious security challenges. In the meanwhile, Turkish-Russian relations pursued the trajectory of a pendulum's swing that caught many analysts off-guard.
In NATO-Gulf monarchies relations, military education is the most effective vector of cooperation. Moreover, individual partnerships work definitely better than a multilateral format. For this reason, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), launched in 2004 as a practical cooperation framework between NATO and some Arab Gulf states (United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait) has showed all its limits so far, slightly changing its nature - or rather adapting - on course.
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan represents a key partner and reliable ally for NATO, playing vital roles on NATO’s Southern flank, as a moderate force in a tumultuous region. But the kingdom also remains aid-dependent, resource-poor, and subject to crises from within and without. Yet, despite its longstanding partnership with NATO and with Western countries in general, the kingdom is too often neglected and under-valued.
Regardless the final composition of the next Iraqi coalition government, NATO will have to interact with an executive part interested in maintaining the militias, their base of power. As a matter of fact, Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Iraq may appear as a national issue, but in reality the structure of Iraq's armed forces has implications for the whole region, including the Mediterranean, which is the "Southern", and in some cases also the "Eastern" flank of NATO.
Since the so-called Arab Spring stormed North Africa in 2011, security cooperation with partner countries along the Southern flank of the Mediterranean Sea has been a primary concern for NATO. The collapse of long-standing regimes in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia has forced the North Atlantic alliance to reconsider its role in the region, exploring options to accompany these countries in their difficult democratization processes.