Russia and China make no secret of their enhanced cooperation, especially in light of their worsening ties with the US; the international sanction regime against Russia, the US' threatened withdrawal from the INF Treaty, and the US-China trade war, among other things, are driving Moscow and Beijing closer together. This dossier examines the security nexus of the Russia-China relationship. Specifically, it looks at both countries’ military transformation and security approach at the international level.
Eighteen years after the first ground-breaking Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC, 2000), launched to officialise and institutionalize China’s relations with Africa, Beijing hosted – on 2-4 September 2018 - 50+ African heads of state/government and international actors during the 7th event of the series. Throughout these past 18 years, the global status and role of China and individual African countries changed dramatically.
This background note was presented at the High Level Panel on "G7 & Africa" held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, 5 May 2017.
What does food security mean for Africa today?
Cyber space is a complex environment with many factors and dimensions that make it unstable and, at the same time, fascinating and interesting.
The opening of the so-called Western Balkan route in the summer of 2015 brought the region back to our living rooms and to political boardrooms. One could sense relief and hope among those long advocating for increased efforts on the side of the EU for the Thessaloniki agenda to reach its finalité. Relief because it looked like the immense strains the refugee wave put on the countries along the route did not seem to endanger the regional stability still feared to be fragile.
This brief text addresses the question of how Russia’s recent actions in Ukraine – and elsewhere – have influenced debates and policies in the Nordic countries. The ambition here is to shed light on how these questions are addressed in Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland, the countries that for various reasons have had to redefine their policies towards Russia in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis in 2014.
South Korea’s new President Moon Jae-in could find himself stuck between a rock and hard place in the months ahead. Indeed, dealing with North Korean dictator Kim Jong-Un on the one hand and US President Donald Trump on the other could be the cause for a number of sleepless nights for Seoul’s new president. While the former is still announcing that he will turn the Korean Peninsula into a ‘sea of fire’ on a regular basis, the latter – at least so he announced the other day - wants ‘his’ money back.
For many years now, successive American administrations have made no secret of their frustration with how little most NATO allies spend on their militaries, leaving the United States with a disproportionately large share of the bill for the joint defense. James Mattis, the new Secretary of Defense, recently expressed much the same frustration in remarks delivered in Brussels. Recently, President Donald Trump went even further warning that unless the allies paid up, America might reduce its commitment.
The EU and Japan have big plans to intensify and institutionalize cooperation in international politics and security. A bilateral agreement, through which such increased and institutionalized cooperation is envisioned to take place is the EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA). The SPA will cover cooperation in regional and global politics and security and is envisioned to give the e.g. current EU-Japan ad-hoc on the ground non-military security cooperation an institutional framework.