Nigeria: sequestro di futuro
Boko Haram rivendica il sequestro di centinaia di studenti. È solo l’ultimo di una lunga serie di violenze e rapimenti nel nord del paese, sempre più fuori controllo.
Boko Haram rivendica il sequestro di centinaia di studenti. È solo l’ultimo di una lunga serie di violenze e rapimenti nel nord del paese, sempre più fuori controllo.
10 domande e 10 risposte sulle proteste #EndSars in Nigeria.
Nigeria’s Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) is notorious for conducting gruesome extra-judicial killings, extortion and engaging in sexual abuse amongst other vices. Almost every Nigerian will have a story to tell of being harassed by SARS. If you are poor, you are termed a criminal; rich, you are a yahoo boy, the local slang for Internet fraudster.
Da settimane in Nigeria si protesta contro la SARS, reparto speciale della polizia accusata di brutalità e violenze. Una protesta che riguarda soprattutto i giovani del paese più popoloso dell’Africa, e che è stata repressa nel sangue negli ultimi giorni.
Defined by multiple dynamics of instability, the Lake Chad Basin represents a complex regional system. Over the last ten years, violent extremism has spread across the region as a result of Salafi-jihadi armed groups – Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS), commonly known as Boko Haram,[1] and Islamic State in West African Province (ISWAP) – which gave impulse to regional security cooperation processes.
The Fulani are a large and internally diverse population spread across West and Central Africa, with their largest concentration in Nigeria. In very broad terms, they can be divided into two main categories: the (semi)-nomadic and transhumant pastoralists, who raise cattle and sheep and, contrary to popular belief, usually also cultivate crops on a subsistence basis; and settled Fulani, who are not pastoralists and live in urban areas and villages as traders, farmers, traditional rulers, educated professionals.
The Lake Chad region is caught in a conflict trap. Climate change and conflict dynamics create a feedback loop where climate impacts feed additional pressures while conflict undermines communities’ coping capacity. Whilst the region around the lake, bordering Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, is a priority for stabilisation efforts for many international and regional military actors, to date these efforts have failed to de-escalate the violence. Indeed, in some cases, military responses are making the situation worse.
2017 and 2018 had confirmed the pre-eminence of Boko Haram’s splinter faction known as the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), which broke away from Boko Haram’s historic leader Abubakar Shekau around mid-2016.
The Lake Chad Basin shows a complex regional system defined by multiple instabilities. Non-state Salafi-jihadi actors – namely Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) – confront state institutions and compete for power over local communities, fuelling regional political and economic insecurity. Furthermore, an increasingly harsh climate is having a serious impact on livelihood activities, feeding into social tensions – such as farmers-herders conflicts over access to natural resources – and prompting a severe humanitarian crisis.
Una Niamey blindata accoglie, dal 4 all’8 luglio, uno degli appuntamenti simbolicamente più importanti per il continente africano nel 2019: un summit di ministri e capi di stato dell’Unione Africana che, domenica 7 luglio, lanceranno ufficialmente la Zona di libero scambio continentale africana.