Russia

The concept of hybrid warfare is currently used to describe a wide set of practices such as the use of information warfare, political, intelligence operations, cyber warfare, diplomatic action in combination with limited conventional military operations. Many of these activities have been considered as rather routine intelligence and diplomatic activities since time immemorial.

Since 2014, the term “hybrid warfare” (HW) has been all over the news, as well as think tanks and academic studies. It has also spurred the creation of new research centres and operational structures within international organisations. In 2016, the European Commission and the European External Action Service developed a joint framework on countering hybrid threats and established a Hybrid Fusion Cell as part of the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre.

While the weaponization of disinformation and propaganda is as old as warfare itself, new technologies and an increasingly more globalized world have rendered information operations a more prominent feature of some states’ battle for global influence.

Since 2017, Russian private military companies (PMC), such as the Wagner Group, have played a prominent role in facilitating the expansion of Moscow’s geopolitical influence in Africa. On the heels of Russia’s use of PMCs in Ukraine and Syria, Russia deployed Wagner Group PMCs to Libya in 2017, in order to facilitate Libya National Army (LNA) chieftain Khalifa Haftar’s ambitions for territorial expansion.

Researchers are still divided on the need to use the term ‘hybrid warfare’. Focusing on the essence of conflicts may be a far more productive approach than getting lost in endless debates about labels^[1].

Since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 without firing a single shot, former Soviet States in the area – particularly the Baltic countries – have been increasingly worried by the idea they could be ‘the next’ target of an hybrid war operated from Moscow with some form of occupation as their objective.