Qatar

Il Qatar si prepara a ospitare i Mondiali di calcio 2022 accelerando su riforme politico-sociali e diplomazia internazionale. Sul piano interno, Doha ha organizzato le prime elezioni nazionali per il Consiglio consultivo (Majlis al-Shura), definito un “esperimento di partecipazione popolare”[1]. Il governo sta inoltre revisionando la legislazione sul lavoro, introducendo prime, innovative tutele per i lavoratori stranieri, come il salario minimo mensile.

The MED This Week newsletter provides expert analysis and informed insights on the most significant developments in the MENA region, bringing together unique opinions on the topic and reliable foresight on future scenarios. Today, we focus on Qatar, whose recent vibrant diplomatic role has been emphasized by its involvement in a broad range of issues discussed during Sheikh Tamim’s visit to Washington, the first Gulf leader to meet Biden at the White House.

On January 31st, President Joe Biden designated Qatar a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) to the US, making it the third country of the Gulf region after Kuwait and Bahrain to receive the designation and one of only 18 countries globally. MNNA status bestows significant benefits and privileges on holders, including preferential access to advanced US military technology and defense equipment.

Non solo calcio: l’Emirato sta investendo 300 miliardi di dollari per sostenere lo sviluppo delle sue infrastrutture in chiave sostenibile.

Qatar is carving out a leading role for itself within international diplomacy - particularly in light of recent events in Afghanistan - through its mediation-oriented foreign policy. This occurs after — and despite — three years of political and diplomatic crisis between the Quartet (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates-UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt) and Qatar. Doha’ diplomacy appears better positioned — and influential — today than before the eruption of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) rift, occurred in 2017.

Nel Golfo diviso il Qatar ha amici, nemici e qualcuno che ha preferito non schierarsi

In uno storico vertice in Arabia Saudita, i paesi del Golfo annunciano la fine dell’embargo sul Qatar dopo il boicottaggio imposto nel 2017 dall'Arabia Saudita, Egitto, Emirati Arabi e Bahrein.

One of the key developments in the Middle East in the last few decades has been the growing alliance between Egypt and some of the Gulf Cooperation Council states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates/UAE). For most of the 1950s and 1960s Egypt, under President Gamal Abd al-Nasser, viewed the Gulf’s ruling families as reactionary and medieval regimes whose days were numbered. Meanwhile, the Gulf leaders felt threatened by Nasser’s vision of Arab nationalism and socialism.

In spite of numerous efforts by the USA and its European and regional allies, the three-year  blockade of Qatar by the Arab quartet shows no sign of abating. With the Trump administration determined to ratchet up its pressure on Iran and the UN’s Iran arms embargo expiry date fast approaching, one can be certain that the current crisis is set to gain an added urgency in the days and weeks ahead.

Once marginal in shaping the geopolitics of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, Gulf power projection and competition have become a central driver of the politics of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria since the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings. The political turmoil that engulfed these states created both threats and opportunities for Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, the rich and ambitious states of the Arabian Peninsula.

La 40esima riunione annuale del Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) è stata preceduta da diversi segnali di distensione tra Arabia Saudita e Qatar, dopo due anni e mezzo di embargo imposto a Doha da Arabia Saudita, Emirati Arabi Uniti (EAU), Bahrein ed Egitto. La tensione rimane alta, come dimostra la decisione dell’emiro del Qatar Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani di non partecipare neanche quest’anno, nonostante l’invito del re Salman.

La crisi interna al Consiglio di Cooperazione del Golfo (GCC) si prepara a entrare nel terzo anno. Il 4 giugno 2017 Arabia Saudita, Emirati Arabi Uniti, Bahrein e Egitto (il cosiddetto Quartetto arabo) rompevano le relazioni con il Qatar, rivolgendogli diverse accuse e un ultimatum in tredici richieste alle quali Doha avrebbe dovuto allinearsi per mettere fine al blocco diplomatico, ma anche aereo e marittimo, nei suoi confronti.